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R&D alliance is a multifaceted phenomenon, in which various socio-technological 
mechanisms operate in the interaction of partner fi rms. This dissertation is 
composed of three studies to shed light on different dimensions of fi rms’ resources 
and performance in different forms of R&D collaborations. These studies consider 
(1) how the partner fi rms differences with respect to different dimensions of their 
knowledge bases infl uence inter-fi rm learning in dyadic R&D alliances, (2) how the 
partner fi rm differences in their resources across locales infl uence the multi-partner 
alliance performances at both alliance and fi rm levels, and (3) how fi rms leverage R&D 
collaboration to navigate the dynamics of technology selection during technology 
change. The fi ndings of these studies tie together to the extent that they clarify the 
complex dynamics that exist between individual fi rms and their alliance partners in 
order to realize individual and joint value. In general, this dissertation contributes to 
the strategy and technology management literature by elucidating the less-explored 
dimensions of the fi rm’s resources and performance in R&D collaborations. 
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then man flew. Life is that which can hold a purpose for three thousand years and never yield. 
The individual fails, but life succeeds. The individual dies, but life, tireless and 
undiscourageable, goes on, wondering, longing, planning, trying, mounting, attaining, longing” 
(Durant, 1934; p. 621-622).
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The “Information Age” has dramatically changed the competitive landscape. 
Technological knowledge has replaced capital goods as the main source of competitive 
advantage, and technological innovations have become the game changers that frequently 
punctuated the dominant practices of industries. Dealing with novel problems in this uncertain 
and fast changing environment has made firms more dependent to each other. Firms engage 
more frequently in different forms of interorganizational relationships (IOR) to share the cost 
and risk of their problem-solving activities. In particular, inter-firm R&D collaborations play 
an important role during technology change, when new technologies compete with each other 
as well as with the existing technology and the outcome of these technological battles is 
unknown ex ante.  
Interorganizational research has investigated the attributes of the firms’ resources as a 
crucial factor in the formation (Yayavaram et al., 2018), the choice of governance mode or 
organization (Oxley & Sampson, 2004), and the performance of different forms of R&D 
collaborations such as bilateral alliances (Nooteboom et al., 2007; Sampson, 2007) and 
multilateral alliances (Lavie, 2007; Olk & Young, 1997). It has underlined a fundamental 
contradiction between the diversity and utilizability of knowledge resources in R&D alliances: 
the difference between the firms’ knowledge increases the value creation opportunities but 
reduces their capabilities to utilize these opportunities (Inkpen, 2005; Inkpen & Tsang, 2007). 
Alliance is a multifaceted phenomenon. Firms are engaged in alliances with different types of 
resources and for different purposes. However, while prior research has greatly contributed to 
our understanding of this contradiction, it has mainly taken knowledge resources in a generic 
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form and overlooked the different dimensions or loci of knowledge. Therefore, our knowledge 
about firm’s different knowledge resources in R&D alliances and their performance 
consequences has remained relatively limited. Furthermore, the current research has mainly 
focused on one dimension of R&D alliance performance, namely innovative performance, 
overlooking the other performance implications of R&D alliances especially in orchestrating 
industrial actors in the selection of new technology during technological change.  
This dissertation attempts to improve the understanding of multidimensionality of 
firms’ resources and performance in R&D collaboration. It aims to provide insight into how 
the differences between partner firm’s resources along different dimensions of partner firms’ 
resources influence the inventive performance of R&D alliances, and how firms can leverage 
R&D alliances to influence the technology selection processes during the technology change.   
  This dissertation providea theoretical explanation and empirical evidence to address 
these under-researched yet theoretically and managerially important aspects of R&D 
collaboration. Specifically, the three essays that constitute the main body of the dissertation 
consider respectively: (1) How the partner firms differences with respect to different 
dimensions of their knowledge bases influence inter-firm learning in dyadic R&D alliances, 
(2) How the partner firm differences in their resources across locales influence the multi-
partner alliance performances at both alliance and firm levels, and (3) How firms leverage 
R&D collaboration to navigate the dynamics of technology selection during technology 
change.     
Cognitive Distance and Inter-firm Learning in R&D Alliances  
In the first essay (Chapter 2), I examine the performance consequence of difference 
between firms’ knowledge bases in R&D alliances. Past research has found the fundamental 
contradiction between potential access to new knowledge and absorptive capacity alongside 
5 
 
knowledge distance. While knowledge access increases with knowledge distance, firm’s 
absorptive capacity decreases with knowledge distance; the interplay between these two 
contradictory mechanisms yields an inverted U-shape relation between knowledge distance and 
alliance performance hypothesized in this literature. However, prior research has only focused 
on one attribute of firm’s knowledge base, that is, knowledge domain that addresses the 
different areas within which firms have accumulated knowledge over time. Another important 
attribute of firm’s knowledge base has been overlooked, the between-domain knowledge or the 
knowledge that firms use to employ their knowledge domains together, namely knowledge 
architecture.  
In this study, I revisit this approach. I employ the notion of cognitive distance to address 
the difference between firms’ knowledge bases. Cognitive distance represents the difference 
between the firm’s understanding of their environment as well as their problem solving 
approaches (Nooteboom, 2000). I argue that firm’s cognition is a function of not only its 
knowledge in different domains, but also the way that it utilizes these knowledge domains 
together, so I extend the notion of cognitive distance based on two dimensions: knowledge 
domain and knowledge architecture. I examine the impact of cognitive distance alongside each 
of these dimensions on inter-firm learning as one of the main proxies of R&D alliance 
performance.  
I concur with the prior literature findings that absorptive capacity decreases with 
knowledge domain distance, but I posit that knowledge access does not significantly changes 
with knowledge domain distance, as the R&D alliance does not provide enough space to access 
new knowledge domains. I argue that partner firms mainly learn from the distinct ways that 
they use their knowledge to understand and solve their common problem, rather than the 
difference of firms’ knowledge domains. Therefore, I theorize that the potential access to new 
knowledge increases with knowledge architecture distance, interacting with decreasing firm’s 
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absorptive capacity, and hypothesize an inverted U-shape relation between knowledge 
architecture distance and inter-firm learning. 
 Moreover, I explicitly model firm-level absorptive capacity as relevant moderators, 
whereas the current approach in the literature lumps together absorptive capacity and 
knowledge accessibility into a function of distance between firms, leaving out the firm’s in-
house knowledge resources that form a very large part of its absorptive capacity. I examine 
how a firm’s absorptive capacity alongside each knowledge dimension conditions the relation 
between cognitive distance and inter-firm learning. I hypothesize that the span of firm’s 
knowledge domains, namely firm’s knowledge breadth, alleviates the negative effect of 
knowledge domain distance on inter-firm learning. In addition, the malleability of firm’s 
knowledge architecture, namely firm’s knowledge decomposability, increases the firm’s 
capacity to benefit from higher levels of knowledge architecture distance in R&D alliances. 
Multi-Partner R&D Alliance Diversity and Performance 
In the second essay (Chapter 3), I examine the performance consequences of different 
dimensions of multipartner alliance diversity. Most researchers have mainly examined the 
performance consequence of within-firm resources and fallen short to address the ex-
boundaries resources that firms share in their alliances. However, MPAs as a multifaceted 
phenomenon cannot be simply explained only in this single dimension, as participating firms 
join MPAs with different attributes in terms of their internal resources and capabilities, their 
relational resources with their counterparts in MPA, and their status in the global alliance 
network. In addition, this stream of research has not distinguished and separately examined 
performance at the alliance level and the firm level, assuming that what is created at the alliance 
level can be proportionally appropriated at the firm level.  
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In this study, I reconceptualize multi-partner alliance (MPA) diversity based on the 
locus of the firm’s resources and empirically examine their performance consequences at both 
alliance and firm levels. I dimensionalize the MPA diversity construct with respect to the 
resources that firms share in their alliance and that are located within the firms, between the 
firms, and across the global network of firms, respectively. I identify three dimensions of MPA 
diversity: ‘partner variety’ to address the diversity of within-firm resources, ‘relational 
separation’ to address the diversity of between-firm resources (i.e., prior tie strength), and 
‘status disparity’ to address the diversity of network resources (i.e., status). I separately 
examine the performance consequence of each dimension at the alliance level as well as the 
firm level. 
I indicate the fundamental contradiction between the diversity and utilizability of 
resources in each dimension and argue that diversity in each of these dimensions has an 
inverted U-shaped relation with MPA performance, but these relations at the firm level are not 
aligned with the MPA level. Partner variety provides the MPA with more opportunities and 
resources to achieve its intended goal, but as the MPA’s diversity in this dimension exceeds a 
certain point, MPAs’ ability to exploit these opportunities sharply decreases. However, partner 
firms with narrower knowledge breadth do not proportionally benefit from partner variety in 
either case as much as their counterparts with broader knowledge do. Likewise, moderate 
relational separation among partner firms benefit MPAs the most, as partner firms may learn 
from novel information and knowledge from their less familiar partners, but excessive 
relational separation leads to dividedness in the MPA and hurts the alliance performance. 
Nevertheless, partner firms with a brokerage role in divided partnerships can extract a higher 
share of created value at the cost of their partners. Finally, while status disparity may ease 
coordination via higher status firms to a certain level, the inequality across an MPA with high 
disparity can disturb the required transparent multilateral interaction for efficient collaboration 
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among the alliance partners, exerting a negative effect on MPA performance. However, partner 
firms with a higher status in the global alliance network can extract a higher share of created 
value at the cost of their low-status partners. 
Leveraging R&D Collaborations to Navigate Technology Change  
In the third essay (Chapter 4), I take a qualitative approach to study the socio-
technological performance of collaborative R&D activities over the course of technological 
change. Researchers have mainly showed interest in general antecedents and consequences of 
R&D alliances in their studies, so they mainly wash out the other influential factors existing in 
social and environmental contexts of alliances. As the result, we know less, for example, about 
how R&D collaborations assist firms to manage the course of technological change. We 
specifically know less about how firms may leverage from the underlying socio-technological 
mechanisms of their alliances to influence the socio-technological mechanisms that drive the 
technology selection procedures during technology change.  
In this study, I take a real option theory perspective to investigate how successful firms 
take advantage of R&D collaborations to probe different technological options over the course 
of technological change. Moreover, how they timely make commitment to and abandon their 
technological options by the formation and termination of their R&D collaborations to attain 
enough legitimacy and endorsement to take the lead in the emerging technologies.  
As a whole, the dissertation advances our understanding of various socio-technological 
mechanisms that operate in R&D collaborations and explain multiple aspects of this complex 
phenomenon. I also hope that this dissertation will inspire new research on the other 
performance implications of technological-based interorganizational relations, so we can better 




COGNITIVE DISTANCE DIMENSIONS AND INTER-FIRM LEARNING:                                                                              
KNOWLEDGE DOMAIN AND KNOWLEDGE ARCHITECTURE DISTANCE 
ABSTRACT 
Extant research has employed a rather narrow concept of cognitive distance in inter-
firm learning as consisting of knowledge-domain distance only. We widen this approach by 
conceptualizing cognitive distance based on two dimensions: knowledge domain distance and 
knowledge architecture distance. We theorize how inter-firm learning in R&D alliances varies 
along each dimension of cognitive distance. We test our theory on a sample of 278 dyadic R&D 
alliances in the semiconductor industry, identifying the technological scope of each alliance 
through content analysis. Our findings contradict the stylized inverted U-shape association 
between knowledge domain distance and firm learning conjectured in the literature, and show 
a negative association which is, however, attenuated by firm’s knowledge breadth. We also 
find that firm learning maximizes at an optimal level of knowledge architecture distance, and 
this optimal level is a function of firm’s knowledge decomposability.  





Facing novel problems in dynamic environments, firms may choose R&D alliance to 
improve the performance of their inventive search (Caner et al., 2017; Rosenkopf & Almeida, 
2003; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Hagedoorn, 1993). In this joint effort, firms share and apply 
their distinct knowledge to execute their alliance tasks. That makes R&D alliances a platform 
on which firms can learn from each other, provided that they have the required absorptive 
capacity to recognize and assimilate new knowledge (Inkpen, 2005; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; 
Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).  
Learning research poses a contradiction between the antecedents of inter-firm learning 
in R&D alliances. On one hand, the firms’ access to new knowledge is theoretically higher 
when their knowledge bases are more different. On the other hand, their absorptive capacity to 
make use of new knowledge is higher when their knowledge bases are more similar (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Mowery et al., 1996; Inkpen, 2005; Grant & Baden-
Fuller, 2004). Addressing this contradiction, researchers have employed the notion of cognitive 
distance to conceptualize and operationalize between-firm knowledge difference (Nooteboom 
et al., 2007; Gilsing et al., 2008). Cognitive distance between two firms represents the 
difference between their understandings of the environment and their approaches in their 
inventive search based on their distinct prior knowledge and experience (Nooteboom, 2000). 
Therefore, access to new knowledge in R&D alliances increases with cognitive distance 
between firms, but at the same time firm’s absorptive capacity to acquire this knowledge 
decreases, suggesting the existence of an optimal level of between-firm cognitive difference.   
However, this stream of research conceptualizes and operationalizes cognitive distance 
on one basis, knowledge domain distance. Knowledge domains represent one attribute of a 
firm’s knowledge base: the categories of knowledge that a firm uses to comprehend its 
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environment and solve its problems. Nevertheless, it does not demonstrate how a firm maps its 
observation into these categories or makes use of them to solve its problem. In other words, it 
does not address the inter-domain links that form the architecture of a firm’s knowledge base 
(Yayavaram & Ahuja, 2008). Ironically, the organizational learning literature suggests that the 
firm’s cognitive map that serves a firm to understand its environment and solve its problems is 
mainly a function of knowledge architecture or the way that knowledge domains are connected 
and combined, rather than knowledge domains per se (Nooteboom, 2000; Yayavaram & Ahuja, 
2008; Fleming & Sorenson, 2001; Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000).        
In this study, we take a closer look into inter-firm learning mechanisms in alliances by 
reconceptualizing cognitive distance based on two distinct dimensions, knowledge domain and 
knowledge architecture. We elaborate on the influence of each dimension into underlying 
mechanisms of inter-firm learning and examine whether both dimensions give rise to the 
stylized inverted-U shape hypothesized in the literature, or that they exert differential 
influences. With respect to the knowledge domain dimension, we argue that R&D alliance is 
not a proper platform for inter-firm learning in this dimension. On one hand, firms cannot 
acquire knowledge in domains that they do not have developed the required absorptive 
capacity. On the other hand, the adequate access and time for the required developments is 
generally beyond the scope and capacity of alliance agreements. Thus, we hypothesize that 
knowledge domain distance and inter-firm learning have a negative relation. With respect to 
the knowledge architecture dimension, we posit that R&D alliance is a proper platform in 
which firms can learn from the distinct ways that they apply their knowledge domains to 
execute alliance task. However, while access to new knowledge increases with knowledge 
architecture distance, absorptive capacity decreases at the same time, yielding an inverted U-
shape relation between knowledge architecture distance and inter-firm learning. Thus, the 
hypothesized relation in the literature holds in this dimension.  
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Moreover, we submit that considering absorptive capacity as subsumed into cognitive 
distance at the alliance level neglects within-firm absorptive capacity. We look into within-
firm absorptive capacity alongside each knowledge dimension to have a separate and deeper 
understanding of the absorptive capacity mechanisms and to examine empirically how it 
interacts with cognitive distance to influence inter-firm learning. We argue that the span of 
firm’s knowledge domains, namely firm’s knowledge breadth, and the malleability of firm’s 
knowledge architecture, namely firm’s knowledge decomposability, represents two distinct 
dimensions of firm’s absorptive capacity. We hypothesize that firm’s knowledge breadth 
provides more chance for the firm to make use of knowledge domain distance in R&D alliances 
and alleviates the negative effect of knowledge domain distance on inter-firm learning. In 
addition, firm’s knowledge decomposability increases the firm’s capacity to benefit from 
higher levels of knowledge architecture distance in R&D alliances. 
We test our theory on a sample of 278 R&D alliances in the semiconductor industry 
from 1990 to 2002. We analyze the content of each alliance agreement to identify the 
technological scope of each alliance and map it onto relevant patent sub-classes. Prior research 
includes indiscriminately the whole knowledge bases of two firms when operationalizing 
cognitive distance in inter-firm learning. However, an R&D alliance is an agreement with 
limited technological scope within which firms share their knowledge (Inkpen & Tsang, 2007; 
Khanna, 1998; Khanna et al., 1998). For example, Hitachi, Ltd. and Texas Instruments (TI) 
Inc. formed an R&D alliance in 1991 to collaborate in the joint development of 256-megabit 
dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) chips. It is unlikely that these two large leading 
competitors share their knowledge and expertise in any domains except those relevant to the 
development and application of DRAM. Therefore, the real impact of the within-scope distance 
may be exaggerated, deflated, or otherwise distorted in the overall distance measure. We take 
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technological scope of R&D alliances into account to avoid this issue and substantially reduce 
noise in our cognitive distance measures. 
Our results show that knowledge domain distance between firms has a negative effect 
on firm learning, though firm’s knowledge breadth alleviates this negative effect. In addition, 
our results show that an optimal level of knowledge architecture distance maximizes firm 
learning, and this optimal level is higher for firms with a more decomposable knowledge base 
(i.e., the optimal level increases and shifts to the right with knowledge decomposability).  
Our study offers a fresh insight into the antecedents of firm learning in alliances and 
extend the prior findings. We extend and reconceptualize cognitive distance based on two 
dimensions: knowledge domain distance and knowledge architecture distance. This approach 
allows us to fully utilize this concept to examine the boundaries of inter-firm learning in R&D 
alliances. Our findings show that the two distinct dimensions of cognitive distance are not both 
associated with inter-firm learning in an inverted-U shape as suggested in the literature. In other 
words, our findings show that the stylized inverted-U shape hypothesized in literature is 
theoretically sound, but it holds on the other undertheorized dimension of cognitive distance, 
knowledge architecture distance, rather than knowledge domain distance. These findings 
suggest that firm learning maximizes in R&D alliances in which firms have an intermediate 
knowledge architecture distance and a small knowledge domain distance. Taken together, these 
findings redefine the boundaries of inter-firm learning in R&D alliances and suggest R&D 
alliances as a proper vehicle for renewing knowledge architecture rather than acquiring 
knowledge in less familiar domains. This study also offers a novel insight into the construct of 
absorptive capacity. We employ two dimensions of absorptive capacity alongside each 
dimension of cognitive distance. Knowledge breadth represents the breadth of a firm’s 
knowledge base or knowledge domains with which a firm comprehends its environment and 
acquire relevant knowledge. Knowledge decomposability represents the capacity of a firm to 
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change the architecture of its knowledge base by adding new links to or altering the existing 
ones between its knowledge domains. Finally, our approach in identifying the technological 
scope of an alliance agreement may encourage future research in alliances, M&A, and other 
forms of inter-firm relations to identify and consider the technological scope of such 
agreements.  
BACKGROUND: INTER-FIRM LEARNING IN R&D ALLIANCES 
Strategic management literature underscores R&D alliances as a generic external 
inventive search and knowledge sourcing strategy (Hagedoorn, 1993; Bierly & Chakrabarti, 
1996; Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002). Through their joint search process, firms share their 
distinct knowledge to execute alliance tasks within the scope of the agreement, so they get 
access to new knowledge that would be otherwise inaccessible (Doz & Hamel, 1998; Inkpen, 
2000; Khanna et al., 1998; Kogut, 1988). Firms may use this opportunity to learn from their 
alliance partners not only to execute alliance tasks, but also to enhance their own knowledge 
to operate in areas unrelated to the alliance activities (Inkpen & Tsang, 2007; Sampson, 2007).   
There is a paradox (Inkpen, 2005), however, in inter-firm learning. On one hand, 
significant knowledge distance between firms provides firms with access to new knowledge 
beyond the firm's knowledge boundaries (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001), implying that the 
greater the differences between firms, the greater the chance of learning. On the other hand, 
unrelated knowledge may have limited value, as the recipient firm cannot efficiently acquire 
and recombine new knowledge with existing one without the required absorptive capacity 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004; Inkpen, 2000; Mowery et al., 1996).  
Dealing with this paradox, extant research considers competing arguments for the 
advantages and disadvantages of knowledge distance between firms. Accordingly, as cognitive 
distance between firms in R&D alliances increases, partner firms’ access to new knowledge as 
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an advantage for inventive search and inter-firm learning increases, but at the same time, 
mutual understanding and common knowledge background required to make use of it decrease. 
As a function of these two interacting latent linear mechanisms, an inverted U-shape relation 
between cognitive distance and firm learning is proposed. Advantages dominate disadvantages 
up to a certain level of cognitive distance, such that cognitive distance is positively associated 
with firm learning in alliance and its inventive performance; beyond this level, however, 
disadvantages dominate advantages, driving a negative relation between cognitive distance and 
firm learning. These studies conceptualize and operationalize cognitive distance as 
technological diversity (Sampson, 2007), technological distance (Gilsing et al., 2008), and 
cognitive distance per se (Nooteboom et al., 2007), and provide evidence of an optimal level 
of cognitive distance between firms. For example, Nooteboom et al. (2007) delineates that 
novelty value and absorptive capacity are two contradictory factors that determine the influence 
of cognitive distance. Their findings show that cognitive distance between firms has an inverted 
U-shape relation to firm inventive performance in alliances, as an indicator of firm learning.  
This stream of research contributes greatly to our understanding of inter-firm learning, 
but not without limitations. It conceptualizes cognitive distance by a single variable of 
knowledge domain distance, leaving out the important dimension of knowledge architecture 
distance. In addition, it uses absorptive capacity only as a dyadic level mechanism and a 
function of cognitive distance between two firms, so it does not fully address the absorptive 
capacity of firms that influences their learnings. Finally, it overlooks the alliance scope in the 
conceptualization and operationalization of cognitive distance and inter-firm learning in R&D 
alliances. 
In this study, we expand this stream of literature. We reconceptualize cognitive distance 
at the alliance level based on two attributes of knowledge base, namely knowledge domain 
distance and knowledge architecture distance. We also identify two firm-level moderators, 
16 
 
namely knowledge breadth and knowledge decomposability, that allow us to have a separate 
and potentially deeper peek into the absorptive capacity mechanism and to examine empirically 
how it interacts with cognitive distance to influence inter-firm learning. Finally, we take the 
scope of alliance into account in both of our theoretical and empirical analyses, which has been 
overlooked so far.   
COGNITIVE DISTANCE AND INTER-FIRM LEARNING IN ALLIANCES 
In a continuous learning loop, firms use their cognition, based on their accumulated 
knowledge in their past experience, to drive their inventive search, which in turn adds a new 
experience to prior knowledge and adjusts the cognition (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000). New 
experiences and the way that firms relate them to prior experiences reshape the firm’s 
knowledge base. Therefore, two dimensions characterize the firm’s knowledge base: the 
knowledge domains in which different content of a firm’s knowledge can be categorized, and 
the links that connect these knowledge domains together.    
In an R&D alliance, firms share their accumulated knowledge within the scope of the 
agreement to drive their joint inventive search; this collaboration also provides them with a 
unique learning opportunity (Doz & Hamel, 1998; Inkpen, 2000; Khanna et al., 1998; Kogut, 
1988). For example, Hitachi, Ltd. and Texas Instruments (TI) Inc. formed an R&D alliance in 
1992 to collaborate in the joint development of 256-megabit dynamic random-access memory 
(DRAM) chips. According to their alliance agreement, the participants planned to work 
together on all phases except actual production, which each was to undertake separately. First, 
we expect that these two large companies get involved in this alliance with knowledge and 
expertise relevant to the development and application of DRAM; it is indeed unlikely that 
Hitachi shares its knowledge in non-electric control systems or vehicle brake systems, or TI 
shares its expertise in producing chips for smart control of tire air pressure. Accordingly, our 
17 
 
theoretical development and empirical analysis in this study will be focused on firms’ 
technological knowledge that is relevant and applicable to the technological scope of alliances. 
It includes knowledge that directly addresses the technological scope of alliances, such as 
Hitachi and TI’s knowledge in design and production of volatile memory (G11C1), and 
associated knowledge in closely connected areas, such as Hitachi’s experience to apply its 
knowledge in memory in telecommunication systems (H04L), or TI’s effort in utilizing 
magnetic measuring techniques in development of volatile memories (G01R). Once this scope 
is established, the relevant cognitive distance between firms can be defined over the knowledge 
that they share in alliances.  
Looking at Hitachi and TI’s knowledge domains in Fig.1, while Hitachi has used its 
knowledge of memory with knowledge in telecommunication systems (H04L) in specific 
cases, TI’s knowledge profile does not show this record, and while TI uses its memory 
knowledge with magnetic measurement technology in some cases, this expertise is absent in 
Hitachi’ profile. Considering the links that form their knowledge architecture, Hitachi and TI 
both naturally use their knowledge in volatile memory with strong links to CMOS technology 
(H01L), electric digital processing (G06F), and Pulse techniques (H03K). Nevertheless, the 
link between volatile memory knowledge and CMOS technology is stronger in TI, which 
implies TI has more experience in using CMOS technology in producing volatile memories 
like DRAM. On the other side, Hitachi’s knowledge profile shows a stronger link between 
volatile memory and pulse techniques, which implies Hitachi has superior expertise in DRAM 
clock design.  
 
 
1 CPC (Cooperative Patent Classification) is used to denote the technological knowledge domain of 
each company in this example and its corresponding figure. More explanation about this classification can be 
found in the Method section.  
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FIGURE 1: An excerpt of knowledge structure of Hitachi (left) and Texas Instrument (right) 
on 1991. The size of the node represents the level of knowledge that a firm possesses in the 
corresponding domains. The ties between the domains represents the inter-domain links. The 
thickness of the tie indicates the strength of links between the two domains. The size of the 
nodes and thickness of ties shown in the figure are for illustrative purposes. The figure just 
includes a selection of knowledge domains that are used in association with knowledge scope 
















G01R: Magnetic measuring techniques
G06F: Electric digital processing 
G11C: Design and production of volatile memory
H01L: CMOS technology 
H03K: Pulse techniques 
H04L: Telecommunication Systems  
In the following, we examine the performance consequence of both dimensions of 
cognitive distance in R&D alliances, and in each dimension, we investigate the moderating 
effect of firm’s absorptive capacity. For example, we examine TI’s learning from Hitachi along 
their knowledge domain distance, such as the exposure to Hitachi’s knowledge in 
telecommunication, new to TI, or to its profound knowledge in electric digital processing, less 
rich in TI. Then, we investigate how TI’s knowledge breadth in the semiconductor industry 
conditions its learning from Hitachi. We also examine TI’s learning from Hitachi along their 
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knowledge architecture distance, such as Hitachi’s higher expertise in using pulse techniques 
in volatile memory design. Then, we investigate how the TI’ knowledge decomposability or its 
malleability in changing its knowledge architecture affects its benefit from this opportunity.  
Knowledge Domain Distance 
Extant research mainly uses knowledge domain distance to theorize and operationalize 
cognitive distance and predict an inverted-U shape relationship between it and firm learning in 
alliances. Accordingly, access to new knowledge domains increases with knowledge domain 
distance, but the required absorptive capacity to utilize this new knowledge decreases at the 
same time and outweighs its benefits after a certain point (Nooteboom et al., 2007; Sampson, 
2007). In contrast, we argue that the acquisition of knowledge in less familiar or new domains 
is usually beyond the scope and capacity of R&D alliances, because the benefits of access to 
new knowledge domain are dampened by escalating recombination uncertainty, circumscribed 
by an alliance’s limited scope and time, and discounted by alliance firms that need to specialize.  
First, accessing knowledge in new domains may potentially provide the chance of 
adding novel combinations to a firm’s knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 1992), but each new 
knowledge domain exponentially increases the number of possible combinations with multiple 
existing domains. Thus, the chance of finding a valuable combination actually decreases as 
recombination uncertainty increases (Fleming, 2001; Fleming & Sorenson, 2001). In addition, 
the chance of partner firms to pool their knowledge to share risk and enjoy economies of scale 
in their joint R&D efforts decreases when the knowledge distance increases (Yayavaram et al., 
2018). Second, alliance agreements have limited scope and time, and firms deploy systematic 
safeguarding mechanisms to limit unintended knowledge transfer. Hence, R&D alliances do 
not usually provide enough space for the acquisition and combination of new knowledge 
domains (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004; Inkpen, 2000; Inkpen & Tsang, 2007). Finally, firms 
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may still jointly use their complementary knowledge to address their common problem, without 
actually learning from each other, when their alliance tasks mainly involve pooled or sequential 
interdependence tasks, rather than reciprocal interdependence (Kavusan et al., 2016; Mowery 
et al., 1996; Gulati & Singh, 1998). In this case, firms focus their efforts to specialize in their 
own technological domains to develop complementary knowledge toward a joint outcome 
(Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Schilling, 2000), rather than learning from their counterpart’s 
complementary knowledge.  
With respect to firm’s absorptive capacity, firms require prior knowledge and 
appropriate communication channels across knowledge domains to decompose, assimilate, and 
associate new knowledge with existing ones (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Kogut & Zander, 
1992). A firm’s knowledge is embedded in organizational elements such as its members, 
technological components, and tasks as well as the various subnetworks or communication 
channels formed by combining or crossing these elements (J. E. McGrath & Argote, 2001; 
Argote & Ingram, 2000, p. 153). Therefore, learning from new domains requires knowledge 
acquisition from all these elements and subnetworks, and combination of acquired knowledge 
with the existing embedded knowledge in the firm (Argote & Ingram, 2000). Generally, these 
developments take more time than limited duration of alliances. Thus, as the knowledge 
domain distance increases, the difficulty of acquisition and combination of knowledge in new 
domains exponentially increases; particularly, when firms aim to apply this new knowledge in 
a new context. In sum, as the knowledge domain distance between firms in R&D alliances 
increases, the firm’s chance to develop the required in-house capabilities to absorb new 
knowledge significantly decreases. 
Recalling the above-mentioned example, we expect that not only TI cannot acquire and 
utilize telecommunication technology from Hitachi in their alliances, but also having this new 
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knowledge may impede TI’s learning from Hitachi’s expertise within the technological scope 
of the alliance, volatile memory.  
Hypothesis 1: Knowledge domain distance in R&D alliances has a negative effect on 
firm learning in R&D alliances. 
The Moderating Effect of Firm’s Knowledge Breadth 
Although knowledge domain distance has a negative effect on firm learning, firms with 
a broader knowledge breadth may be less negatively influenced. Broad knowledge across 
different technological domains increases the chance of finding novel association and links 
between new and existing knowledge domains, so that recognition and assimilation of new 
knowledge will be easier (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). In addition, experience of engaging in 
dispersed inventive searches and experiment with unknown combinations strengthen these 
firms’ capabilities to deal with recombination of new knowledge (Carnabuci & Operti, 2013; 
Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000). 
Moreover, the practice of venturing with the creation and acquisition of new knowledge 
across different knowledge domains helps firms to develop inter-domain communication 
channels that facilitate the process of decomposition, transfer, and recombination of new 
knowledge (Caner et al., 2017; Zahra & George, 2002). This practice also strengthens the 
required organizational culture and structure to push firms beyond their knowledge boundaries 
(Argyres & Silverman, 2004; Carnabuci & Operti, 2013; Laursen & Salter, 2006).  
All these factors ease the acquisition and integration of new knowledge, so as to reduce 
the negative effect of knowledge domain distance on firm learning in alliances.  
Hypothesis 2: The negative effect of knowledge domain distance on firm learning in 
R&D alliances is weakened by firm's knowledge breadth.   
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Knowledge Architecture Distance 
Knowledge architecture reveals how a firm makes use of its different knowledge 
domains together: which domains of knowledge are most likely to work well together and 
conversely, which ones are unrelated to each other and cannot be considered jointly 
(Yayavaram & Ahuja, 2008). In other words, knowledge architecture shapes the cognitive map, 
or the way that firms approach and formulate their problems and orient their inventive search 
(Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Levinthal, 1997; Simon, 1983). Given the idiosyncratic path of 
search processes and knowledge development in firms, each firm has a distinct knowledge 
architecture that can be the source of invention in an alliance.  
Looking at the same problem from different perspectives in joint problem-solving 
activities allow firms to learn from the distinct patterns and new links with which they connect 
their knowledge domains and revisit their developed communication channels and filters within 
or across their organizational elements that form these patterns (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Kok 
et al., 2020). Learning from new patterns is not limited to knowing about the unexplored links 
between knowledge domains, but also entails awareness of the failed links that have been 
already tried in the development path of firms. Therefore, firms can use their distinct 
knowledge architecture to reduce iterations of trial and errors in their knowledge 
reconfigurations, and to adjust their cognitive maps in their inventive searches.  
However, as architectural distance increases, the capability of firms to acquire and 
utilize this knowledge decreases. Significant difference in firms’ cognitive maps harms the 
required mutual understanding to appreciate and combine different perspectives in 
collaborations (Nooteboom et al., 2007). Moreover, facing a disparate knowledge architecture 
with many new links may handicap firms in terms of recognizing and assimilating the new 
patterns that embedded in the subnetworks or communication channels across organizational 
elements (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Argote & Ingram, 2000). 
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Therefore, as knowledge architecture distance increases, the difficulty of its utilization 
increases in a way that after a certain point it outweighs its learning benefits.      
Hypothesis 3: Knowledge architecture distance in R&D alliances has a curvilinear 
(inverted U-shape) effect on firm learning in alliances such that moderate distance 
yields maximum learning. 
The Moderating Effect of Firm’s Knowledge Decomposability   
To benefit from knowledge architecture distance, firms should have the capability to 
make changes in their knowledge architectures. Extant research shows that the degree of 
decomposability of a firm’s knowledge base, or knowledge decomposability in short, addresses 
its capacity for change or “malleability” in knowledge architecture (Yayavaram & Ahuja, 2008; 
Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Schilling, 2000; Simon, 1962). Knowledge decomposability indicates 
the extent to which knowledge architecture of a firm can be divided into clusters of domains. 
When links are distributed evenly across knowledge domains, identifying and decomposing 
clusters are difficult. However, when the distribution varies, clusters of highly connected 
knowledge domains which are loosely connected with each other appear, making knowledge 
architecture decomposable (Yayavaram & Ahuja, 2008; Nickerson & Zenger, 2004; Simon, 
1962).       
Firm’s knowledge decomposability conditions the limit to which firms can take 
advantage of accessible knowledge architecture in R&D alliances. Firms with low knowledge 
decomposability, or in other words highly integrated knowledge, have limited malleability (i.e., 
capacity for change). Even a minor change requires significant reshuffling across the whole 
knowledge structure, as it is densely interconnected (Yayavaram & Ahuja, 2008). Moreover, 
the repetitive application of the same pattern over time limits the capability of firms to think of 
new patterns (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Levinthal & March, 1993). However, as knowledge 
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decomposability increases, the malleability increases. The loose connections between and tight 
connections within knowledge clusters give firms enough background to recognize and 
assimilate other unexplored links and distinct patterns, and at the same time they leave enough 
space in the knowledge architecture to receive new links or accept the changes.  
Therefore, as knowledge decomposability increases, the firm’s capability to absorb and 
benefit from greater knowledge architecture distance increases.  
Hypothesis 4: As firm's knowledge decomposability increases, the turning point of the 
inverted-U shape relation between knowledge architecture distance and firm learning 
in R&D alliances shifts to the right; that is, firms with a higher knowledge 
decomposability can benefit from greater knowledge architecture distance in alliances. 









Empirical Design and Data 
 Empirical Design. We tested our theory in the context of R&D alliances in the 




















this industry are regularly involved in the practice of patenting innovations, and its 
heterogeneous population provides considerable variations to test the hypotheses (Stuart, 
2000). Firms in this industry also actively engage in alliances to address their rapidly changing 
competitive environment (Hagedoorn, 2002; Schilling, 2015).  
Data. We collected alliance data from the JV & Alliance section of the SDC Platinum 
database. We found 414 R&D dyadic alliances that formed between 1990 and 2002 in the 
semiconductor industry, considering the SIC-Primary (i.e., SICP) flag of alliances. We chose 
this period to develop a balanced sample of observations over a complete circle of the alliance 
trend in this industry. The semiconductor industry has observed a boom in the formation of 
R&D alliances in the first half of this period, as they faced significant technological shocks and 
technological transitions, but a significant decrease in the second half after the emergence of 
Dot-com bubble crisis (Brown & Linden, 2011; Hagedoorn, 2002; Schilling, 2015; Zirulia, 
2009). We identified 346 dyadic R&D alliances after re-checking the alliance status (i.e., 
completion), and removing alliances with undisclosed partners. We also compared the SDC 
information with that in the FACTIVA dataset to check all information such as alliance 
announcement dates and enhance alliance descriptions. Finally, we tracked historical alliances 
(all types of alliances, including dyadic alliances) all the way back to the year 1985 in order to 
ensure sufficient coverage of active alliances for the required analysis in this study. 
We extracted the patents from the EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database 
(PATSTAT2). PATSTAT covers all registered patents in more than 100 patent offices that 
allows us to aggregate the registered patent at patent family level (DOCDB patent family) to 
cover all the relevant registered patents in different patent offices without over counting those 
 
 
2 PATSTAT Edition: 2017 Autumn; Classification Version: 2013. 
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registered in multiple offices. This database, as the NBER and the USPTO patent database, 
contains patent number, assignee name, filing year, and grant year, but not the CUSIP numbers 
(key identifier used in Compustat & the SDC databases) of the assignee firms, so matching of 
patents with identified firms in our sample is not straightforward. In addition, we used alliance 
data, rather than public semiconductor firms, as the starting point of our data collection, and 
we kept non-public firms in our sample to cover more R&D alliances and to improve the 
generalizability of our theory, but non-public firms do not have CUSIP which makes the 
matching procedure even more complicated.  
Therefore, we took significant care in matching our firm list and patent data. First, we 
used the company directory list, who-owns-whom information, in LexisNexis to identify all 
divisions, subsidiaries, and joint ventures of each firm at the level of parent firm in the sample. 
We then used different online sources to trace each firm’s history to account for name changes, 
division names, divestments, acquisitions, and joint ventures; and to obtain precise information 
also on the timing of these events. This process yielded a master list of entities that we used to 
identify all patents belonging to sample firms during the period of study. To match the 
corresponding patents to each firm, we first used the name-matching bridge between the 
NBER/USPTO patents and Compustat firms provided by Hall and colleagues (Hall et al., 
2001), in which patent assignee names are standardized and matched with firm names in 
Compustat. However, we could find patent information for only 226 partner firms out of 392 
partner firms3, and we could not determine whether the rest of the firms had no patents or had 
patents but did not appear in this database. In addition, our sample is not limited to the public 
firms, and includes 133 non-public firms which are not recorded in Compustat. Therefore, we 
 
 




wrote a name-matching program to get additional patents for both public and non-public firms 
in our database. The resulting collected patents were granted between 1987 and 2005 to our 
sample firms. Finally, we dropped 68 alliances of non-patenting firms, as it was not possible 
to develop both independent and dependent variable measures, so the final sample of our study 
consists of 278 R&D alliances.  
 As large firms may diversify in different industries and technologies, relying on all 
their patent data might be misleading in our analysis (Sampson, 2007). To this end, we did a 
content analysis of the technological description of each alliance agreement to determine its 
technological scope. We obtained the technological descriptions from the SDC and FACTIVA. 
Then, we followed the patent office procedure for examiners to match these descriptions to 
specific technology sub-classes under the Cooperative Patent Classification (CPC) scheme 
(Espacenet - Classification Search, 2019; Hunt et al., 2012; White, 2010; Devarakonda & 
Reuer, 2018)4. The CPC is a common classification system for patent documentation that 
integrates the USPTO (American system) and the EPO (European System) and classifies 
technologies in hierarchical nested levels, such as section, class, subclass, and so on (CPC, 
2019). In short, we made a brief, accurate summary of the technological description of each 
alliance, noted the key technical words, and searched for the synonyms. Then, we used the 
advanced search form in the EPO search engine, and search keywords and synonyms in the 
Title and Abstract fields to retrieve a list of the corresponding sub-classes. Finally, we retrieved 
the corresponding patent to each sub-class and reviewing their abstracts and top claims to check 
the relevancy of the patents to the technological scope of alliances (this procedure is explained 






examiner at the EPO office in The Hague in the Netherlands. Then we compared the results on 
a random sample of 50 alliances in our data with the same examiner as well as a commercial 
patent search engine5. The results were consistent in 45 alliances at the sub-class level and in 
all 50 alliances at the class-level.   
Measures  
We used patents to construct the firm’s knowledge base, the basis for our key measures. 
We followed the following procedure to reduce the common noise of patents in this process. 
First, we considered a three-year window in our study. We included those patents that their 
applications are filed in three years after the alliance formation for the post-alliance variable, a 
conservative choice based on trade-offs between the required time for firm learning in an 
alliance and recording such learning in the citations of subsequent patent applications, and the 
high rate of internal technology development within the firm. To consider the fast-changing 
technological knowledge in this industry and also to keep the balance between pre and post 
alliance variables, the same restriction was considered for the pre-alliance variables. Moreover, 
as the main CPC sub-class of each patent has been often co-listed with other CPC sub-classes, 
we followed Fleming and Sorenson (2001) and used this information to construct the firm’s 
knowledge base. 
We used the firm’s knowledge base to develop our measures at two levels: alliance 
level independent variables that address the distance of firms in alliances as well as firm 
learning from its partner, and firm-level moderators and control variables. For the sake of 
accuracy, we took different approaches at each level. For alliance-level independent variables, 
we took the technological scope of alliances into account. We selected all the patents that at 
 
 
5 Octamine patent search: https://app.octimine.com/ 
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least one of their assigned technology sub-classes (i.e., CPC sub-classes) matched to the 
identified scope of alliances. In this way, we take into account the firms’ knowledge that either 
directly addresses the technological scope of alliances, or closely associated with it. For the 
other firm-level variables, we followed Yayavaram and Ahuja (2008, p. 347) and Carnabucci 
and Operti (2013) by including all 56 sub-classes that are related to the semiconductor industry. 
Dependent Variable at the firm level. Firm learning was measured as the number of 
total citations that a firm made to its counterpart’s patents within the technological scope of the 
alliance within three years after the alliance formation, namely “firm’s post alliance cross-
citation”. This measure is extensively used to measure knowledge diffusion and learning (Jaffe 
et al., 1993; Mowery et al., 1996a; Roach & Cohen, 2013). The alliance agreement has limited 
scope, so attributing all cross-cited patents between firms to a single alliance is not 
representative, so we reduced the noise by counting those patents that cite the counterpart’s 
patents within the scope of the alliance. 
 Independent Variables at the alliance level. We used PATSTAT technology class data 
to identify the technological scope of each alliance and build our measures. Following Fleming 
(2001) and Fleming and Sorenson (2001), we considered the technology sub-classes assigned 
to patents as proxies for knowledge domains, and the co-listing of sub-classes as indicative of 
inter-domain links.  
For knowledge domain distance, we measured the angular distance between firms’ 
prior-alliance patents within the technological scope of alliances with respect to their 
technology sub-classes. The angular distance addresses the difference between the orientations 
of developed knowledge in different knowledge categories in firms. To this end, we first used 
Jaffe’s angular proximity measure (Jaffe, 1986), and then calculate the distance measure. We 
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indicated the technical position of a firm a in knowledge space as a vector of a firm’s 
knowledge in distinct knowledge categories: 
𝑓𝑎 = (𝑓𝑎1, … , 𝑓𝑎𝑘 , … , 𝑓𝑎𝐾)                                               (1) 
where 𝑓𝑎𝑘 is the fraction of firm a’s patent that are in patent sub-class k during the years t-3 to 
t-1. Angular proximity between two firms a and b, then, is the cosine of the angle between their 






                                                                 (2) 
and the angular distance is 𝐷𝑎𝑏 = 1 − 𝑆𝑎𝑏. 
To operationalize knowledge architecture distance, we followed Yayavaram et al. 
(2018). We first developed a link matrix that represents the inter-domain knowledge links that 
form the architecture of knowledge that each firm shares in accordance with the alliance scope. 
Second, we compared these link matrices. We use an example to illustrate this procedure. To 
calculate the knowledge architecture distance between Hitachi and TI in their R&D alliance to 
develop volatile memories, we first calculated the strength of the links between all the patent 
subclasses in Hitachi that are either in the scope of its alliance with the TI (i.e. G11C) or 
connected to G11C (i.e. G06F, H03K, H01L, H04L) (Fig.1). For example, we calculate the 
likelihood of having two patent subclasses like G11C and G06F co-listed in the Hitachi’s 
patents that indicates how much the corresponding knowledge to each of these sub-classes are 
used together compared to the other possible combinations. This yields a link matrix between 
all patent sub-classes, and represents the architecture of knowledge that Hitachi shares in its 
alliance with the TI. Thus, the strength of link between technology sub-classes j and k for the 






                                                  (3) 
Where 𝑛𝑗  is the number of firm a’s patents that are assigned to sub-class j but not sub-
class k, 𝑛𝑘 is the number of patents that are assigned to sub-class k but not sub-class j, and 𝑛𝑘𝑗 
is the number of patents that are assigned to both sub-classes. The link matrix L consisting of 
𝐿𝑎,𝑗−𝑘 for all pairs of domains represents the structure of the firm’s knowledge base 
(Yayavaram et al., 2018; Yayavaram & Ahuja, 2008).  
Second, we compared the knowledge structure or link matrices of these firms to 
calculate their knowledge architecture distance. We measured knowledge architecture distance 
as the sum of the absolute difference between the corresponding links to all technology sub-
class pairs that are common to both firms6.  
However, we calculated the strength of links between each patent sub-classes as the 
likelihood of having them co-listed in a patent, so the size and diversity of firm’s knowledge 
base can influence this measure (Yayavaram & Ahuja, 2008). In other words, firms with larger 
and more diverse knowledge base have more possibility in recombination of its knowledge 
domains, so the likelihood of having two sub-classes co-listed in a patent is naturally lower 
than a firm with smaller and less diverse knowledge base. To remove the effect of size and 
diversity of firms’ knowledge bases, we compare the percentile score of the strength of each 
link rather than their absolute value. To do so, we followed Yayavaram et al. (2018, p. 2288) 
and first use the number of patents (size) and the number of patent sub-classes to compute the 
 
 
6 In our data, we did not observe any R&D alliance in which firms did not have any patents in the 
scope of alliance. 
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percentile values of each link (i.e., 1st percentile, 2nd percentile, and so on, until 100th 
percentile) with the following power-law relationship: 
Log (percentile value) = constant+α × log (size of the firm’s knowledge base) + β × 
(the number of patent sub-classes)        (4) 
We then compare each firm’s link strength with the predicted values. Based on these 
comparisons, we then computed the percentile score p(𝐿𝑎,𝑗−𝑘) for each firm’s links. We 
measured Knowledge architecture distance as the weighted sum of the absolute difference in 
percentile scores between the two firms for all technology sub-class pairs that are common to 
them. 
 Knowledge Architecture Distance 𝑎,𝑏 = 
∑ 𝑊𝑎,𝑏,𝑗,𝑘 × |𝑝(𝑗,𝑘 𝐿𝑎,𝑗−𝑘) − 𝑝(𝐿𝑏,𝑗−𝑘)|  (5) 









𝑏) represent the fraction of patents that belong to a technology sub-class j 
(resp. k) for firm a and firm b, respectively. We set the value of knowledge architecture distance 
to 0 when two firms had no common domain pairs and normalized its values to be more 
comprehensible and comparable to knowledge domain distance. 
Moderator Variables at the firm level. To measure knowledge breadth, we focused on  
the distribution of patents across all semiconductor patent sub-classes (Carnabuci & Operti, 
2013; Yayavaram & Ahuja, 2008), not just within the scope of alliances, and calculated the 
inverse of the nonbiased Herfindahl Index (HHI) proposed by Hall (2002, p. 3). This approach 
adjusts the bias caused by the size of the firm’s patent portfolio (Hall, 2002). To this end, we 
calculated knowledge breadth as it follows: 
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Knowledge breadth𝑎 = 1 − [
𝑁𝑎∗𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑎−1
𝑁𝑎−1
]   (6) 






𝑘=1  where a= firm; k= patent sub-classes; 𝑁𝑎𝑘 = number of 
patents in sub-class k by the firm a; 𝑁𝑎= total number of patents in all sub-classes by the firm 
a. The index rises with the number of patent sub-classes a firm invents in and equality of its 
efforts across sub-classes, its value range from 0 to 1, with smaller value indicating that, 
adjusting for the size of the overall patent portfolio, a firm has narrower knowledge breadth. 
To measure knowledge decomposability of the whole firm’s knowledge base, we used 
the weighted clustering coefficient. The clustering coefficient addresses knowledge 
composability, as it measures the extent to which nodes in a network tend to cluster together. 
The non-weighted clustering coefficient for a patent sub-class with 𝑘𝑖 links to other sub-classes 
(co-listed sub-classes) is defined as 𝐶𝐶𝑖 = 𝑛𝑖/[𝑘𝑖 × (𝑘𝑖 − 1)/2], where 𝑛𝑖  is the number of 
links between the 𝑘𝑖 neighbors (co-listed patents) of patent sub-class i. The denominator is the 
maximum number of links that are possible between 𝑘𝑖 neighbors of patent-subclass i. Finally, 
the clustering coefficient for the whole knowledge base, CC, is 𝐶𝐶𝑖 averaged across all patent 
sub-classes (Yayavaram & Ahuja, 2008, pp. 350–351).  
We followed the above procedure to measure knowledge decomposability, but we also 
considered the weight of links between patent sub-classes of firms in the semiconductor 
industry. We used the NW_WCC module of STATA to calculate the weighted clustering 
coefficient of all nodes in the above calculated link matrix (formula (3)) (Joyez, 2017; Saramäki 
et al., 2007)7. Then, we measured the degree of decomposability for the entire knowledge base 
 
 
7 Yayavaram and Ahuja (2008) built this measure by designing an elaborated procedure to distinguish 
strong and weak ties; however, we calculated the clustering coefficient of all ties and took all them into account. 
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as (1- knowledge composability). Thus, when nodes in the network have ties that are mostly 
within their clusters, the network has high decomposability and when the nodes in the network 
have ties that are mostly outside their clusters, the network has low decomposability.   
Control Variables. We included several additional control variables to exclude 
alternative explanations. First, we included several firm-level controls. We controlled for the 
Firm pre-alliance learning, as the prior learning history between firms can ease their learning 
in alliances (Yang et al., 2015). We also controlled for Firm's pre-alliance total in-scope 
patents. This variable can help control for the firm’s in-house R&D efforts within the alliance 
scope, as a more precise measure than the conventional aggregate R&D spending which entails 
all R&D activities of the firm (i.e., in- and ex-scopes) and is subject to accounting 
considerations (Sampson, 2007). Moreover, we control for Firm's pre-alliance total patents. 
This variable can also help control for firm (applicant) size, as it address the size of financial 
and non-financial resources that come with firm size (Sampson, 2007). We also control for 
Firm’s degree of centrality to control for possible information channels that foster firm 
learning. We also used dummy variables to control for firms came from the semiconductor 
industry, Firm's semiconductor industry dummy, and the U.S., US firm dummy. Finally, we 
used a dummy variable to distinguish public firms from private firms, Firm government-related 
dummy. 
Moreover, we control for all these variables for the partner firms, namely Partner's pre-
alliance total in-scope patents, Partner’s pre-alliance total patents, Partner's degree of 
centrality, Partner's semiconductor industry dummy, US Partner dummy, Partner government-
related dummy. In addition, we controlled for Partner's knowledge breadth, and Partner’s 
knowledge decomposability, as it can be argued that learning from firms with broader 
knowledge or more decomposable knowledge base might be easier.    
35 
 
At dyadic level, we controlled for Number of prior alliances btw firms in the 
semiconductor industry, excluding licensing agreements, to consider the possible effect of 
partner-specific experience in firm learning. We defined also dummy variables to control for 
Joint Ventures (JV), as well as Cross border alliance dummy, as prior suggested that JVs can 
provide a better platform for learning (Mowery et al, 1996), and international alliances 
demonstrate different attributes for firm learning in alliances (Lane, Salk, and Lyles, 2001).   
Statistical Analysis 
Since our dependent variable, the firm’s post alliance cross-citation, is a count variable 
that has high variance relative to its mean, over-dispersed, we used negative binomial 
regression analysis. The likelihood-ratio (LR) test of dispersion parameter (i.e., α) shows α is 
significantly greater than zero in all our models, so confirming over dispersion in data and 
supporting our choice of negative binomial over poisson. Since we include both alliance partner 
firms in our analysis, a multi-level fixed effect model seems as the ideal choice, but the results 
of ANOVA test, as well as MLM itself, show that the higher-level variance at the alliance level 
is trivial (9.35 E-15), obviating the need to fit our data with multi-level models. Nevertheless, 
we report standard errors clustered at the alliance level, by using vce (cluster alliance_id) 
option in our estimation model in STATA, to relax the requirements that the observation must 
be independent.  
RESULTS 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations. The mean of Firm’s post 
alliance learning (530) as well as Firm’s pre-alliance learning (361) show that firms more 
intensively cite each other post-alliance than pre-alliance (p<0.001 in t-test). The mean of 
normalized Knowledge architecture distance is lower than knowledge domain distance as we 
used in-scope knowledge that was common between firms to measure Knowledge architecture   
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
1 Firm’s post alliance learning  1.00                       
2 Knowledge domain distance  -0.19 1.00                      
3 Knowledge architecture distance  0.44 -0.29 1.00                     
4 Firm’s knowledge breadth 0.28 -0.38 0.23 1.00                    
5 Firm's knowledge decomposability  0.22 -0.39 0.19 0.82 1.00                   
6 Firm’s pre-alliance learning  0.94 -0.19 0.45 0.28 0.21 1.00                  
7 Firm's pre-alliance total in-scope patents 0.74 -0.21 0.48 0.24 0.20 0.71 1.00                 
8 Firm's pre-alliance total patents 0.72 -0.25 0.44 0.44 0.29 0.79 0.60 1.00                
9 Firm's degree centrality 0.52 -0.26 0.34 0.43 0.32 0.52 0.45 0.64 1.00               
10 Firm's semiconductor industry dummy -0.13 0.03 -0.13 -0.14 -0.03 -0.16 -0.13 -0.27 -0.03 1.00              
11 US Firm dummy 0.00 0.15 -0.10 -0.13 -0.09 -0.04 0.03 -0.18 -0.07 0.08 1.00             
12 Firm government-related dummy -0.07 0.00 0.04 -0.03 0.03 -0.07 -0.04 -0.08 -0.01 0.05 -0.13 1.00            
13 Partner's pre-alliance in-scope patents 0.04 -0.21 0.48 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.02 0.10 -0.01 0.00 0.09 1.00           
14 Partner's pre-alliance total patents 0.01 -0.25 0.44 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.04 -0.18 0.13 0.60 1.00          
15 Partner's degree centrality 0.05 -0.26 0.34 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 0.00 0.45 0.64 1.00         
16 Partner's semiconductor industry dummy 0.01 0.03 -0.13 -0.10 -0.06 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.06 -0.04 -0.13 -0.27 -0.03 1.00        
17 US Partner dummy -0.04 0.15 -0.10 -0.12 -0.11 -0.07 0.00 -0.18 -0.06 0.06 0.45 -0.08 0.03 -0.18 -0.07 0.08 1.00       
18 Partner government-related dummy 0.11 0.00 0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.19 0.09 0.13 0.00 -0.04 -0.08 -0.02 -0.04 -0.08 -0.01 0.05 -0.13 1.00      
19 Partner's knowledge breadth 0.02 -0.38 0.23 0.13 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.04 -0.10 -0.12 0.03 0.24 0.44 0.43 -0.14 -0.13 -0.03 1.00     
20 Partner's knowledge decomposability  0.06 -0.39 0.19 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.02 -0.06 -0.11 -0.03 0.20 0.29 0.32 -0.03 -0.09 0.03 0.82 1.00    
21 Number of prior alliances btw firms 0.47 -0.27 0.48 0.28 0.23 0.45 0.38 0.48 0.56 -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 0.38 0.48 0.56 -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 0.28 0.23 1.00   
22 Cross border alliance dummy -0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.06 0.09 -0.21 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.06 0.09 -0.21 -0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.01 1.00  
23 JV dummy -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 0.09 0.07 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 -0.02 0.09 0.07 -0.06 -0.07 1.00 
 Mean 530.13 0.40 0.19 0.74 0.86 361.09 119.11 1205.13 0.01 0.33 0.59 0.02 119.11 1205.13 0.01 0.33 0.59 0.02 0.74 0.86 24.64 0.32 0.15 
 S.D. 1029.96 0.43 0.19 0.29 0.32 723.03 256.09 1734.87 0.01 0.47 0.49 0.13 256.09 1734.87 0.01 0.47 0.49 0.13 0.29 0.32 22.73 0.47 0.35 
 Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 




distance, rather than whole in-scope knowledge in knowledge domain distance. The relatively 
large mean of Firm’s knowledge breadth and Firm’s knowledge decomposability indicates that 
firms joined R&D alliances with relatively well-developed knowledge in the scope of alliances, 
so their knowledge is well recombined with other knowledge domains. The correlation among 
predictor variables are not critically high. We performed a diagnostic test using the “collin” 
procedure in Stata to check for multicollinearity issue. The test showed no VIF higher than 3 
and the conditioning numbers of the models were all less 25, all less than the suggested 
threshold for VIF, 10, and conditioning number, 30 (Table 2) (Belsley & Kuh, 1993)8. 
Table 2 shows estimates of binomial regression models to test our hypotheses. Model 
1 includes only the control variables. The interpretation on control variables can be subject to 
inaccuracy due to other possible explanations (Cinelli & Hazlett, 2018), so we just mention the 
most noticeable results with caution. The positive and significant coefficients of Firm’s pre-
alliance total patents and Firm's semiconductor industry dummy indicate the expectable higher 
absorptive capacity of large firms as well as semiconductor active firms. The positive and 
significant coefficient of Firm's degree of centrality confirms the role of network connections 
as a conduit that provides firms with complementary information to take advantage of their 
partners’ knowledge. 
In Model 2, the variable Knowledge domain distance is introduced to test H1. The 
results suggest a negative association between Knowledge domain distance and Firm learning. 
We followed Haans et al. (2016) and tested the Knowledge domain distance squared to rule 
out the possibility of a U-shape relation and providing support for the hypothesized linear    
 
 
8 We acknowledge that the collinearity test suits linear regression models, and although our test is 
common in extant research, the relevancy of the results should be consider with cautious. However, our 
robustness tests did not show any indication of multicollinearity in our models. 
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TABLE 2: Negative Binomial Regress Estimate of Firm Learning in R&D Alliances 
Firm post-alliance learning (DV) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
















Firm's knowledge breadth*  
Knowledge domain distance (H2) 
  
1.435* 
     (0.740) 
  
0.934 
     (0.716)      
Knowledge architecture distance (H3) 
   
5.289*** -0.115 -2.580     
(1.041) (2.154) (1.972) 
Knowledge architecture distance square 
(H3) 
   
-8.165*** 
     (1.749) 
-7.139*** 
     (1.584) 
-5.735*** 
     (1.790)     
Firm's knowledge decomposability  
    
3.000*** 2.075***      
(0.286) (0.477) 
Firm's knowledge decomposability* 
Knowledge architecture distance (H4) 
    
4.991** 
     (2.102) 
6.429*** 
     (2.025)      
Focal firm controls: 
      
Firm pre-alliance learning (lagged Y) 0.00172*** 0.00155*** 0.00163*** 0.00168*** 0.00171*** 0.00171***  
(0.000500) (0.000509) (0.000458) (0.000504) (0.000455) (0.000311) 
Firm's pre-alliance total in-scope patents 0.000616 0.000327 0.000263 0.000394 4.08e-05 -6.25e-05  
(0.000454) (0.000430) (0.000406) (0.000619) (0.000546) (0.000501) 
Firm's pre-alliance total patents 0.000191*** 0.000220*** 6.25e-05 0.000192** 0.000137** 0.000121 
 (7.07e-05) (7.25e-05) (6.55e-05) (7.81e-05) (6.74e-05) (8.17e-05) 
Firm's degree of centrality 101.7*** 96.90*** 72.97*** 100.6*** 70.83*** 71.21*** 
 (26.56) (25.45) (24.58) (25.24) (22.89) (22.60) 
Firm's semiconductor industry dummy 0.580*** 0.476*** 0.673*** 0.646*** 0.670*** 0.632*** 
 (0.158) (0.155) (0.150) (0.159) (0.143) (0.161) 
US firm dummy -0.181 0.0236 0.0769 -0.130 -0.0901 0.00636  
(0.137) (0.142) (0.148) (0.139) (0.137) (0.163) 
Firm government-related dummy -2.388*** -2.576*** -2.543*** -2.054*** -2.248*** -2.336***  
(0.699) (0.551) (0.488) (0.710) (0.673) (0.538) 
Partner firm controls: 
      
Partner’s pre-alliance total in-scope patents 0.000364 8.51e-05 0.000180 0.000657 0.000839 0.000568 
 (0.000470) (0.000435) (0.000425) (0.000610) (0.000578) (0.000476) 
Partner's pre-alliance total patents -4.52e-06 -4.70e-05 -6.27e-05 -7.65e-06 -7.31e-05 -5.44e-05 
 (6.90e-05) (6.78e-05) (6.09e-05) (6.45e-05) (5.40e-05) (6.80e-05) 
Partner's degree of centrality 40.16* 19.99 37.10* 31.51 29.01 30.84  
(21.80) (21.32) (21.45) (20.21) (18.40) (21.18) 
Partner's semiconductor industry dummy -0.0786 -0.194 -0.101 -0.000343 -0.00123 -0.0890 
 (0.145) (0.153) (0.142) (0.148) (0.131) (0.158) 
US Partner dummy 0.138 0.264* 0.100 0.179 0.139 0.171 
 (0.148) (0.147) (0.156) (0.145) (0.143) (0.157) 
Partner government-related dummy -0.484 -0.319 -0.103 -0.431 0.454 0.232 
 (0.427) (0.362) (0.431) (0.423) (0.740) (0.587) 
Partner's knowledge breadth   -0.592**   -0.806* 
   (0.276)   (0.443) 
Partner’s knowledge decomposability     0.0852 0.399 
     (0.206) (0.387) 
Dyadic-level Controls: 
      
Number of prior alliances btw firms -0.0133 -0.00865 -0.00647 -0.0147* -0.0119 -0.0105  
(0.00940) (0.00911) (0.00913) (0.00875) (0.00791) (0.00865) 
JV dummy -0.494** -0.542*** -0.595*** -0.527** -0.605*** -0.612*** 
 (0.219) (0.205) (0.195) (0.213) (0.197) (0.201) 
Cross border alliance dummy -0.158 -0.0823 0.0263 -0.226 -0.219* -0.100  
(0.155) (0.146) (0.152) (0.142) (0.131) (0.156) 
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Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 3.873*** 3.997*** 2.829*** 3.622*** 0.726 1.807*  
(0.718) (0.648) (0.728) (0.511) (0.542) (0.966) 
Observations 556 556 556 556 556 556 
Log Likelihood -3209 -3192 -3155 -3199 -3135 -3127 
Degree of Freedom 28 29 32 30 33 37 
Wald's chi square 505.24 663.59 907.87 635.77 1093.49 531.85 
α (dispersion parameter) 2.656*** 2.521*** 2.247*** 2.572*** 2.107*** 2.061*** 
Condition number |Mean VIF 14.35|2.98 14.64|2.90 19.51|2.80 14.99|2.96 16.68|2.79 25.38|3.06 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
negative association in Hypothesis 1. The coefficient was positive but insignificant, and the 
slope tests at the higher and lower ranges of Knowledge domain distance were insignificant, 
rejecting the possibility of a quadratic relationship. The coefficient (Model 2: β = -1.161, SE = 
.170, p = 0.000) suggest that a one standard deviation increase in Knowledge domain distance 
between firms decreases the cross citation between firms by a considerable factor of 68% (=
𝑒−1.161 − 1), while holding all other variables in the model constant.  
In Model 3, the interaction of Firm’s knowledge breadth and Knowledge domain 
distance on Firm learning (H2) is tested. The coefficient (Model 3: β = 1.435, SE = .740, p = 
0.053) is positive and marginally significant, supporting H2 that the negative association 
between knowledge domain distance and firm learning is weakened by firm's knowledge 
breadth. However, prior studies suggest that in nonlinear models such as negative binomial 
models, the significance of the interaction term should be interpreted with caution to conclude 
whether or not the interaction hypothesis is supported (Bowen, 2012; Wiersema & Bowen, 
2009). An interaction model in nonlinear models confound two distinct moderating effect: the 
model inherent moderation which is a function of the model nonlinearity, and the product term 
which is a function of interaction variables in the model (Bowen, 2012). To this end, we 
distinguished the model inherent moderation from the product term induced moderation and 
use the latter one for our interpretation. As illustrated in Fig. 3a, the (total) average marginal 
effect (AME) of knowledge domain distance decreases with Firm’s knowledge breadth, 
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demonstrating a negative interaction effect of Firm’s knowledge breadth and Knowledge 
domain distance against our prediction in H2. However, when we partition the interaction 
components, it appears that negative effect of inherent interaction outweighs the positive effect 
of product term interaction (Fig. 3b). Excluding the inherent moderation, the (real) average 
marginal effect (AME) of knowledge domain distance increases with Firm’s knowledge 
breadth (Fig. 3c). In other words, the effect of Knowledge domain distance on Firm learning 
becomes less negative as Firm’s knowledge breadth increases, supporting H2. 
The results in Model 4 support the hypothesized inverted-U shape relation between 
Knowledge Architecture Distance and Firm learning in H3. Knowledge architecture distance 
is positive (Model 4: β = 5.289, SE = 1.041, p = 0.000) and Knowledge architecture distance 
squared is negative (Model 4: β = -8.165, SE = 1.749, p = 0.000). The slope test at the lowest 
range is positive and significant (β = 5.289, SE = 1.041, p = 0.000) and at the highest range is 
negative and significant (β = -51.167, SE = 11.294, p = 0.000). In addition, the turning point at 
which Knowledge architecture distance begins to exhibit a negative effect on firm learning 
occurs at 0.324 (β = 0.324, SE = 0.044 , p = 0.000), within the data range (0, 1), and 78.8 
percent of observations have Knowledge architecture distance values below that level. All 
confirms a quadratic relation in which firm learning increases with knowledge architecture 
distance and hits its maximum at the 79th percentile of architectural distance range, but this 
positive association turns to be negative after this turning point.  
In Model 5, we tested the interaction of Firm’s knowledge decomposability and 
Knowledge architecture distance. The results confirm H4, as it shows a significant positive 
interaction between Firm’s knowledge decomposability and Knowledge architecture distance. 
It suggests that Firm’s knowledge decomposability shifts the turning point of quadratic relation 




(a) Average marginal effect (AME) of Knowledge domain distance as Firm’s knowledge 
breadth changes without exclusion of model inherent effect (top). 
(b) Model inherent, product term induced, and total interaction of Knowledge domain 
distance and Firm’s knowledge breadth on Firm learning (Middle). 
(c) Average marginal effect (AME) of Knowledge domain distance on Firm learning as 






to note that the flattening in this figure is an artifact of the nonlinear model as it explained 
above (Bowen, 2012). The model only includes the linear-by-linear interaction term between 
Firm’s knowledge decomposability and Knowledge architecture distance as we only address 
the turning point of the relationship between Knowledge architecture distance and Firm 
learning in our hypothesis (Haans et al., 2016; Oriani & Sobrero, 2008). Nevertheless, we also 
tested the model by including the linear-by-quadratic interaction term between Firm’s 
knowledge decomposability and Knowledge architecture distance squared, but it did not 
exhibit statistically significant coefficients, consistent with our expectations. 
FIGURE 4: Turning point shift of relationship between Knowledge architecture distance and 
Firm learning as the degree of Knowledge decomposability increases. 
 
In model 6, we included all main effect and interaction variables. The model supports 
our H1 and H4. Regarding H2, the coefficient of the interaction between Firm's knowledge 
breadth and Knowledge domain distance is positive as expected but not significant. Regarding 
H3, while the expected quadratic relationship between Knowledge architecture distance and 
Firm learning is still supported, the coefficient of Knowledge architecture distance turns to 
negative and is not significant. However, these coefficients only indicate the Knowledge 
architecture distance-Firm learning relationship when the moderator, Firm’s knowledge 
decomposability, is set to zero, which is a very special case, and as the quadratic form of H3 
remains, the provided support for H4 is still warranted. The non-linearity of model and the 
Turning point 
shifts to right 
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limited number of observation, as a limitation of this study, may explain these relatively weaker 
results in this model. 
Robustness Checks 
We took several steps to ensure that our findings are robust. We used alternative 
estimation models and analysis to make sure the indicated interaction effects is not a natural 
outcome of negative binomial regression models. We used Poisson regression and OLS 
regression on the log-transformed version of model to confirm the significance of the 
interaction effect. All these analyses produced similar and consistent results, thus leading 
credence to the findings. 
DISCUSSION 
This study revisits the knowledge antecedents of inter-firm learning in R&D alliances 
and complements this long stream of research (Inkpen & Tsang, 2007; Kavusan et al., 2016; 
Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Mowery et al., 1996; Nooteboom et al., 2007; Sampson, 2007). Extant 
research has focused on knowledge domain distance to examine the influence of cognitive 
distance in inter-firm learning. We widened this approach by reconceptualizing cognitive 
distance based on two dimensions: knowledge domain distance and knowledge architecture 
distance. We particularly argued that the established inverted-U shape hypothesis between 
cognitive distance and firm learning is theoretically sound, but this relation is hold in 
undertheorized knowledge architecture dimension rather than knowledge domain dimension. 
Our findings confirm that knowledge domain distance has a negative effect on firm learning, 
though firm’s knowledge breadth alleviates this negative effect. We also found that knowledge 
architecture distance between firms has an inverted U-shape relation with firm learning in 
alliances. That is, the maximum firm learning occurs at an optimal level of knowledge 
architecture distance. However, firm’s knowledge decomposability, which represents the 
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firm’s capacity for change, sets this optimal level. More knowledge decomposability, more 
capacity to learn from partner firms with greater knowledge architecture distance.    
The arguments and findings in this paper have several significant theoretical 
implications. First, the distinction between knowledge domain and knowledge architecture 
distance contributes to our understanding of the cognitive distance concept and brings all 
alternative proposed concepts to address knowledge distance between firms under one 
umbrella. Second, our approach distinguishes between two inter-firm learning opportunities: 
learning from within-domain and between-domain knowledge. Our findings demonstrate this 
distinction, question prior findings, and show that firms can mainly learn from their 
counterparts’ between-domain knowledge rather than within-domain knowledge in R&D 
alliances. In other words, our findings highlight the role of an R&D alliance as a proper vehicle 
to change the cognitive map and problem-solving attitudes of alliance partners, rather than the 
extension of their knowledge domains.    
Third, our findings criticize the stylized findings in literature with respect to the benefit 
of knowledge domain distance. One possible reason for this disparity is in the way that extant 
research operationalizes the concepts of knowledge domain distance and firm learning. These 
studies generally take all the registered patents of firms into account that significantly distort 
to the measures. For example, knowledge domain distance between a large diversified firm and 
a small firm is typically greater than the domain distance that operates in their alliance with 
limited scope, because the knowledge base of the larger firm includes multiple ex-scope 
knowledge domains absent in the knowledge base of its smaller counterpart that exaggerates 
knowledge domain distance. Moreover, the number of post-alliance patents in large firms may 
increase because of their investment in ex-scope domains. To this end, we took special care of 
the technological scope of alliances to significantly improve the precision of our analysis. Our 
approach in the identification of the technological scope of alliances is novel. We analyzed the 
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technical content of each alliance agreement and took that part of a firm’s knowledge into 
account that has fallen in the knowledge category of alliance technological scope or has been 
used by its association. This approach minimizes the noise of attributing knowledge domains 
to the alliances that have never been used or created in alliances, particularly in large companies 
that have a very wide knowledge breadth and use different knowledge sourcing instrument 
(Sampson, 2007). This approach can be widely applied to research on firms’ activities within 
specific technological scope; machine learning techniques can particularly improve and 
standardize it.  
This study also has important managerial implications. Firms may choose different 
knowledge sourcing strategies to enrich their knowledge bases (Bierly & Chakrabarti, 1996; 
Hagedoorn, 2002; Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002). We identify two distinct dimensions of firm’s 
knowledge base and redefine the boundaries of R&D alliances with respect to these 
dimensions. Our findings suggest that an R&D alliance is a proper choice for firms seeking to 
renew their knowledge architectures, rather than to extend their knowledge domains. Prior 
studies show that firms face difficulty in the renovation of their knowledge architecture, while 
it is an important source of  architectural innovations (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Yayavaram 
& Ahuja, 2008).     
Naturally, this research has several limitations. First, the alliances examined in this 
study are those pertaining to R&D alliances, and although our argumentation is general and 
can apply to learning in all types of alliances, we should be cautious in the generalizing our 
findings to the other types of alliances (e.g., marketing, manufacturing, and supply chain). 
Second, we used patents to develop our main measures; however, the accuracy of patents to 
represent firm’s knowledge and inter-firm learning is under question (Roach & Cohen, 2013). 
Nevertheless, our treatment in specifying the scope of alliance offers a solution to use patent 
data in a more precise way to measure innovative performance of firms. Third, learning is a 
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multifaceted construct and measuring the learning in technological aspect may not represent 
the realized learning in alliances. However, we tried to partially address this issue by narrowing 
our sample selection strategy to the R&D alliances that explicitly specified their research 
agenda.  
Future research may extend this study in both theoretical and empirical aspects. From 
the theoretical point of view, we distinguish between two inter-firm learning opportunities. 
This approach invites future research to revisit knowledge sourcing strategies of firms 
accordingly. This study mainly suggests that R&D alliances are mainly proper vehicles for 
learning knowledge architecture rather than knowledge domain. Future studies may examine 
the other forms of knowledge sourcing such as M&A with this respect: which knowledge-
sourcing mode provides which learning opportunity.  
Prior literature suggests repetitive alliances, at least to a certain level, may improve the 
chance of learning. We controlled for the number of prior-alliances in this study. However, 
future research may examine whether learning opportunities from knowledge domain distance 
appear in the repetitive alliances between the same firms or within the same technological 
scope. Future studies may also consider a combination of inter- or intra- organizational 
activities in knowledge sourcing regarding both dimensions, separately or together. Moreover, 
further research may also study alliance portfolios to examine how a combination of different 
alliances jointly influence firm’s knowledge base.  
This study exclusively focuses on firm learning in R&D alliance. There are 
opportunities to use our approach to extend research on the alliance scope and the trade-off 
between firm’s performance and alliance performance (Khanna, 1998; Khanna et al., 1998). 
For example, future studies may examine firm learning, as a firm-level benefit, against alliance 
performance, as an alliance-level benefit, in the same setting to delineate the trade-off between 
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these two essential outcomes. Finally, future research may use our approach in the 
identification of alliance technological scope to examine the trade-off between the breadth of 




We followed the below procedure to match the technological scope of alliance 
agreement with patent sub-classes in cooperative patent classification (CPC) scheme. 
1) Reviewing the alliance agreement synopsis in SDC database and selecting the technological 
key words. 
2)  Double-checking the agreement in FACTIVA database to seek for further information. 
3)  Choosing the keyword and finding the relevant synonyms.  
4) In this step, we search for the patent sub-class in various patent databases simultaneously: 
i. Direct search for patent sub-class in “classification search” option in Espacenet 
website, a worldwide dataset for patent search, to find the top suggestions. 
ii.  Search for patent in “smart search” and “advanced search” options in Espacenet to find 
the most relevant patents, and to identify the patent sub-class of the found patent after 
checking the title and abstract of patent.  
iii. Doing the same procedure in Google Patent database 
iv. Using Octamine application, a private patent search engine, to find the top patents and 
top patent-subclasses to double-check the finding in the above procedure. 
We use the example that we used in this paper (i.e., R&D alliance agreement between 
Hitachi and Texas Instrument (TI) to develop Dynamic random memory (DRAM)) to illustrate 
the process in below flowchart.
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SDC Synopsis:  
Hitachi, Ltd. and Texas Instruments, Inc.(TI) formed an alliance to 
cooperate in the joint development of 256-megabit dynamic 
random-access memory(DRAM) chips.  The participants planned 
to work together on all phases except actual production, which 
each were to undertake separately. Through the alliance, the 
participants aimed to share the huge financial investment required 
to develop and commercialize the 256 DRAM chips, which the 







Hitachi, TI Team Up for 64M DRAM Chips. (the prior agreement)
20 November 1991
Jiji Press English News Service (JIJI)
English (c) 1991
Tokyo, Nov. 20 (Jiji Press)--Hitachi Ltd. said Wednesday it has signed a contract with Texas 
Instruments Inc. (TI) of the United States to jointly develop 64-megabit dynamic random access 
memory (DRAM) chips, known as the next-generation semiconductor chip. The latest 10-year 
contract provides for wide-ranging joint development work on 64M DRAMs, including 
standardization of product specifications and manufacturing technology, Hitachi officials said. The 
two companies have similar joint development arrangements for some technologies for 14M 
DRAMs. A joint design team will be set up in Japan to develop 64M DRAMs, which are likely to 
be mass-produced separately in three to four years, Hitachi officials said. A 64M DRAM chip, 
boasting a storage capacity equivalent to 256 newspaper pages, requires technology of processing 
0.35-micron-wide circuit wires. By teaming up with TI, Hitachi, which developed a prototype 64M 
DRAM chip for the first time in the world last year, aims to lower development costs, among 






























MULTI-PARTNER R&D ALLIANCE DIVERSITY AND INNOVATION 
PERFORMANCE:                                                                                                                    
THE DILEMMA OF VALUE CREATION AND VALUE APPROPRIATION  
ABSTRACT 
We systematically examine partner diversity in multi-partner alliances and its 
performance consequences both at the alliance level as well as at the firm level in the context 
of technological knowledge sourcing. We identify three dimensions of multi-partner diversity, 
namely partner variety, relational separation, and status disparity, based on within-firm, 
between-firm, and across the entire network resources, respectively. We argue that each of 
these dimensions has distinct performance consequences at alliance and firm levels. We tested 
our theory on a sample of research and development collaborations in technology-driven 
industries from 1990 to 2008. Our findings reveal diverging mechanisms of value creation at 
the alliance level and value appropriation at the firm level regarding each dimension of multi-
partner alliance diversity. Our results suggest that managers should be cautious with 
configuring multi-partner alliances and consider the critical trade-offs between value creation 
and value appropriation when they are deciding to join, stay, or leave multi-lateral partnerships.   






Multi-partner alliances (MPAs) have gained popularity in technology-driven industries 
due to the speed of technological advancements, the competitive pressure to set the next 
technological standards, and the complexity of problems to solve. Firms voluntarily engage in 
MPAs in multilateral value chain activities to take advantage of their complementary resources 
and capabilities, to access valuable information, to share the costs and risks of undertaking 
exploratory and uncertain activities, to shorten the product lifecycle, and to improve their 
collective competitive advantage (Lazzarini, 2007; Das & Teng, 2002; Lavie et al., 2007; 
Gomes-Casseres, 2003). MPAs appear in different forms such as R&D consortia, multiparty 
production bundling, supplier networks, joint bidding, and industry constellations (Das & 
Teng, 2002; Li et al., 2012; Ekeh, 1974; Lavie et al., 2007). MPA setting is a unique 
phenomenon in interorganizational relations (IORs). The received wisdom from sociology 
suggests that the dynamics of interactions in a group substantially change when a dyadic 
relation turns to triadic or multilateral relations (Simmel, 1950). Likewise, the dynamics of 
multi-lateral interaction within a group of firms in MPAs is different from the dynamics of the 
bilateral interaction between two firms in a dyadic alliance (Das & Teng, 2002). Moreover, the 
dynamics of such a within-group multi-lateral interaction in the MPA is different from an ego 
network (alliance portfolio), in which a focal partner firm manages each of its direct relation 
with its counterparts independently.  
IOR researchers have paid more attention to MPA in the last two decades. This stream 
of research has addressed several organizational attributes of MPAs, such as the governance 
modes, contractual forms (García-Canal, 1996; Gong et al., 2007; Li et al., 2012), and the 
cooperative relationships between the MPA partners (Das & Teng, 2002; Heidl et al., 2014; 
Madhavan et al., 2004); strategic decisions throughout its lifecycle, such as decisions about 
joining, staying in, or leaving an MPA (Olk & Young, 1997; Lavie et al., 2007, 2015), and the 
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benefits of membership in an MPA (Gomes-Casseres, 2003; Lazzarini, 2007). However, these 
studies have paid relatively less attention to MPA as an organizational association or a strategic 
entity (Das, 2015; Gomes-Casseres, 2003; Lavie et al., 2007). Consequently, our knowledge 
about the antecedents of group based advantages of MPAs in value creation, the aggregated 
performance of an MPA partners as the MPA performance, and the internal dynamics that 
shape what a partner firm can appropriate from these advantages, the partner firm performance, 
is relatively limited.    
Strategic management literature suggests that one of the main factors that can explain 
the performance of such an organizational association or a strategic entity with multiple sub-
entities is the diversity or the distribution of differences among its members with respect to a 
common attribute (for a recent review see Ahuja & Novelli (2017)). IOR researchers have 
studied the diversity of partner firm’s resources in dyadic alliances (Sampson, 2007) and of 
partner firms in alliance portfolios (Jiang et al., 2010). However, the diversity of MPAs has 
mainly remained unexplored. Exploring MPA diversity can improve our understanding about 
the antecedents of overall performance of an MPA and of its partner firms, and in consequence, 
the rationale behind the choice of firms in forming or joining, staying, and leaving an MPA. 
The diversity of an MPA can be defined based on different attributes of its partner firms, so it 
necessitates a systematic approach to study the different possible dimensions of diversity and 
their performance consequences. Moreover, the performance consequences of MPA diversity 
at alliance and firm levels are not necessarily aligned, as the mechanisms and dynamics of 
value creation at the MPA-level are not necessarily compatible with the mechanisms of value 
appropriation at the firm level. However, IOR research has mainly overlooked this critical 
point. For instance, Lee, Kirkpatrick-Husk, and Madhavan (2014) show in their meta-analysis 
that the performance consequences of alliance portfolio diversity are neither theoretically clear 
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nor empirically consistent, as existing studies tend to overlook the fundamental difference of 
diversity and performance at different levels of analysis.  
In this study, we systematically examine the relation between MPA diversity and 
performance. We submit that an MPA is a multifaceted phenomenon that cannot be simply 
explained in a single dimension, as participating firms join MPAs with different attributes in 
terms of their internal resources and capabilities, their relational resources with their 
counterparts in MPA, and their status in the global alliance network. To this end, we 
dimensionalize the MPA diversity construct with respect to partner firms’ attributes and 
resources within-firm, ‘partner variety’, between-firm, ‘relational separation’, and across the 
entire network, ‘status disparity’. We separately examine the performance consequence of each 
dimension at the MPA level as well as the firm level.   
We argue that diversity in each of these dimensions has an inverted U-shaped relation 
to MPA performance. Partner variety provides the MPA with more opportunities and resources 
to achieve its intended goal, but as the MPA’s diversity in this dimension exceeds a certain 
point, MPAs’ ability to exploit these opportunities sharply decreases. Likewise, moderate 
relational separation among partner firms may benefit MPA, as partner firms may learn from 
novel procedures and ideas from the partner firms that they had less interaction before, but 
excessive relational separation may lead to dividedness in the MPA and may hurt the alliance 
performance. Finally, while status disparity may ease coordination via higher status firms to a 
certain level and benefit MPAs to a certain level, the inequality across MPAs with high 
disparity can disturb the required transparent multilateral interaction for efficient collaboration 
among the alliance partners, exerting a negative effect on MPA performance.  
At the firm level, however, we argue that the performance consequence of each 
diversity dimension is not consistent with that at the MPA level. Partner firms with lower 
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internal knowledge variety, or in the other words, with narrower knowledge breadth, do not 
benefit from partner variety as much as their counterparts with broader knowledge do. With 
respect to relational separation and status disparity, likewise, partner firms with a brokerage 
role in divided partnerships, as well as those with high status in the global alliance network can 
extract a higher share of value created by the MPA. 
We examine our theory in the context of technological collaboration, focusing on R&D 
consortia in high-tech sectors including electronic and computer components producers, 
telecommunication equipment and system providers, medical equipment producers, and firms 
from the pharmaceutical industry. The rationale behind this choice is that these industries 
regularly practice multi-lateral partnership for their technology-based activities. We compiled 
a sample of multi-partner R&D collaborations from the SDC platinum data set, enhanced by 
FACTIVA, and combined with the patent data extracted from PATSTAT by matching assignee 
names of granted patents to firm names of the MPA sample. Then, to have more precision for 
the patent-based dependent variables, we established the technological scope of each alliance 
by carrying out an elaborate content analysis on the alliance’s technological description to code 
their technological domain based on the patent classification index. We test our hypotheses at 
two distinct levels of MPA and partner firms. Overall, our findings are consistent with our main 
arguments that the performance consequences of multi-partner alliances vary between the 
distinct dimensions of MPA diversity. Specifically, our results underline the distinction 
between underlying mechanisms of value creation at the MPA level and value appropriation at 
the firm level.          
To our knowledge, this study is the first to distinguish systematically the different 
dimensions of MPAs and to examine the performance consequences of each dimension at both 
the alliance and firm levels. It offers a novel insight into the conceptual meaning of MPA 
diversity and its performance consequences. We believe that this approach may contribute to 
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our understanding of performance consequences of diversity in the general strategy literature, 
as diversity is such an important construct in a wide range of contexts. The findings contribute 
to our understanding of the complex configuration of MPAs. They particularly underline the 
distinct dynamics of alliance and partner firm performance in MPAs. There are critical trade-
offs to be considered by partner firms in their decision to join, stay, or leave multi-partner 
alliances.  
MULTILPLE-PARTNER ALLIANCE DIVERSITY: THE DIMENSIONS 
  “A multi-partner alliance is a collective, voluntary organizational association that 
interactively engages its multiple members in multilateral value chain activities, such as 
collaborative research, development, sourcing, production, or marketing of technologies, 
products, or services” (Lavie et al., 2007, p. 578). Multilateral interaction within a group of 
firms as an organizational association are the distinctive characteristics of an MPA. They 
distinguish an MPA from the bilateral interaction between two firms in a dyadic alliance, from 
a portfolio of independent bilateral interactions between partner firms and a focal firm in an 
alliance portfolio, and from a network of bilateral interactions among different firms in an 
alliance network. These unique characteristics necessitate a different framework that explains 
the source of group based advantages of an MPA and that explains how the within-group multi-
lateral interaction in an MPA shapes what a partner firm can appropriate from its group work 
(Gomes-Casseres, 2003, p. 333). The received wisdom from the diversity research in strategic 
literature suggests that one of the main factors that can explain the performance of such an 
organizational association as a strategic entity is its diversity or the distribution of differences 
among its members with respect to a common attribute.  
In an MPA, the differences among the MPA partners with respect to their resources can 
be a source of group-based advantages of MPAs to fulfill their intended goals. In addition, 
56 
 
these differences can also determine the advantage of some partner firms in appropriating more 
value than their counterparts from the total created value. The partner firms join an alliance 
with their internal resources within their organizational boundaries, with their relational 
resources based on prior relations with their counterparts in the MPA, and with their social 
capital based on the status that they have acquired in the global alliance network. We argue 
that MPA diversity can be dimensionalized with respect to these within-firm, between-firm, 
and across the entire network resources, as each reflects a distinct attribute of partner firms and 
can be a source of value creation in MPA as well as value appropriation by partner firms.   
Firms share their distinct knowledge, information, and resources in alliances to fulfill 
their common goals. The development path of these resources is idiosyncratic (Nelson & 
Winter, 2009) that implies uniqueness or distinctiveness of these resources. Group diversity 
research uses the term of variety to refer to differences in kind, source, or category of 
background and associated experience among group members (Harrison & Klein, 2007; Van 
Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007). Likewise, we label diversity in this dimension as partner 
variety that refers to the qualitative difference of partner firms on a categorical attribute such 
as their functional backgrounds, knowledge, information, and resources. Partner firms with 
unique and distinct attributes provide their partnerships with the maximum partner variety; in 
contrast, the minimum partner variety occurs when all partner firms share similar attributes.  
Partner firms also bring their between-firm relational resources to MPAs. Each couple 
of firms in an MPA might have developed varying levels of bilateral trust and mutual 
understanding on their prior relations. These relational resources can represent the proximity 
of organizational attitude and approaches toward various aspects of partnerships. The 
difference in the strength of between-firm relational resources can potentially divide an MPA 
into cohesive subgroups of partner firms, because of mistrust, and conflict in their attitudes and 
approaches to their collaboration (Heidl et al., 2014). Group diversity research labels this type 
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of diversity that represents the differences in lateral position or opinion among group members 
(e.g., different values, beliefs, or attitudes of partners) as separation, implying disagreement or 
opposition among them (Harrison & Klein, 2007; Van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007). 
Likewise, we name diversity in this dimension as relational separation. Relational separation 
refers to the members’ differences in terms of a single continuous attribute such as 
commitment, trust, or belief in the goal of collaboration that affects the cohesion between them 
and leads to a set of systematic consequence. The highest degree of separation occurs when 
partner firms are divided into two subgroups, each taking a stance as far from the other as 
possible; in contrast, the minimum relational separation occurs when all partner firms practice 
similar approach in their partnership and form a single cohesive group.  
Network resources, or the social capital of partner firms, can also be a source of 
diversity. While relational resources refer to prior ties between partner firms within an MPA, 
network resources brought in by a partner firm are accumulated from the entirety of its past 
relations, not just those relations with partner firms of the focal MPA. Social capital can provide 
firms with credit, privileged access to information, opportunities, and reputation or status 
(Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Granovetter, 1985). According to social network theory the 
centrality position of an entity, as a particular node in the global network, can reflect its social 
status (Bonacich, 1987). Likewise, the centrality position of a partner firm in its global 
networks can provide access to information through direct and indirect ties, and being in the 
different possible paths of information provides firms with this chance to influence the 
information flow between the other firms in the network. It is assumed in this dimension that 
members can be different in the degree to which they possess specific attributes that also 
implies their prestige, quality and income (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). Group diversity 
research names this type of diversity as disparity (Harrison & Klein, 2007; Van Knippenberg 
& Schippers, 2007), and we label it as status disparity in this context. Multi-partner alliances 
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in which the status of one firm outranks the others has the maximum disparity, because the 
high-status firm can dominate the MPA; in contrast, minimum diversity occurs when all firms 
are in the same status, either low or high. It should be considered that the disparity dimension 
is asymmetric by nature. For example, if all partner firms have high status except one, the 
disparity would be low, because in this case just one firm is disadvantaged relative to the 
majority, but when just one firm has high status, the disparity would be high, because the 
majority of partner firms disadvantaged relative to the privileged one.    
 It is worthy to note that the overall size of an MPA (i.e., the number of partner firms) 
does not address "within-unit" types of diversity. In addition, prior research has shown that the 
advantage of a multi-partner alliance is in fact not so much determined by its size, but by certain 
characteristics and quality of the partner firms and their interrelations (e.g., Stuart, 2000). 
THE ALLIANCE & PARTNER FIRM PERFORMANCE                                          
IN MULTIPARTNER ALLIANCES 
 Strategic alliance research suggests that partner firms not only collaborate to create 
value at the alliance level but also compete to appropriate more value than their counterparts 
in their partnerships (Dyer et al., 2008; Adegbesan & Higgins, 2011; Hughes-Morgan & Yao, 
2016; Lavie, 2007; Lee et al., 2014; Hamel, 1991). Therefore, not all partners may be able to 
proportionally benefit from the produced collaborative rent from shared resources. Moreover, 
value appropriation entails not only the partner’s share from the common benefits, or benefits 
to all parties based upon the alliance’s specific objectives, but also the partner’s private benefits 
or gains that are realized only by individual firms in the alliance (Khanna et al., 1998). We 
distinguish between the value creation mechanism, leading to the alliance performance, and 
the value appropriation mechanism, leading to the partner firm performance to have a better 
understanding of the group-based advantages and the within-group interactions of MPA. In the 
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following, we separately examine the performance at the MPA level and at the firm level with 
respect to each dimension of diversity.  
Value Creation at MPA level 
Partner variety 
The most explored dimension of diversity in alliances is partner variety. Extant studies 
show that variety in terms of partners’ differences in their resources, knowledge, information, 
or experience are a prevalent rationale for creating multiple alliances (Baum et al., 2000; Das 
& Teng, 2002; Ozcan & Overby, 2008; Sakakibara, 1997b).  
A diversified MPA in partner variety dimension can benefit from the critical and 
complementary resources and capabilities to achieve fuller utilization of partner firms’ 
resources, create more synergy and added value, and to hedge the risks of undertaking uncertain 
activities (Lazzarini, 2007; Ozcan & Overby, 2008; Sakakibara, 1997a, 2001; Xu et al., 2014). 
The variety of knowledge and problem-solving capabilities, as well as the spread of non-
redundant knowledge across partner firms enable the partnership to explore novel opportunities 
and find more creative solutions for their common problems (Olk & Young, 1997).  
However, such an opportunity comes at a cost. When the difference between partner 
firms’ shared resources increases, the mutual understanding and relational absorptive capacity 
to assimilate and recombine their shared resources decreases (Sampson, 2007; Lane & 
Lubatkin, 1998; Mowery et al., 1996). In the context of MPAs, this undesired effect can be 
even stronger as the mutual understanding and relational absorptive capacity among multiple 
partners decrease faster with partner variety. 
  Therefore, as partner variety increases the difficulty of its utilization increases in a 
way that after a certain point outweighs its benefits, so we expect that partner variety bears a 
nonlinear relationship with innovative performance of MPAs.     
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Hypothesis 1: Multi-partner R&D alliances with moderate partner variety has higher 
innovation performance (create more value) than alliances with very low or very high 
levels of partner variety. 
Relational Separation       
As discussed earlier the separation type of diversity refers to the difference in opinions, 
beliefs, and cognitive processes among the members. Extant studies suggest that partner firms 
who are strongly tied to each other are more likely to develop a shared understanding and closer 
opinions and beliefs to reinforce their existing relationships and facilitate the exploitation of 
shared knowledge bases (Beckman et al., 2004; Verspagen & Duysters, 2004). That is, 
engaging in recurrent alliances with a select group of partner firms can influence their 
cooperative behavior (Gulati, 1998), diminish exchange hazards and promote trust (Gulati & 
Nickerson, 2008), and improve the chance of effective coordination across partner firms to 
facilitate the flow of knowledge and information and complete their joint and individual tasks 
(Gulati et al., 2012).  
Hence,  as the variation of tie strength between a group of partner firms based on their 
prior interactions increases, fragmented subgroups, which are cohesive within but cannot 
effectively interact between, emerges (Heidl et al., 2014; Gibson & Vermeulen, 2003). Such 
polarization leads to more conflicts, reduces the cooperative motivation of partner firms, and 
damages the embedded relation between these subgroups, so the expected synergy, 
coordination, cooperative culture, and the performance of working with a group of partners 
diminishes (Das & Teng, 2002).  
Nevertheless, having new partners with no prior ties, implying the difference in 
opinions and cognitive processes in this context, can lead to productive conflict specifically in 
research collaborations. In addition, new partners can provide MPAs with new information 
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channels, different perspectives, and new knowledge that are not available through existing 
immediate network (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006), increasing the chance of finding novel ideas 
and more creative solutions.  
In sum, as relational separation increases the access to new information channels and 
knowledge resources increases, but the cooperative culture of MPAs decreases in a way that 
after a certain point outweighs its benefits. Thus, we expect that relational separation bears a 
nonlinear relationship with innovative performance of MPAs.  
Hypothesis 2: Multi-partner R&D alliances with moderate relational separation has 
higher innovation performance (create more value) than alliances with very low or very 
high levels of relational separation.  
Status disparity 
Network research shows that the firm’s structural position, centrality, comes with status 
and social power (Bonacich, 1987; Gulati et al., 2000; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Stuart & 
Sorenson, 2007). As firms develop more central network positions, they accrue resource and 
information benefits that enhance their ability, social power, and so their performance (Powell 
et al., 1996; Shipilov & Li, 2008). In addition, firms with central positions in the global network 
are particularly able to achieve the benefits of ties to prominent partners, because centrality 
provides superior information, legitimacy, and prestige, thus improving their negotiation power 
(Bae & Garguilo, 2004). 
Status disparity addresses the difference of partner firms’ status in the global alliance 
network. Status disparity implies that at least one partner firm has higher status than its 
counterparts do. Such disparity may benefit MPAs in two ways. First, it provides valuable 
information, legitimacy, and prestige to the MPA that can benefit all. In addition, powerful, 
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high status partner firms can facilitate coordination across partner firms to align and adjust 
partners’ actions to achieve jointly determined goals (Gulati et al., 2012, p. 537). 
However, high level of status disparity comes with the inequality of the status and 
asymmetry of social power among partner firms that leads to conflict of interest and disturbs 
the required transparency for efficient cooperation. This disparity induces high-status firms to 
their unilateral outcome at the cost of their partners, so the chance of their opportunistic 
behavior increases (Lavie, 2006, 2007). Low-status firms, in anticipation of such opportunistic 
behavior by high-status counterparts, will exert less effort towards the MPA. Therefore, even 
if partner firms have strong intention for collaboration, status disparity induces them to be less 
transparent and institute protective mechanisms to limit their outbound spillovers, which will 
dampen the MPA performance.  
Therefore, status disparity provides partner firms with accessing superior information, 
prestige, and legitimacy as well as easing the coordination within MPA, but it harms the 
cooperation in MPAs in a way that after a certain point outweighs its benefits, so we expect 
that status disparity bears a nonlinear relationship with innovative performance of MPAs. 
Hypothesis 3: Multi-partner R&D alliances with moderate status disparity have higher 
innovation performance (create more value) than alliances with very low or very high 
levels of structural disparity.  
Value Appropriation at the Firm Level 
Diversity in different types of resources has performance consequences at both MPA 
and firm levels, but their effects on the partner firms’ performance are conditioned by partner 
firm’s resources. We argue that the mechanism of value creation at MPA-level is not 
necessarily applicable to value appropriation mechanisms at the partner-firm level, so we do 
not focus on the main effect of diversity dimensions at MPA-level on the firm-level 
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performance. We focus on the interaction of MPA diversity in each dimension with its 
corresponding partner firm resources on the proportional value that partner firms appropriate 
in compare to all MPA.   
Partner variety at the MPA level and internal knowledge variation at the firm 
level  
At the firm level, received research shows that getting access to a variety of knowledge 
and exposure to partners’ diverse technologies provides more recombination and 
reconfiguration opportunities between new knowledge and existing knowledge to come up 
with more creative solutions (Sampson, 2007; Caner et al., 2017; Srivastava & Gnyawali, 
2011). However, the firms’ ability to learn and utilize novel knowledge from different types of 
knowledge sources is a function of their absorptive capacity with respect to each of these new 
sources of knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). The prior related 
knowledge allows firms to absorb and recombine the created knowledge and resources in their 
partnerships with their own existing ones (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 1995; Lavie, 2006; Dyer et 
al., 2008; Kogut & Zander, 1992) and offers them the opportunity to access complementary 
knowledge and skills to exploit their existing capabilities or to explore novel opportunities 
(Lavie et al., 2007; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006).  
In MPAs with a higher variety of knowledge and resources due to the partner variety, 
partner firms with broader internal knowledge have more chance to appreciate and utilize new 
knowledge, so they can proportionally appropriate more value than what their counterparts can 
with limited internal knowledge variety. Therefore, regardless of the relation between partner 
variety and value creation at the level of the MPA, which is indeed a function of partner variety 
at MPA level, partner firms’ value appropriation from their collective effort diverges to the 
extent of their differential internal knowledge variety. 
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Hypothesis 4:  MPA partner variety positively moderates the positive relation between 
the partner firm’s internal knowledge variety and partner firm’s value appropriation.  
Relational separation at MPA-level and brokerage role of firms  
At the firm level in a multilateral partnership setting, partner firms who have stronger 
relations with their counterparts, especially with those who are weakly connected with each 
other, can enjoy a brokerage role (Ahuja, 2000; Zaheer & Bell, 2005). A brokerage role can 
provide firms with more diverse and timely information to take advantage of weak ties between 
counterparts, as well as power and control to play off one counterpart against another (Burt, 
2009; Zaheer et al., 2010).  
With this respect, a partner firm that has close relations with its counterparts in an MPA 
with high relational separation has the chance to take advantage of both different novel ideas 
and perspectives as well as the weak ties between them. Having relations with separated 
subgroups improve the bargaining power of the focal firm in terms of the possibility of working 
with both subgroups and of the unique information from both subgroups, giving it the upper 
hand to appropriate a larger share of created value (Dyer et al., 2008; Lavie, 2006). In this 
respect, partner firms with more brokerage opportunities take even more advantage of their 
unique positions in MPAs with deep divisive fault lines (Heidl et al., 2014).   
Therefore, it follows that regardless of the relation between relational separation and 
value creation at MPA, as relational separation increases, particular partner firm(s) can take 
more advantage of their brokerage role to appropriate more value than what other partners can. 
Hypothesis 5: MPA relational separation positively moderates the positive relation 
between the partner firm’s brokerage role and partner firm’s value appropriation.  
Status disparity at MPA-level and status of firms  
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At the firm level, a partner firm that has higher status enjoys its superior situation to 
access critical information, to get the upper hand in the ex-ante negotiations, and to take actions 
in cooperation that cannot be easily responded by their counterparts (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 
2001). In addition, high status partner firm(s) usually take the lead to coordinate the 
collaboration, so they can influence it in a way to be more consistent with their routines and 
appropriate more value than their counterparts can.  
Therefore, regardless of the relation between status disparity and value creation at 
MPA, as status disparity increases, particular partner firm(s) can take more advantage of their 
higher status to appropriate more value than what other partners can. 
Hypothesis 6: MPA status disparity positively moderates the positive relation between 
the partner firm’s status and partner firm’s value appropriation. 
METHODS 
Empirical Design and Data 
 Empirical Design. We tested our theory in the context of research collaboration in a 
group of high-tech industries. We selected a group of high-tech industries that regularly involve 
in practice of patenting innovations, and their heterogeneous population provides ample 
variation to test the hypotheses (Stuart, 2000). In addition, these industries regularly engage in 
multiple and simultaneous alliances to address different technological requirements and the 
risks of developing and launching new products. With this respect, we focus on high-tech 
industries such as pharmaceutical, medical equipment, laboratory, computer, and electronics 
and communication industries with the following three-digit SIC codes: Drugs (SIC: 283), 
Computer and office equipment (SIC: 357), communication equipment (SIC: 366), Electronic 
Components and Accessories (SIC: 367), Laboratory, Optic, Measure, Control Instruments 
(SIC: 382), Surgical, Medical, Dental Instruments (SIC: 384), Telephone Communications 
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(SIC: 481), Communication Services (SIC: 489), Computer Programming, Data Processing, 
etc. (SIC: 737), and Research, Development, Testing Services (SIC: 873).     
Data. We collected the alliance data from the JV & Alliance section of SDC Platinum 
database. We selected the multi-partner R&D alliances that formed between 1990 and 2008 in 
the aforementioned high-tech industries, considering the SIC-Primary (i.e., SICP) flag of 
alliances. We identified 155 multilateral R&D alliances after verifying the alliance status (i.e., 
completion), removing MPAs with undisclosed partners, and comparing the SDC information 
with the ones in FACTIVA dataset. Finally, we tracked historical alliances (all types of 
alliances, including dyadic alliances) all the way back to the year 1985 in order to ensure 
sufficient coverage of active alliances for the required analysis in this study. 
We extracted the patents from the EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database 
(PATSTAT9). PATSTAT covers all registered patents in more than 100 patent offices that 
allows us to aggregate the registered patent at patent family level (DOCDB patent family) to 
cover all the relevant registered patents in different patent offices without over counting those 
registered in multiple offices. This database, as the NBER and the USPTO patent database, 
contains patent number, assignee name, filing year, and grant year, but not CUSIP numbers 
(key identifier used in Compustat & the SDC databases) of the assignee firms, so matching of 
patents with identified firms in our sample is not straightforward.  
Therefore, we took significant care in matching our firm list and patent data. First, we 
used the company directory list, who-owns-whom information, in LexisNexis to identify all 
divisions, subsidiaries, and joint ventures of each firm at the level of parent firm in the sample. 
We then used different online sources to trace each firm’s history to account for name changes, 
 
 
9 PATSTAT Edition: 2017 Autumn; Classification Version: 2013. 
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division names, divestments, acquisitions, and joint ventures; and to obtain precise information 
on the timing of these events. This process yielded a master list of entities that we used to 
identify all patents belonging to sample firms during the period of study. To match the 
corresponding patents to each firm, we first used the name-matching bridge between 
NBER/USPTO patents and Compustat firms provided by Hall and colleagues (Hall et al., 
2001), in which patent assignee names are standardized and matched with firm names in 
Compustat. However, we could find patent information for all partner firms in our sample, and 
we could not determine whether the rest of the firms had no patents or had patents but did not 
appear in this database. In addition, our sample is not limited to the public firms and includes 
non-public firms which are not recorded in Compustat. Therefore, we wrote a name-matching 
program to get additional patent for both public and non-public firms in our database. The 
resulting collected patents were granted between 1985 and 2013 to our sample firms. Finally, 
we dropped 18 alliances of non-patenting firms, as it was not possible to develop both 
independent and dependent variable measures, so the final sample of our study consists of 137 
multipartner R&D alliances.  
 As large firms may diversify in different industries and technologies, relying on all 
their patent data might be misleading in our analysis (Sampson, 2007). To this end, we 
performed a content analysis of the technological description of each alliance agreement to 
determine its technological scope. We obtained the technological descriptions from the SDC 
and FACTIVA. Then, we followed the patent office procedure for examiners to match these 
descriptions to specific technology sub-classes under the Cooperative Patent Classification 






CPC is a common classification system for patent documentation that integrates the USPTO 
(American system) and the EPO (European System) and classifies technologies in hierarchical 
nested levels, such as section, class, subclass, and so on (Cooperative Patent Classification - 
About CPC, n.d.). In short, we made a brief, accurate summary of the technological description 
of each alliance, noted the key technical words, and searched for the synonyms. Then, we used 
the advanced search form in the EPO search engine, and search keywords and synonyms in the 
Title and Abstract fields to retrieve a list of the corresponding sub-classes. Finally, we retrieved 
the corresponding patents to each sub-class and reviewing their abstracts and top claims to 
check the relevancy of the patents to the technological scope of alliances, this procedure is in 
accordance with what is explained in more details with an example in appendix 1 of Chapter 
2. We checked this procedure with a patent examiner at the EPO office in The Hague in the 
Netherlands.  
Measures at MPA-level 
Dependent Variable. The measurement of MPA innovative performance in this study 
context is the aggregated number of granted patents to partner firms within the technological 
scope of alliances in a 5-year window after the alliance formation, namely MPA partners’ post 
alliance in-scope patents. The rationale behind this choice is that in successful R&D 
partnership, firms tend to legally protect their collective created knowledge in their partnership. 
We ideally preferred to use patents registered by all partners as joint-assignees; however, the 
prior studies showed that this practice is not common in high-tech industries due to the legal 
issues (Hagedoorn, 2003), so we counted the post-alliance registered patents by partner firms 
as a proxy of their collective created knowledge.  
 Independent Variables at MPA level. MPA diversity is a multidimensional construct 
that includes the variety, the separation, and the disparity dimensions. To this extent, we 
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followed Harrison and Klein (2007) guidelines and measured each dimension with respect to 
their distinct attributes.   
For the partner variety, we measured the variation of partner firms’ prior-alliance 
knowledge with respect to different knowledge categories. We used the Blau Index (Blau, 
1977) to measure partner variety: 𝐷 =  1 − ∑ 𝑝𝑖
2 , where ‘D’ represents degree of diversity, p 
represents the proportion belonging to a given category ‘i’ which was coded based on. The 
variables range from 0 (a perfectly homogeneous group) to 1 (a perfectly heterogeneous group, 
with members spread evenly among all categories).  
For the relational separation, we followed Heidl et al. (2014) suggestion to compute tie 
strength dispersion. Therefore, to assess tie strength dispersion within each multi-partner 
alliance k in year t-1, we counted the number of prior ties formed by each dyad in the multi-
partner alliance in a five-year moving window (i.e., t-5 to t-1). The strength of each prior tie 
was weighted based on the scope of activities that occurred in the prior alliance: 2 if technology 
co-development is involved and 1 for other activities. We then computed tie strength variance 
across multiple dyads within each sample multi-partner alliance for each year. Variance is 
essentially a measure of polarization that suits measuring of this variable (Harrison & Klein, 
2007). A value of 0 indicates that tie strength is equal across all partner pairs. Higher values of 
variance indicate that tie strength within a multi-partner alliance is concentrated among a subset 
of partner pairs.  
For the status disparity, we used Bonacich centrality, to measure a firm’s positional 
embeddedness. That is, we measured the Bonacich centrality for all sample firms based on their 
collaborative activities in the global alliance network. Then, we followed Harrison and Klein 
(2007) to calculate the coefficient of variation (i.e., Standard Deviation (SD)/mean) of 
positional embeddedness among the multi-partner alliance members. Aligned with our 
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definition for this dimension, the coefficient of variation captures the relative dominance in the 
MPA of partner firms with high levels of global network centrality. 
Control Variables. We included several additional control variables to exclude 
alternative explanations. First, the innovative performance of partner firms before the alliance 
formation may partially address the innovative performance of partner firms after the alliance 
formation. We used the number of registered patents within the alliance scope by partner firms 
before the alliance formation, MPA partners' pre-alliance in-scope patents, as MPA partners’ 
pre-alliance innovative performance. Moreover, we control for MPA partners' pre-alliance 
patents. This variable can also help control for the aggregated size of partner firms, as it 
addresses the size of financial and non-financial resources that come with firm size (Sampson, 
2007).  
Second, there are some other features of the partner firms that might be related to the 
independent variables described above and that may affect the observed innovative 
performance of MPA. To this end, we control for several variables with respect to all 
dimensions of diversity. We control for the partner variety regarding the SIC code (Ozcan & 
Overby, 2008). We measured it by calculating the Blau index of 4-digit SIC codes as Partner 
SIC variety. We also defined Partner government mode variety dummy to address whether all 
the partner firms are either public or private (=0), or a mixed of these two types (=1). In 
addition, we considered the average of the weighted prior alliance numbers, Within MPA mean 
of prior alliances, to distinct between the relational separation in an MPA with high number of 
prior alliances and an MPA with lower number of prior alliances. In the same vein, we 
controlled for Within MPA mean of centrality to distinct between the status disparities between 
MPAs with high status firms and those with low status firms.    
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Finally, we defined dummy variables to control for Joint Ventures (JV) and Cross 
border alliance dummy, as prior suggested that JVs can provide a better platform for learning 
(Mowery et al, 1996) and international alliances may demonstrate different dynamics of R&D 
collaborations (Lane, Salk, and Lyles, 2001). We also control for the Number of partner firms 
and a year indicator for the study time interval (we divided the time-interval of our sample to 
three 6-year period). 
Measures at firm-level 
Dependent Variable. To measure value appropriation, we measure the firm’s 
proportional innovative performance. That is the number of post-alliance patents, granted 
within the technological scope of alliance, by the firm divided by all post-alliance patents, 
granted within the technological scope of alliance, by all partner firms, namely Firm’s 
proportional post alliance in-scope patents. The rationale behind this choice is that we assumed 
that this measure reflects their appropriated value, or more precisely the acquired knowledge, 
from their partnership in compared to their counterparts at the same alliance. 
Moderating variables at the firm level. For measuring the firm’s Internal knowledge 
variety, we measured the variation of partner firms’ prior-alliance knowledge with respect to 
different knowledge categories. We used the Blau Index (Blau, 1977) to measure partner 
variety: 𝐷 =  1 − ∑ 𝑝𝑖
2 where ‘D’ represents degree of diversity, p represents the proportion 
belonging to a given category ‘i’ which was coded based on. The variables range from 0 (a 
perfectly homogeneous group) to 1 (a perfectly heterogeneous group, with members spread 
evenly among all categories).   
For measuring the broker status of partner firms within MPA, we used the ratio of the 
mean to the standard deviation of the number of prior alliances of each partner firm. With this 
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approach, partner firms with high and equal numbers of prior alliances with their counterparts 
get the higher values, consistent with the situation of brokerage role in MPAs. 
 Finally, for measuring the status of partner firms we used the Bonacich centrality of 
each partner firm, as the common measure for the status of the firms (e.g., Shipilov & Li, 2008). 
Control Variables. We included several additional control variables both at firm-level 
and MPA-level to exclude alternative explanations. At the firm level, we controlled for the 
Firm’s proportional pre-alliance in-scope patents, Firm’s pre-alliance total patents, Firm’s 
pre-alliance in-scope patents, and SIC codes.  
At MPA level, we controlled for Partner SIC variety, Partner government mode variety 
dummy, Within MPA mean of prior alliances, Within MPA mean of centrality, Joint venture 
dummy, and Number of partner firms, as it explained above.  
Statistical Methods  
In this study, we deal with two levels of analysis, MPA and firm levels. At MPA level, 
the dependent variable of our model is a count variable that has high variance relative to its 
mean, over-dispersed, so we used negative binomial regression analysis. The likelihood-ratio 
(LR) test of dispersion parameter (i.e., α) shows α is significantly greater than zero in all our 
models, so confirming over dispersion in data and supporting our choice of negative binomial 
over poisson. 
At the firm level, each partner firm is nested in a multi-partner alliance, and both MPA 
and firm level variables are taken into account in the analysis, suggesting the choice of a 
multilevel model to test the hypotheses. Moreover, the dependent variable is fraction, varies 
between 0 and 1. Thus, we initially run a generalized linear mixed model (GLMM). However, 
the higher level of variance appeared trivial, and the log likelihood test to compare GLMM and 
GLM model (i.e., single level model) was not significant. Therefore, we picked a fractional 
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response regression with logit model (fractional logit model) (Papke & Wooldridge, 1996) that 
fit the dependent variable. We chose fractional logit model over the beta regression as the 
dependent variable includes multiple zeros not allowed in beta regression.   
RESULTS 
Results at MPA level 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations at MPA level. The mean of 
MPA innovative performance (2047) as well as MPA partners' pre-alliance innovative 
performance (1265) show that the aggregation of firms’ registered patent is significantly 
increased after the alliance formation (p<0.001 in t-test). The correlation among predictor 
variables are not critically high. We performed a diagnostic test using the “collin” procedure 
in STATA to check for multicollinearity issue. The test showed no VIF higher than 3.2 and the 
conditioning numbers of the models were all less 20, all less than the suggested threshold for 
VIF, 10, and conditioning number, 30 (Table 2); this indicates that multicollinearity does not 
affect our results (Belsley & Kuh, 1993)11. 
Table 2 shows the results of hypothesis tests at MPA level. Model 1 includes only the 
control variables. The control variables reports can be subject to inaccuracy due to other 
possible explanations (Cinelli & Hazlett, 2018), so we just mention the most noticeable results 
with caution. The results show that MPA partners' pre-alliance innovative performance is 
positively associated with innovative performance of MPA. The results show a negative but 
insignificant association between MPA innovative performance and the variety of partners’   
 
 
11 We acknowledge that the collinearity test suits linear regression models, and although our test is 
common in extant research, the relevancy of the results should be consider with cautious. However, our 
robustness tests did not show any indication of multicollinearity in our models. 
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics (MPA LEVEL) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 MPA innovative performance 1.00             
2 Partner Knowledge variety -0.03 1.00            
3 Relational separation 0.42 0.12 1.00           
4 Structural disparity 0.09 0.11 0.36 1.00          
5 MPA partners' pre alliance innovative performance 0.88 -0.01 0.48 0.03 1.00         
6 MPA partner firm pre alliance patents 0.47 0.10 0.47 0.02 0.68 1.00        
7 Partner SIC variety -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.15 -0.05 -0.08 1.00       
8 Partner government mode variety dummy -0.16 -0.10 -0.23 -0.02 -0.18 -0.29 0.05 1.00      
9 Within MPA mean of prior alliances 0.35 0.05 0.67 0.02 0.38 0.55 -0.03 -0.43 1.00     
10 Within MPA mean of centrality   0.19 0.06 0.07 -0.01 0.12 0.20 -0.14 -0.09 0.20 1.00    
11 Joint venture dummy -0.01 0.21 0.17 0.09 0.05 0.17 -0.07 0.15 0.05 0.00 1.00   
12 Cross border alliance dummy 0.01 -0.04 -0.12 -0.10 0.01 0.09 -0.06 -0.07 0.07 0.08 0.04 1.00  
13 Number of partner firms 0.37 0.00 0.16 0.12 0.26 0.18 -0.09 0.24 -0.07 0.06 0.24 -0.09 1.00 
 Mean 2047.22 0.60 0.19 0.41 1265.34 7714.28 0.02 0.50 0.22 0.02 0.18 0.14 3.76 
 S.D. 2759.07 0.22 0.19 0.23 2041.59 7427.14 0.15 0.50 0.24 0.01 0.38 0.35 1.33 
 Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 





modes as well as partners’ industries. These results are unreliable but consistent with the 
findings of alliance portfolio studies (Jiang et al., 2010) and suggests that MPAs with different 
types of partners’ government mode and industry are less innovative than uniform MPAs with 
those respects, due to lower levels of mutual understanding and incentive across partner firms.  
In Model 2, the variable Partner variety is introduced to test H1. The results support the 
hypothesize inverted-U shape relation between Partner variety and MPA innovative 
performance. Partner variety is positive and significant (Model 2: β = 16.250, SE = 1.791, p = 
0.000), and Partner variety squared is negative and significant (Model 2: β = -13.930, SE = 
1.746, p = 0.000). We followed Haans et al. (2016) recommendation for testing the curvilinear 
relations. The slope tests at the lower range is positive and significant (β = 16.254, SE = 1.791, 
p = 0.000), and at the highest range is negative and significant (β = -7.772, SE = 1.387, p = 
0.000). In addition, the turning point at which Partner variety begins to exhibit a negative effect 
on firm learning occurs at 0.583 (β = 0.583, SE = 0.213 , p = 0.000), within the data range (0, 
0.86), and 39.4 percent of observations have Partner variety values below that level. All 
confirms a quadratic relation in which MPA innovative performance increases with partner 
variety and hits its maximum at the 39th percentile of partner variety range, but after that, the 
positive association turns to be negative.    
In Model 3, we included the variable Relational separation to test H2. The results 
support the hypothesize inverted-U shape relation between Relational separation and MPA 
innovative performance. Relational separation is positive and significant (Model 3: β = 9.110, 
SE = 1.810, p = 0.000), and Relational separation squared is negative and significant (Model 
3: β = -15.130, SE = 2.595, p = 0.000). The slope tests at the lower range is positive and 
significant (β = 9.110, SE = 1.810, p = 0.000), and at the highest range is negative and 
significant (β = -10076.89, SE = 1728.368, p = 0.000). In addition, the turning point at which 
Relational separation begins to exhibit a negative effect on firm learning occurs at 0.301 (β =   
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  TABLE 2: Negative Binomial Estimates for MPA Diversity and Value Creation 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Partner variety (H1)  16.25***   14.43*** 
  (1.791)   (1.750) 
Partner variety squared (H1)  -13.93***   -12.67*** 
  (1.746)   (1.716) 
Relational separation (H2)   9.110***  7.691*** 
   (1.810)  (1.954) 
Relational separation squared (H2)   -15.13***  -13.27*** 
   (2.595)  (2.531) 
Structural disparity (H3)    0.459 -0.563 
    (1.656) (1.437) 
Structural disparity squared (H3)    0.563 0.583 
    (1.820) (1.523) 
MPA partners' pre-alliance innovative performance 0.000651*** 0.000694*** 0.000657*** 0.000629*** 0.000656*** 
 (0.000109) (9.51e-05) (8.70e-05) (0.000107) (7.89e-05) 
MPA partner firm pre-alliance patents 3.14e-06 -1.11e-05 2.02e-05 1.82e-05 -1.16e-05 
 (2.51e-05) (2.14e-05) (2.52e-05) (2.35e-05) (2.17e-05) 
Partner SIC variety -1.167 -0.687 -1.516** -0.873 -1.008 
 (0.752) (0.678) (0.725) (0.761) (0.667) 
Partner government mode variety dummy -0.328 -0.390** -0.242 -0.444** -0.310 
 (0.233) (0.196) (0.224) (0.222) (0.195) 
Within MPA mean of prior alliances 0.617  0.384  0.184 
 (0.645)  (0.701)  (0.655) 
Within MPA mean of centrality 14.84   17.30* 16.53** 
 (9.815)   (9.930) (8.065) 
Joint venture dummy 0.161 0.0885 0.311 0.152 0.387 
 (0.297) (0.275) (0.277) (0.292) (0.256) 
Cross border alliance dummy -0.0864 0.0211 0.109 0.0338 0.0689 
 (0.323) (0.286) (0.316) (0.332) (0.275) 
Number of partner firms 0.0896 0.0402 0.0234 0.0721 0.0331 
 (0.0902) (0.0771) (0.0865) (0.0922) (0.0771) 
SIC dummies included included included included included 
Year dummies included included included included included 
Constant 4.767*** 1.403** 3.968*** 4.330*** 1.087* 
 (0.661) (0.576) (0.630) (0.766) (0.653) 
Observations 137 137 137 137 137 
Log Likelihood -1082 -1060 -1071 -1080 -1047 
Degree of Freedom 18 18 19 19 24 
Wald's chi square 1.20E+05 1.20E+05 7.70E+03 1.20E+05 6.70E+04 
α (dispersion parameter) 1.314 1.016 1.155 1.291 0.856 
Condition number |Mean VIF 13.94|2.92 14.20|2.68 14.08|3.14 13.39|2.69 19.21|2.95 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
0.301, SE = 0.273 , p = 0.000), within the data range (0, 1), and 74.5 percent of observations 
have Relational separation values below that level. All confirms a quadratic relation in which 
MPA innovative performance increases with relational separation and hits its maximum at the 
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75th percentile of relational separation range, but after that, the positive association turns to be 
negative.  
In model 4, we included the variable Structural disparity to test H3. The results do not 
support the hypothesize inverted-U shape relation between Structural disparity and MPA 
innovative performance. Structural disparity is positive but insignificant (Model 4: β = 0.459, 
SE = 1.656, p = 0.782), and Structural disparity squared is also positive and insignificant 
(Model 4: β = 0.563, SE = 1.820, p = 0.757). Then we tested the linear relation. The results 
show a positive but marginal significant between Structural disparity and MPA innovative 
performance. The coefficient (β = 0.948, SE = 0.487, p = 0.052) suggests that a one standard 
deviation increase in Structural disparity increase the MPA innovative performance by a 
considerable factor of 158% (= e0.95 − 1), while holding all other variables in the model 
constant. 
We next incorporated all the independent variables corresponding to the hypotheses 
H1, H2, and H3 into Model 5. The results were unchanged. In sum, while the results provide 
support for H1 and H2, H3 is not supported in our sample.  
Results at the firm level 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations at the firm level. The 
correlation among predictor variables are not critically high. We performed a diagnostic test 
using the “collin” procedure in Stata to check for multicollinearity issue. The test showed no 
VIF higher than 2.9 and the conditioning numbers of the models were all less 21, all less than 
the suggested threshold for VIF, 10, and conditioning number, 30 (Table 4); this indicates that 
multicollinearity does not affect our results (Belsley & Kuh, 1993). 
Table 4 shows the estimations results of fractional response regression. Model 1 
includes the control variables. The proportion of partner firms’ prior alliance in-scope patent 
78 
 
number to MPA (total patents) has a significant positive effect on the proportion of partner 
firms’ post alliance in-scope patent number to MPA, as value appropriation (hereafter), and the 
number of partners has a negative effect; both expectable. 
In Model 2, the interaction of internal knowledge variety and partner variety on value 
appropriation (H4) is tested. The coefficient is positive and significant (Model 2: β = 6.798, SE 
= 1.630, p = 0.000). The marginal plot of interaction terms in Figure 1a shows that when Partner 
firms’ internal knowledge variation increases the marginal effect of partner knowledge variety 
on partner firm’s value appropriation increases, supporting H4.  
Model 3 includes the interaction of brokerage-role of the partner firms with relational 
separation to address the H5. The coefficient is positive and significant (Model 3: β = 0.192, 
SE = 0.0076, p = 0.010). The marginal plot of interaction terms in Figure 1b show that as the 
broker status increases the positive effect of relational separation on partner firm’s value 
appropriation increases, supporting H5.  
Model 4 addresses H6, in which we asserted that partner firms with a higher status take 
more advantage from the disparity in their partnerships. The coefficient of interaction term is 
positive and marginally significant (Model 4: β = 23.354, SE = 0.383, p = 0.053). The marginal 
plot of interaction terms in Figure 1c illustrates how with increasing the status disparity of 
partner firms, firms with stronger network position benefit from status disparity, marginally 
supporting H6.   
Finally, we incorporated all the independent variables corresponding to the Hypotheses H4, 
H5, and H6 into Models 5, 6, 7 respectively. The results for interaction variables were 





TABLE 3: Descriptive Statistics (Firm Level) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Firm’s proportional post alliance in-scope patents 1.00                
2 Internal knowledge variety 0.15 1.00               
3 Broker status 0.19 0.13 1.00              
4 Bonacich Centrality 0.22 0.27 0.22 1.00             
5 Partner variety -0.42 0.16 0.00 0.03 1.00            
6 Relational separation -0.14 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.11 1.00           
7 Structural disparity -0.11 -0.07 0.01 -0.04 0.06 0.39 1.00          
8 Firm’s proportional pre-alliance in-scope patents 0.88 0.16 0.16 0.23 -0.41 -0.14 -0.10 1.00         
9 Firm's prior alliance total patents 0.27 0.42 0.22 0.34 0.06 0.26 -0.02 0.28 1.00        
10 Firm's prior alliance in-scope patents 0.21 0.24 0.07 0.24 -0.05 0.34 0.02 0.23 0.57 1.00       
11 Partner SIC variety 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.14 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 1.00      
12 Partner government mode variety dummy 0.07 -0.23 -0.09 -0.04 -0.07 -0.17 0.03 0.07 -0.25 -0.18 0.03 1.00     
13 Within MPA mean of prior alliances -0.09 0.18 0.15 0.10 0.06 0.69 0.05 -0.09 0.39 0.32 -0.03 -0.40 1.00    
14 Within MPA mean of centrality -0.04 0.09 0.04 0.65 0.05 0.03 -0.05 0.00 0.12 0.06 -0.13 -0.07 0.16 1.00   
15 Joint venture dummy -0.09 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.24 0.21 0.07 -0.09 0.05 -0.03 -0.07 0.13 0.07 0.01 1.00  
16 Number of alliance partners -0.16 -0.06 -0.12 0.05 -0.02 0.22 0.19 -0.14 -0.09 0.02 -0.10 0.24 -0.07 0.07 0.26 1.00 
 Mean 0.22 0.73 5.77 0.02 0.60 0.20 0.42 0.20 2071.77 204.11 0.02 0.55 0.21 0.02 0.21 4.22 
 S.D. 0.28 0.34 17.33 0.02 0.22 0.20 0.24 0.26 3098.48 435.88 0.13 0.50 0.23 0.01 0.41 1.70 
 Min 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 
 Max 1.00 0.99 266.58 0.14 0.86 1.00 1.00 1.00 21100.00 3202.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.07 1.00 9.00 
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TABLE 4: Fractional Logit Model: Value Appropriation (proportional) at the Firm Level 
Proportional value appropriation (Firm’s proportional post alliance in-scope patents) (DV) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Internal knowledge variety  -1.735*   -1.591* 0.808** 0.840** 
  (0.939)   (0.877) (0.357) (0.356) 
Partner variety  -6.733***   -6.213*** -1.350*** -1.332*** 
  (1.418)   (1.270) (0.493) (0.493) 
Internal knowledge variety*Partner variety 6.798***   6.210***   
  (1.630)   (1.485)   
Broker status   -0.00524  7.73e-05 -0.00458 -0.000884 
   (0.00362)  (0.00154) (0.00308) (0.00147) 
Relational separation   -0.833**  -0.0226 -0.119 -0.0132 
   (0.409)  (0.397) (0.435) (0.384) 
Broker status*Relational separation   0.0192**   0.0132*  
   (0.00751)   (0.00718)  
Bonacich centrality    1.577 13.47*** 14.99*** 0.594 
    (7.270) (3.285) (3.691) (7.592) 
Structural disparity    -1.220*** -0.549** -0.797*** -1.200*** 
    (0.371) (0.270) (0.291) (0.402) 
Bonacich centrality*Structural disparity    23.54*   24.76** 
    (12.15)   (12.36) 
Firm’s proportional pre-alliance in-scope 
patents 5.401*** 4.731*** 5.373*** 5.199*** 4.529*** 4.911*** 4.871*** 
 (0.394) (0.403) (0.395) (0.383) (0.427) (0.418) (0.420) 
Firm’s pre-alliance total patents 4.89e-05*** 1.71e-05 4.93e-05*** 3.79e-05** 1.66e-05 3.61e-05** 3.70e-05** 
 (1.81e-05) (1.77e-05) (1.79e-05) (1.63e-05) (1.70e-05) (1.75e-05) (1.77e-05) 
Firm’s pre-alliance in-scope patents 3.86e-05 0.000105 7.05e-05 1.90e-05 9.24e-05 -3.20e-05 -2.18e-05 
 (9.57e-05) (0.000103) (9.96e-05) (9.42e-05) (0.000105) (0.000102) (0.000102) 
Partner SIC variety 0.0364 -0.246   -0.410 -0.127 -0.163 
 (0.315) (0.511)   (0.548) (0.410) (0.417) 
Partner government mode variety dummy 0.0912 0.168   0.132 0.116 0.148 
 (0.136) (0.124)   (0.124) (0.132) (0.128) 
Within MPA mean of prior alliances -0.0247  0.110  0.00547 -0.0708 -0.102 
 (0.287)  (0.334)  (0.368) (0.367) (0.357) 
Within MPA mean of centrality -8.120*   -20.14*** -25.12*** -24.33*** -18.28*** 
 (4.932)   (6.856) (5.914) (6.571) (6.772) 
Joint venture dummy -0.119 -0.0934 -0.0785 -0.121 -0.111 -0.00244 -0.0170 
 (0.132) (0.129) (0.123) (0.120) (0.127) (0.122) (0.121) 
Number of partner firms -0.121** -0.141*** -0.0936* -0.110** -0.136*** -0.125** -0.131** 
 (0.0536) (0.0460) (0.0479) (0.0444) (0.0473) (0.0513) (0.0512) 
Firm SIC dummies included included included included included included included 
Year dummies included included included included included included included 
Constant -2.097*** -0.00968 -2.097*** -1.439** 0.328 -1.331* -1.221 
 (0.523) (0.853) (0.536) (0.581) (0.817) (0.788) (0.796) 
Observations 509 509 509 509 509 509 509 
Log Likelihood -183.3 -178.1 -183.2 -181.6 -176.9 -179.8 -179.7 
Pseudo R squared 0.31 0.329 0.311 0.316 0.334 0.323 0.324 
Condition number |Mean VIF 10.25|1.93 15.00|1.97 10.04|2.27 10.69|2.16 20.73|2.9 20.73|2.10 20.73|2.11 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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FIGURE 1a, b, & c:  
The marginal effect plot of interaction terms for Firm’s internal knowledge variety and 
Partner variety in MPAs (a: the upper one), for Firm’s broker status and Relational separation 
in MPAs (b: the middle one), and for the Firm’s Bonacich centrality and structural disparity 










In this study, we investigated the performance consequence of multi-partner alliance 
diversity at both multi-partner alliance (MPA) and firm levels in the context of research 
collaboration. We made a distinction among the different types of resources, to underline the 
distinct dynamics of different dimensions of diversity in multi-partner alliances. Then, we 
examined the performance variation of both MPA and partner firms with respect to the MPA 
diversity along each of these dimensions. Our results show while diversity in within-firm 
resources, namely partner variety, and between-firm resources, namely relational separation,  
have an inverted U-shaped effect on MPA performance, diversity in network resources, namely 
status disparity, has a linear positive effect on performance. Our findings also reveal the 
diverging mechanisms between value creation at the multi-partner alliance level and value 
appropriation at the firm level regarding each dimension of MPA diversity. We demonstrate 
that some partners can benefit more than others do, even if the total partnership is worse off, 
and vice versa. This divergence depends on the advantage or disadvantage of a partner firm to 
its counterpart in each dimension.  
Our systematic approach to examine the performance consequence of MPA diversity 
contribute to the growing research on multi-partner alliances. Prior research on MPA has 
shown that how the variation of different types of resources affect the stability and performance 
of MPAs (Heidl et al., 2014; Xu et al., 2014; X. Yin et al., 2012). We contribute to this stream 
of research by examining the effect of variation of different types of resources on the collective 
advantage of partner firms at MPA level as well as the advantage of partner firms in their multi-
lateral partnership. 
  At the MPA level, our results show the performance consequences of variation in 
different types of resources across partner firms. These findings addressed the quest for 
research on MPA as a strategic entity (Gomes-Casseres, 2003; Lavie et al., 2007). With this 
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respect, this study bridges between research on MPAs and the longstanding stream of strategy 
research on the performance consequence of diversification strategy (Rumelt, 1982; 
Montgomery, 1985; Markides & Williamson, 1996; Richter et al., 2017; Ahuja & Novelli, 
2017). In the context of multi-partner alliances, as collective, voluntary organizational 
associations, diversification is a consequence of the initial decision of partner firms at the time 
of alliance formation, as well as the decision of partner firms to stay, leave, or invite and accept 
the new partners to join their alliance. Our findings show that diversity in different types of 
resources leads to distinct rent variation at both MPA and firm levels. This approach addresses 
the call in the literature for more fine-grained theoretical and empirical analysis of the 
mechanisms through which diversity adds or subtracts value (Ahuja & Novelli, 2017). 
At the firm level, our findings show how a partner firm’s resource attributes condition 
the value that it appropriates from their partnerships. Only a few studies in IOR research have 
elaborated on the moderating role of firm’s resource attributes in the appropriation of total 
created value in its partnerships. For example, in alliance portfolio research, Srivastava and 
Gnyawali (2011) showed that how the technological diversity and strength of a focal firm 
condition the positive impact of diversity and quality of resources in the alliance portfolio on 
the rate of breakthrough innovation. We contribute to this approach and examine how MPA 
diversity in each dimension moderates the relation between firm’s resource attributes and its 
value appropriation.   
Our findings also contribute to the understanding of value creation and appropriation 
mechanisms of MPAs by taking into account both the value creation at the MPA and the value 
appropriation mechanisms at the firm levels in the same study. On one hand, the value creation 
mechanism at the MPA is a function of partner firms’ contributed resources to MPA as well as 
the dynamics of cooperation and coordination of partner firms in their mutual effort (Gulati et 
al., 2012; Gulati, 1998). On the other hand, the value appropriation mechanism at the firm level 
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depends on the value of firms’ contributions, as well as their internal resources, their brokerage 
position, and their status and power (Adegbesan & Higgins, 2011; Dyer et al., 2008; Lavie, 
2006; Lavie et al., 2007). Our findings show the divergence of these two mechanisms at MPA 
and firm levels in such a way that the value creation mechanisms in MPAs may not be 
compatible with the value appropriation mechanism in partner firms. In simple words, we show 
that what is beneficial for the alliance is not necessarily beneficial for all partner firms, and 
vice versa. 
Moreover, this study offers some managerial implications. The diverging mechanisms 
of value creation and appropriation in MPAs suggests that managers should pay attention to 
the trade-off between MPA performance and the proportional performance of partner firms in 
their decision to join, stay, or leave an MPA. The proportional performance of partner firm is 
critical at it usually shapes the perceived value of firms and influence their contribution to MPA 
(Fonti et al., 2017). For example, an SME may not proportionally benefit from staying in a 
partnership with an optimum diversity due to its resource disadvantages, and consequently 
decide to leave or reduce their collaboration level, while its absolute performance is higher than 
joining a partnership with less diversity. As another example, while an MPA has been already 
divided into subgroups due to its excessive relational separation, a firm with good relations 
with the MPA subgroup members may still decide to join at the cost of the other members’ 
performance.        
Naturally, this research has important limitations. First, the alliances examined in this 
study are those pertaining to research collaborations, and although our argumentation is general 
and can apply to all types of alliances, caution is needed regarding the generalizability of our 
findings to the other types of alliances (e.g., marketing, manufacturing, and supply chain).  
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Second, our selected measures for the MPA and partner firm’s performance are not the 
most precise measure of the performance, given the accuracy of patents in measuring the firm’s 
(innovative) performance. However, our treatment in specifying the scope of the alliance offers 
a solution to use patent data in a more precise way to measure innovative performance of the 
firms. Third, performance is a multifaceted construct and measuring the performance in one 
aspect may not represent the full realized performance of alliances and partner firms. However, 
we tried to partially address this issue by narrowing our sample selection strategy to the 
research collaborations that explicitly specified their research agenda. In addition, the same 
argument might be applicable to the other aspects of performance such as status accumulation, 
market share, or financial outcome.   
 Further studies are needed to understand better the complexity of configurations and 
dynamics of value creation and appropriation in MPAs. MPAs appear in different forms and 
we only focus on one form (i.e., R&D collaboration) in this research. Investigating the 
configuration and dynamics of the other forms of MPAs may improve our general 
understanding of this phenomenon. Future research might also take into account the other types 
of performance to further improve our theoretical and empirical understanding of dynamic of 
value creation and creation in MPAs. This research tried to address the performance of MPAs 
in a specific context with elaboration on the alliance scope. However, we believe that it is 
necessary to have a systematic examination of alliance performance measures at the alliance 
level, rather than the common focal firm level. Finally, our approach to systematically examine 
the diversity in the context of multi-partner alliances can apply to other relevant phenomena 





INCUMBENT SUCCESS IN THE ERA OF FERMENT:                                
NAVIGATION OF INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSITION OF LITHOGRAPHY 
TECHNOLOGY WITHIN ASML 
ABSTRACT 
How can some incumbent firms proactively navigate technological change while others 
fail to do so? We explore this question by studying the dynamics of incumbents’ engagement 
in an era of ferment, in which new technological options challenge the dominance of the current 
technology generation. We take a real option theory perspective and focus on a successful 
incumbent firm, ASML, in a period when varieties of new technological options were 
threatening the dominance of the optical-lithography regime. Our findings show that ASML 
managed this turbulent period in such a way that it gained the core position in both the existing 
and in the new technological regime. First, ASML proactively engaged in the experimental 
development of technological options. Second, ASML persistently relied on the scientific rules 
of physics and economics, rather than on their current performance, in the assessment of the 
long-term feasibility and extendibility of technological options. Third, timely commitment to 
and abandonment of technological options in its portfolio enabled ASML to play an active role 
in the dynamics of transition to the next generation of lithography technology. 





Technological change starts with a turbulent period, the so-called era of ferment, in 
which new, emerging technologies challenge the dominance of existing technologies 
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990). In this era, there is an intense competition between technologies, 
as well as between new and existing technologies, to dominate the market (Anderson & 
Tushman, 1990; Dosi, 1982). During this period incumbents need to take timely actions to 
survive, but their established core and complementary capabilities, which give them the edge 
in the reign of existing technology, may be a liability at this time (Tushman & Anderson, 1986). 
Research has extensively studied the competition between old and new technologies 
(e.g., Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Dosi, 1982), the success factors of winner technologies 
(e.g., Schilling, 1998, 2002), and the strategic actions of incumbent and new firms in the era of 
ferment (e.g., Tripsas, 1997). However, it has mainly focused on the reaction of incumbent 
firms to the rise of new technologies, rather than their possible proactive engagement in the 
development and selection of these technologies. Therefore, the proactive engagement of 
incumbents in the era of ferment has remained largely unstudied, with only a few exceptions 
(Eggers, 2016; Eggers & Kaul, 2017; Moeen & Agarwal, 2016). A potential reason for this 
oversight is that this research stream mainly considers the emergence of a new technology as 
an exogenous shock, which punctuates the existing technology trajectory, and examines the 
heterogeneity of incumbents’ responses (for a recent review see Eggers and Park (2018)). In 
addition, these studies mainly apply theoretical lenses such as resource-based view, dynamic 
capabilities, or ambidexterity to examine the heterogeneity of incumbent firms’ reaction to 
technological changes. However, while these theoretical lenses describe how companies 
explore and adopt to these new technologies in general, they do not offer the required 
framework to understand the incumbents’ behaviors in the era of ferment (Chi et al., 2019; 
Raisch & Tushman, 2016). How do they choose between different emerging technologies, and 
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how do they decide to scale up, or to end their inquiries? Moreover, how may their behavior 
affect the selection process of a new dominant technology?   
In this study, we explore the proactive engagement of incumbents in the development 
of different technological options and their potential influence in the selection of the next 
dominant technology. We qualify the punctuated-equilibrium based explanation of the era of 
ferment, by incorporating a gradual model of technology growth. This approach enables us to 
trace the proactive engagement of incumbent firms in the era of ferment.  
We conducted an explorative case study to understand the dynamics of the era of 
ferment and the rationale of a successful incumbent’s behavior. We chose an exemplary 
incumbent firm, ASML, which successfully passed through a turbulent period in the 
lithography equipment industry, in which a variation of existing optical-lithography 
technologies and emerging particle-based and X-ray technologies competed to become the next 
dominant technology. To understand ASML’s actions in this uncertain period, we apply a real 
option perspective. The real option view equips us with a dynamic, forward-looking 
perspective to study how ASML identified, invested in, abandoned, or continued technological 
options. 
Our findings offer several contributions to research in technological change as well as 
to real option theory. Our detailed observations shed light on the evolutionary side of 
technological discontinuity. We revisit the punctuated-equilibrium based explanation of the era 
of ferment and delineate the technology selection process in this era. Our findings reveal how 
ASML managed the era of ferment in such a way that it gained the core position in both the 
existing and the new technological regime. First, ASML proactively engaged in the 
experimental development of technological options. Second, ASML persistently relied on the 
scientific rules of physics and economics in the assessment of the long-term feasibility and 
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extendibility of technological options, rather than on the current state of their performance. 
Finally, the timely commitment to and abandonment of technological options, alongside the 
formation and termination of corresponding collaborations that ASML engaged in, enabled 
ASML to play an active role in the transition of the industry to the next generation of 
lithography technology. Our study not only answers to the recent call for detailed examination 
of real option portfolios consisting of interdependent options (Trigeorgis & Reuer, 2017), it 
also offers a unique insight into the dynamics of endogenous and exogenous uncertainties over 
the course of technological change, within a portfolio of technological options. 
BACKGROUND: ENGAGEMENT IN THE ERA OF FERMENT  
The Battle of Technologies in the Era of Ferment & the Proactive Engagement of 
Incumbent Firms  
The process of technological change as well as the heterogeneity of incumbents in 
adapting to new technology has been a center of attention in the strategy literature. At the 
technology level, earlier research has focused on the modeling of this transition by either 
continuous models, such as the S-form model (Adner & Kapoor, 2016; Foster, 1988; Sood et 
al., 2012), or by discontinuous models such as the cyclical punctuated equilibrium model, to 
highlight the discontinuity between the existing dominant technology and new technologies 
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990). Both perspectives highlight the dynamics and the uncertainty 
of this transition in the so-called era of ferment, in which a variety of new and existing 
technologies compete to become the next dominant technology (Anderson & Tushman, 1990). 
At the firm level, studies have mainly developed discontinuous models of technological change 
and focused on the antecedents of incumbents’ heterogeneous responses to technology change 
(see Eggers and Park (2018) for a recent review). 
These studies offer significant insights into the patterns of technology change, and the 
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heterogeneity of incumbents’ adaptation to this change. However, there are some interrelated 
shortcomings in both groups of studies. First, at the technology level, studies fall short to offer 
an integrative view that covers both continuous and discontinuous change (for an exception see 
Adner & Kapoor, 2016). Therefore, we know less about the issue of timing in the era of 
ferment; when emergent technologies start challenging the existing one, and when the winner 
technology comes out of the selection process and starts its domination. At the firm level, 
studies take new technologies as exogenous shocks that provoke reactions from incumbents to 
survive. Therefore, their possible proactive engagement in the era of ferment is largely ignored 
(for an exception see Eggers (2016)). 
We believe that this deficiency is mainly rooted in the fact that firm-level studies 
conceptualize technological change mainly based on the discontinuous model, and overlook 
the gradual and continuous development of disruptive technologies over time. Therefore, they 
focus on the period when a new superior technology has already been developed to the level 
that it can seriously challenge and discontinue the existing technology. In this approach, there 
is no room for considering the early engagement of incumbent firms in the development and 
selection of new technologies, as well as the competitive dynamics between varieties of new 
and existing technologies.  
However, there are several examples of new technologies that failed to replace the 
existing technology, such as bubble memory that failed to challenge random access memory 
(Cockburn, 2003). Also, some incumbent firms not only passed through several technological 
changes in their history, but also took the lead in many of these changes. For example, Intel 
Company has been an industry leader for decades and has continuously discontinued 
technologies in its successive microprocessor generations. The current study explores how 
incumbent firms can be successful across technology generations, by focusing on their 
proactive engagement in technology development and decision making in the era of ferment.  
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Real Option Perspective to the Management of Technological Choice in the Era 
of ferment 
We started our inductive exploration of the challenges of proactive engagement of 
incumbents during the era of ferment on the basis of an interest in this phenomenon, rather than 
to develop or apply a specific theoretical perspective. However, we soon realized that the real 
option perspective could guide our inquiry and help us frame our research questions and 
findings. The real option perspective is a proper choice to examine irreversible decision-
making processes under uncertainty, when the option value is not known ex ante, and the future 
opportunities are a function of prior investment commitments (Bowman & Hurry, 1993; 
McGrath, 1997; Trigeorgis & Reuer, 2017; Chi et al., 2019). The real option view is 
particularly applicable when investments are divisible and sequential, and when having the 
possibility of deferring the decision to expand or abandon the investment can increase the 
chance of the upside outcome while reducing downside risk of decision making under 
uncertainty (Adner & Levinthal, 2004; Klingebiel & Adner, 2015; McGrath et al., 2004). 
 Received research into technological change has mainly relied on arguments based on 
resource-based theory (Tushman & Anderson, 1986), the dynamic capabilities perspective 
(Danneels, 2011), or the ambidexterity view (Taylor & Helfat, 2009) in examining survival 
antecedents of incumbents in the face of technological change. These perspectives mainly 
assume that incumbents react to technological discontinuities, and offer limited insight into 
incumbents’ proactive engagement in the era of ferment (Chi et al., 2019; Raisch & Tushman, 
2016). In contrast, a real option perspective offers a dynamic and forward-looking framework 
to examine the firm’s proactive decision-making and actions in this turbulent period, in which 
the outcome of competition among technological option is not clear ex ante, but the 
incumbents’ success is a function of their timely commitment to the winning option (Eggers, 
2016; McGrath et al., 2004). 
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We believe that not only real option theory is a proper perspective to examine 
incumbents’ behavior in the era of ferment; the era of ferment also is a unique context to expand 
the application of real option theory in strategy research. First, the dynamics of the era of 
ferment fit the real option life cycle. On one hand, the era of ferment starts with the emergence 
of new technologies that challenge the continuity of existing technology dominance, then 
competition follows over performance and compatibility with the supporting ecosystem 
between developing new technologies and extended existing technology, and finally this 
turbulent period ends with the domination of the winner technology. On the other hand, the life 
cycle of real options starts with the identification of hidden options, creation or acquisition of 
an option at a premium, preservation and management of the firm’s real option portfolio, and 
finally valuing and exercising the selected one(s) and abandoning the others (Trigeorgis & 
Reuer, 2017, p. 47; Bowman & Hurry, 1993). Therefore, examination of incumbent firms with 
respect to technological options over the different stages of the era of ferment fits our firm-
level analysis of the dynamics of technological competition at the technology level. We 
specifically examine how the timing and management of the technological options in the era 
of ferment can determine the success of incumbents.  
Second, the era of ferment is marked by multi-lateral competition between a variety of 
emerging technologies and the existing technology, so incumbent firms may identify and create 
a bundle of competitive technological options among all the possible choices to minimize their 
downside risk and maximize their benefit (Vassolo et al., 2004). The technological portfolio in 
the era of ferment is a particular case. There are just a few competitive options available in this 
period to be chosen by few actors, so adding one option influences the underlying socio-
technological mechanisms that determine the value and uncertainty of other options. Therefore, 
examination of incumbents’ actions in the era of ferment contributes to our understanding of 
the dynamics of timing, valuation, and uncertainty of a portfolio of competitive options with 
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limited number, and to a longstanding conversation in the literature on the boundary conditions 
of real option perspective.  
To this end, we articulate our research question based on the real option framework as 
follows: How do incumbent firms proactively identify, create, and manage a portfolio of 
competing technological options, and play an active role in the valuation and selection of 
upcoming technologies during the era of ferment? 
The remainder of this study is as follows. After introducing our methods and the context 
of our study in the next sections, we identify the stages of the era of ferment, and take the 
perspective of the life cycle of real options to explain ASML’s actions in each step (Figure 1). 
 FIGURE 1: The different stages of technology development in the era of ferment and 
the lifecycle of real options 
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Finally, we discuss our findings and formulate our contributions. 
METHODS 
Research Methods and Context 
Given the limited theory and empirical evidence on our research question, we 
conducted an inductive study of a single case. The inductive approach suits process-based 
research questions extant studies have not yet thoroughly addressed (Glaser & Strauss, 1971), 
and a single case study provides the rich and detailed data for our multifaceted research 
question (R. K. Yin, 2017). We started our study based on the principles of grounded theory 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1971) to explore our original question on the proactive engagement of 
successful incumbent firms in technology development and decision making in the era of 
ferment. Then, we followed an iterative process of moving back and forth between literature 
and data to take a proper theoretical lens to frame our findings.   
We chose an incumbent firm in the semiconductor lithography equipment industry, 
ASML, that successfully passed the era of ferment. Lithography is a key process used by 
semiconductor manufacturers to create integrated circuits (ICs) chips. This context attracted 
many studies as it has experienced several generations of technologies in its explosive growth 
path over the past half-century (Adner & Kapoor, 2010, 2016; Henderson & Clark, 1990; 
Iansiti, 2000). We focus on an under-explored period in which different technological regimes 
such as particle based (i.e., Ion-beam, and E-Beam), and X-ray (i.e., soft X-ray (EUV), and 
hard X-ray) were competing to be selected as the next generation of lithography technology, 
called “NGL” in this industry. During this period, which approximately covers the period 
between the mid-1990s to the mid-2000, emerging technological regimes challenged the 
domination of existing optical-lithography technology. The domination of each of these 
technological regimes could come with significant changes in the core technology and 
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ecosystem of the industry. Therefore, the situation corresponds to the conditions of the era of 
ferment.    
We choose ASML as an exemplary successful case. ASML actively engaged in this 
critical period of the industry in the development of emerging technological regimes, while 
they also made a significant contribution to the extension of the optical-lithography regime. 
The result was that ASML came out of this turbulent period as the market leader for both the 
old and new technological regimes.  
Empirical Data and Analytical Method 
Data. Our case study proceeded in three stages: first, to understand the technological 
roadmap of the lithography industry and identify the era of ferment, we conducted a historical 
analysis of the industry, mainly based on industry reports, industry history, and technical 
monographs (e.g., Bakshi, 2009; Brown & Linden, 2011), electrical engineering and 
semiconductor journals (e.g., Harriott, 2001; Ito & Okazaki, 2000), and management studies 
that used this industry as their research context (e.g., Adner & Kapoor, 2010, 2016; Henderson 
& Clark, 1990). We also used public data such as financial and patent data, and checked our 
insights in expert interviews.  
In the second step, we conducted in-depth interviews which formed our main source of 
information for the study. We followed a snowballing sampling strategy. We started 
interviewing some of the core decision makers of the period at ASML, to investigate 
perceptions of the situation, decisions, and rationales behind decisions. Then we asked them to 
provide us with the list of people who were engaged in decision making within ASML and 
across the industry. One of our key respondents in ASML provided us with lists of industry 
experts who participated in and contributed to SEMATECH conferences, a consortium in 
charge of navigation of semiconductor technology roadmaps. We used this comprehensive list 
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of top experts and decision makers in each interview and asked the respondent whether they 
could introduce us to one of these experts or add a new name to this list. As the result, we 
interviewed some of the most influential players in the ecosystem to triangulate our findings 
from the ASML interviews. In total, we have conducted twenty semi-structured interviews with 
twelve senior people from major players in this industry at that period, such as ASML, Intel, 
AMD, IMS, IMEC, Zeiss, and SEMATECH. Respondents also shared useful documents with 
us, such as product roadmaps, technology papers to which they contributed, and SEMATECH 
documentation. Some of the respondents provided us also with the videos or transcriptions of 
interviews they had given in the past. All interviews were in-depth interviews of about 60 to 
120 minutes with specific sets of questions concerning the interviewee’s area of expertise and 
affiliation during our target period. We checked these findings with archival documents and 
conducted follow-up interviews in order to clarify additional questions raised after comparing 
participants’ answers. 
All the interviews were recorded, transcribed verbatim, and sent back to the respondent 
for confirmation. Then, we used ATLAS software to store and classify the data sources and to 
perform the code systematically.  
Analytical Method. Given the limited number of interviews, and the fact that these were 
specifically targeting the research questions, we decided that it was not necessary to employ a 
coding method (see Gläser & Laudel, 2013). Our analysis was focused on the stages in the 
process of technological change, forms of commitment to technological options, ASML’s 
decision processes, technology selection mechanisms at industry level, and timing of exercise 
or abandonment of technological options.                   
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Moreover, we built a comprehensive timeline of the major events and ASML’s actions 
during the era of ferment. Our analysis revealed three different stages in the development of 
the era of ferment. These three stages are represented in Figure 2.  
 FIGURE 2: Three stages in the era of ferment 
THE ERA OF FERMENT IN SEMICONDUCTOR LITHOGRAPHIC 
EQUIPMENT INDUSTRY 
The Fundamental Drivers of Continuous Advancement in Lithography 
Technology 
Lithography equipment is at the heart of the chip manufacturing process. In the long 
and complex process of chip production, imprinting the designed chip on silicon wafers via 
lithography equipment is the most challenging and expensive step. The most added value and 
competitive advantage lies at this stage; hence, investing in this step of the process is crucial. 
From the early stage of the semiconductor industry, two industry-wide accepted laws have 
navigated the technological advancement of lithography equipment: Moore’s law on the 
demand side and Rock’s law on the supply side. 
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Gordon Moore, the former CEO of Intel, proposed Moore’s law in 1965. He predicted 
that the number of transistors on a microchip should be roughly doubled every other year. Soon, 
this prediction became a roadmap for industry leaders in order to address the exploding demand 
of the market in information era and to keep their competitive advantage. In addition, this law 
has since 1975 been expanded to include the costs per element on a wafer, as production of 
smaller microchips comes with improvement of the throughput and reduction in cost of raw 
materials. To serve this demand, Lithography technology as a major bottleneck has been 
introducing to the market a new technology node – a complete set of working lithography tools 
and auxiliary components - roughly every 3 years from the ‘70’s to the mid-90. As a result, the 
industry not only successfully followed Moore’s law regarding the feature size of microchips, 
but also the total cost of production was reduced by 21% per year.  
However, this exponential growth comes at a price, as the R&D, the manufacturing, 
and the testing costs increase steadily with each new generation of technology. This underlying 
trend on to the supply side is called Rock’s law (Ross, 2003), which states that the capital cost 
of a semiconductor plant doubles every four years. Hence, the investments and risk of 
developing capital goods and manufacturing line equipment considerably increases as the 
technology progresses. 
While Moore’s law pushes the industry forward, Rock’s law constrains the choice of 
industry for new technologies, so the right choice of a new technological solution becomes 
increasingly difficult and crucial for the industry at each step forward. Industry experts mention 
that the main enemy of progress is the development cost of a new technological generation, so 
the extendibility of technology to insure a long-term profitability of incremental progress is 
more crucial than initial technical challenges of the technological progress. 
Fading of Existing Technology Dominance 
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 Since its early days in the 1960’s, the optical-lithography technological regime had 
dominated the Lithography industry. An optical-lithography machine is a delicate interplay 
between lens, energy source, mask, and resist technology. To stay aligned with Moore’s law, 
industry leaders were engaged in advancing technology in both evolutionary and revolutionary 
manners. As a result, five generations of optical-lithography technology had been introduced 
to the market by mid-90 (for an overview of technological generations in this industry, see 
Adner and Kapoor, 2016). Each generation came with architectural change, as well as a 
significant improvement of the energy source (Henderson & Clark, 1990). To give an 
impression, while the then dominant generation, the I-line 365 nm stepper, was running the 
market around mid-90s, the next generation, DUV-248 nm scanner, already entered into the 
market, and feasibility studies on the subsequent generations of DUV machine, the 193 nm 
ArF were in progress.  
However, while optical lithography was still very active and continuously advancing, 
there was a growing conviction among industry actors that optical-lithography technology was 
approaching its physical limit (Ito & Okazaki, 2000). Indeed, the industry was lagging behind 
Moore’s Law in the mid-1990s. Therefore, something significantly different from the current 
technological regime seemed necessary. By the mid-90s, some of the industry’s main actors 
had already invested in substitute technological regimes. In general, two alternative 
technological regimes had started their research phase since mid-80, namely X-ray and particle-
based technological regimes (Figure 3).  
The Emergence of Rival Technological Options 
X-ray technological regime, including hard and soft X-ray. X-ray is a form of high-
energy electromagnetic radiation, with a very short wavelength. X-ray technologies use x-
radiation to project the image through the mask to the wafer without using any lens in their 
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FIGURE 3: The situation of technology edge in industry compared to Moore’s law 
expectation. 
 
architecture. X-rays with higher energy level and shorter wavelengths are called hard X-ray, 
while those with lower energy level and longer wavelengths are called soft X-ray. However, as 
soft X-ray is also close to ultraviolet wavelengths, it is also called Extreme Ultraviolet (EUV).        
 IBM hugely invested in hard X-ray printers since the mid-70s. Japanese institutions 
and firms such as NTT, Nikon, and Hitachi studied and invested in soft X-ray (EUV) 
technology since the 80s.  
Particle based technological regime, including E-beam and Ion beam. Particle 
based- technologies use electron or ion beams to print directly a pre-programmed pattern 
without using any mask on the wafer.  
E-beam lithography is the practice of scanning a focused beam of electrons to draw 
custom shapes on a resist that covers the wafer. E-beam was seen as a very promising 
technology, but electron scattering and slow printing hurt both its resolution and throughput. 
The second option in particle-based regime is Ion-beam or IPL technology that uses ions to 
make projections on wafers. Ions cause less scattering issues compared to electrons in E-beam 
and light in optical lithography. In addition, ions are heavier than electrons, so it is easier to get 
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ions closer to each other than electrons to enable the required alignment for printing.  
IBM’s investment in E-beam writers started in 1980s, and ASML and Siemens started 
supporting a research project on particle-based Ion-beam printer technology in the mid-1990s. 
However, none of these had shown enough progress to be considered as the ultimate substitute 
technology by that time, so there was significant uncertainty about the most promising choice 
of replacement for optical-lithography technology. 
The choice of the new technological regime was very critical, because on one hand, the 
industry’s success in following Moore’s law depended on the choice of the right technological 
regime, while on the other hand, the industry could not afford to concurrently develop two 
technological trajectories, because of Rock’s law. Therefore, there was a collective conviction 
that there could be only one winning technology. Figure 4 shows our own qualitative 
interpretation of the different technological options in the era of ferment.  
FIGURE 4: Development of technological options for lithography 
 
INCUMBENT’S ENGAGEMENT IN THE ERA OF FERMENT 
By the mid-1990s, various economic downturns and continuous demand for 
technological progress had caused industry shakeouts, and two of the major lithography 
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suppliers had been able to keep a dominant market share. Nikon and Canon were market leaders 
with over 45% and 25% of market share, respectively, and ASML, a fast-growing spinout, had 
just joined the leaders with a market share of 25%. 
ASML: A Growing Incumbent Firm  
ASML, a spinout of Philips, had been struggling to survive in its first ten years (1984 -
1994). In addition to the natural challenges that a new venture has in its early life, the 
lithography technology ASML inherited, stepper optic-lithography technology, had already 
suffered a long and bumpy road in the NATLAB laboratories of Philips between the mid-’70’s 
and 1984 (Linden et al., 2000). As the CTO of ASML described the condition: “[Until then, it 
was] seeing the rear lights of the competition, and you try to be as fast as possible and stay out 
of trouble”.  
Nevertheless, ASML showed significant growth after introducing the I-line machine 
(PAS 2500) based on its own production architecture in 1992 and overcame the major industry 
downturn of the early 1990s. Following its fast growth pace, ASML steadily separated from its 
parent, Philips, which had been still in charge of R&D and intellectual property protection. 
ASML set up its own R&D and an in-house IP department, and went through IPO in 1995. 
ASML steadily increased its R&D investment in the subsequent years (from almost €57 million 
in 1996 to €144.5 million in 1998). ASML hired a new research manager to lead a team of 
scientific researchers to set up a fundamental research program to look beyond the horizon. 
The assigned scientific research team had a close interaction with the development division 
and system-engineering department, but also had the required freedom and authority to act 
autonomously without engaging in day-to-day development stress.  
“I think the question was so business critical that they (ASML) wanted to take full 
control themselves. Do not outsource this question. You can outsource the 
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activities, but not how do I address the question and how do I make, give an answer 
to the question. What will happen after optical lithography?” – Senior Vice 
President Research ASML 
By the mid-1990s, ASML found itself as an established incumbent with the required 
confidence and resources to choose and plan its future path. While ASML was still busy 
establishing its status among the market and technology leaders in the industry, the increasing 
difficulties and complexity in the progress of optical-lithography technology signaled the 
imminent end of the domination of the current technology. ASML started to consider the 
emerging technological options in order to remain the industry’s provider of leading 
technology solutions.  
Stage 0: Identification of Emerging Technologies as Real Options 
Application of Simple Scientific Rules in the Initial Assessment of Options  
Moore’s and Rock’s laws impose strict long-term expectations on the resolution and 
throughput of any technological option. ASML researchers were well aware of these 
fundamental laws. They relied on the basic science of physics and on economics to develop a 
set of simple rules to evaluate the prospect of technological option fitting these fundamental 
laws. These simple rules provided ASML with a clear theory about the success factors of each 
technology in its  technology search process, and prevented it from falling into the trap of trial 
and error in pushing the performance of each technological option (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000).   
The ASML research team relied on these simple rules in its exploration to identify the 
technological options in which the firm should invest. Two technological regimes, particle 
based, including E-beam and Ion-beam, and X-ray, including hard and soft X-ray, were 
considered to be the viable options to replace optic-lithography technology. At the first step, 
ASML was convinced that hard X-ray could not be a promising option to invest in. By the mid-
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1990’s, IBM had invested heavily in hard X-ray for many years, and some of the industry 
leaders expected hard X-ray to be the nearest option to market introduction when the search 
for NGL started; however, ASML abandoned this option in the first place. The rationale behind 
this decision was that the extendibility of X-ray technology was questionable. First, as the hard 
X-ray architecture is not equipped with a lens, the resolution of the machine remained a direct 
function of the wavelength of the energy source, a significant limitation that the industry 
already experienced in its very first generations of lithography technology. Second, one of the 
fundamental complementary elements of X-rays machine, the mask, had considerable 
technological issues that could limit the improvement of the energy source (i.e., reduction of 
wavelength to reduce the node of production). Therefore, ASML was convinced that the 
technology was ‘end-of-life’ even before it reached the market.  
Outside of the two challenging technological regimes in the era of ferment, imprint was 
another technological option that was considered later on, but it did not receive any real 
significant research dedication from ASML. Although imprint was mentioned in the 90s, it was 
not one of the initial NGL options and it became more in fashion in the early 2000s receiving 
extensive attention for over ten years. The basic idea behind imprint is to write a mask and to 
press it into the resist on the wafer. Although ASML engineers were challenging their 
technology leaders to consider this technology, it never became a serious consideration for the 
organization. The technology was reckoned too sensitive to defects, so it could not be a real 
option for mass production, and ASML was not interested in niche markets in which imprint 
technology might be suitable.  
Stage 1: Acquisition of Technological Options via Joint Ventures 
After dropping hard X-ray and Imprint as feasible options, ASML focused on the three 
remaining technological options. In terms of compatibility to the existing lens-based optical-
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lithography ecosystem, mirror based Soft X-ray, or EUV, was the closest technology. However, 
ASML still also became actively involved in research projects for E-beam and Ion-beam 
applications. They tried to keep an open mindset towards other solutions by investing in all 
options that might offer a solution to the challenge at hand. As the Senior Vice President of 
research at ASML recalls: 
“We tried to be not biased which is always difficult. Because EUV was the best fit 
to our existing partners (e.g., Carl Zeiss etc), but we told ourselves we should be 
objective in the choice”. 
By doing so, they aimed to overcome their own preference bias and to be open to other 
possibly viable options, because they could not afford to bet on the wrong option. In the 
following, we explain the rationale behind of ASML’s investment in each of these 
technological options.  
E-beam. In the Philips Natlab laboratories, there were two research groups, one for 
optic-based lithography, which was the stepper group that was finally spun-out to become the 
ASML venture. The other one was the E-beam group, which was believed to be the one with 
the most potential. In addition, ASML had already engaged in a research project on E-beam 
with a renowned research group at Delft University in the Netherlands. Therefore, 
technological knowledge about E-beam was more accessible to ASML than that for the other 
options.  
ASML made a visit to Bell Labs in the late 1990’s, and considered a collaboration with 
Applied Materials and Bell labs. In order to do so they started a joint venture named eLith. Bell 
Labs was to provide the scientific fundamentals and ASML and Applied Materials were on 
board for engineering and commercialization of the technology. The goal of eLith was to push 
the technology further in order to make a volume-production proof of concept and to test the 
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technology’s potential for commercialization. eLith not only was a good setting to appraise the 
E-beam technology’s potential, but also provided ASML with the chance to access the 
knowledge and capabilities of a top research institute such as Bell-labs and complementary 
resources of a microelectronic device producer in the US such as Applied Materials.   
Ion-beam. In the early 1990’s, DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) 
in the US showed interest in IPL (Ion Protection Lithography) technology. However, IMS, a 
Vienna-based startup, had the most advanced knowledge of this technology, and DARPA as a 
strategic US entity could not directly fund a non-USA effort. Therefore, they formed a joint 
venture (JV), called Advanced Lithography Group (AGL), which terminated in 1996 due to 
DARPA’s shift towards hard X-ray technology.  
Collaborative R&D efforts were continued in Europe, were ASML joined, together with 
TNO, a consortium of IMS and Siemens, and later on Infineon, as a client sponsor. This project 
was part of a 4-year research program starting in 1997 which was financially supported by the 
MEDEA grant program of the European Union. ASML became interested in this technology 
and since the research effort was supported with EU grants, there was a low entry barrier to 
enter into this option. In this consortium, ASML shared its technological knowledge on 
alignment systems that was its main competitive advantage. 
  Soft X-ray or EUV. EUV research efforts were organized in two main settings. On the 
one hand, there was a research initiative of ASML with its close European research partners: 
Philips, Zeiss, IMEC, Oxford Instruments and TNO. Between 1998 and 2000, ASML worked 
together primarily with Zeiss and Oxford Instruments in the EU-backed EUCLIDES grant 
program to find solutions for the main potential show-stoppers of EUV. After the EUCLIDES 
program finished the EU continued backing the development of EUV in its MEDEA+ program 
between 2001 and 2004, followed up by the More-Moore program after that. 
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On the other hand, an industry-wide research initiative, called EUV LLC, was founded 
in 1997. The goal of the EUV LLC was to overcome the most fundamental issues in the 
development of the first Proof of Concept (POC) of EUV machines. Intel initiated this research 
consortium, and Motorola and AMD joined it, and later on also IBM, Infineon, and Micron. 
ASML joined the EUV LLC consortium from the beginning to get access to the technological 
knowledge that they lacked in EUV at the time. However, in order to join EUV LLC, they first 
had to negotiate with a US governmental inter-agency committee, CFIUS12, to get permission. 
In the summer of 1999, ASML finally received the permission and joined the two other, US-
based, lithography equipment manufacturers in this consortium: USAL (a newly founded 
spinoff of Ultratech) and the Sillicon Valley Group (SVG) (which was finally acquired by 
ASML in 2000).  
Table 1 provides an overview of the different research settings in which ASML was 
engaged during the choice for the NGL. The level of ASML’s engagement in each 
technological option was a function of the perceived prospects, networking opportunities, and 
availability of funding for that option. In EUV technology, ASML engaged in research 
collaboration with its long-term partners as well as in a research consortium with industry 





CFIUS is a governmental inter-agency committee reviewing the implications of foreign investments on national 
security. Especially the influence of investments on crucial technology positions of the U.S. are being reviewed in this 
office. ASML was permitted access to the EUV LLC after reaching an agreement with the DoE (Department of Energy), in 
which was negotiated that ASML had to produce any EUV tools that it would sell to the U.S. in the U.S., in comparable 
production facilities that it had in the Netherlands. 
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TABLE 1: Different research settings of ASML 
Technologies in 
consideration 
EUV SCALPEL Ion-beam 
Industry 
champion 




research with close 
partners 








IMEC, Zeiss, ASML 
Intel, Motorola, AMD, 
IBM, Infineon, Micron, 







Engaging in the development of NGL options not only provided ASML with the 
required technological knowledge to become leading in the possible NGL in the future, it also 
improved its status and legitimacy as a technology leader in both the European and the US 
market. This privilege helped ASML to exercise its influence in the facilitation of the selection 
process and to establish itself as the market leader of the future.       
Stage 2: Managing the Development and the Eliminative Selection of Technology 
Options 
Industry Mechanisms to Navigate the Selection Process 
Pouring hundreds of million dollars into studying and developing various technological 
options just in the research phase, together with the collective consensus that the winner 
technology would take it all, justified a collective mechanism to facilitate and institutionalize 
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the choice of the NGL. SEMATECH 13 took on this critical role. SEMATECH held meetings 
annually between ‘97 and ‘03 involving around 100 expert participants from top industry 
actors, ranging from chipmakers to suppliers and renowned research institutes. Participants 
engaged in workshops led by front-runners of the different technologies. At the end of each 
meeting, all parties voted on the feasibility of each technology to be introduced to market within 
the next decade. These voting sessions were consultative, but were influential in the decision 
of clients and investors, so the results put a significant institutional pressure on the technology 
developers to either continue or abandon their technological options. Therefore, during these 
meetings, participants had a sense that they were involved in the ‘decision of the century’ that 
would set the course for the years ahead. 
Eliminative Process within ASML: Shakeout in the Technological Option 
Portfolio 
ASML had a clear preference for EUV when the experiments started. However, they 
were willing to be wrong and change their course of action when other technologies were more 
likely to suit the needs of the industry. Therefore, all experiments ran for at least two years 
before ASML made any decision. The setup of the different options was to strive to build a 
working demonstrator tool and to track its progress by progressive reduction of the list of 




 SEMATECH was a joint consortium formed by the USA government and major American IC manufacturers 
in mid 1980s. It originally supported new technologies and develop roadmaps for the future of semiconductor industry 




Between 1997 and 2000, it became clear that EUV was building momentum in the 
industry. It was making relatively more progress and was facing fewer fundamental issues than 
particle-based technologies. However, EUV was still facing massive practical and engineering 
challenges, and there was still not any proof of concept warranting the functionality of EUV. 
Therefore, it was hard to make a proactive choice for EUV technology, so ASML kept the 
options in the particle-based regime alive and let them run until it became clear that none of 
them would be able to meet the demands of the fundamental laws. According to the SVP of 
Research at ASML: “we delayed the decision as long as we could afford, to pull the plug (on 
the other technologies)”. 
E-beam. From the beginning of the E-beam project before and during the eLith joint 
venture, ASML was concerned about the progress of this particle-based technology; however, 
they needed more experiments to prove all their assumptions. As the work unfolded, both 
technological and collaborative issues slowed down the progress. On the technology side, the 
particle-based nature of technology came with fundamental challenges that restricted the 
throughput and productivity of the technology. Indeed, electrons repel each other so the 
extendibility of the technology by reducing the distance between electron beams, and 
improving the throughput by increasing beam current, comes with blurring problems. In 
addition, any metal objects in the operation plant also create blurring issues, due to the E-beam 
machine’s sensitive magnetic field. On the collaboration side, there were significant 
organizational and cultural challenges that made the collaboration between Bell Labs, a proud 
scientific institution, and Applied Materials and ASML, two practice-oriented companies, 
difficult.  
Therefore, the work progress fell behind very soon. ASML tried to push the technology 
harder and brought external experts to assess the potential and progress of the technology. 
Nevertheless, the issues of the technology were caused by the rules of fundamental physics, so 
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ASML was convinced that even if all daily technological and collaborative issues could be 
solved, E-beam technology would still not be going to be its long-term technological option of 
choice. Despite the fact that the other partners wanted to keep the JV alive and some IP issues 
that would have to be resolved, ASML finally withdrew and terminated the eLith JV early 
2001, only 14 months after its foundation. After the eLith termination, Bell Labs continued 
SCALPEL developments for two more years before all efforts stopped. 
Ion-beam. The IPL program was the only program to deliver a working prototype by 
2001. The imaging of the IPS tool, despite having its issues, was also a lot better than what was 
accomplished by the other technologies. However, when the 4-year IPL research program 
ended in 2001, most efforts in this technology as an NGL stopped soon, for both technological 
and institutional reasons. IPL technology suffered from the typical problem of particle-based 
technologies with respect to the image, the throughput capacity, and some architectural 
elements that limited its extendibility. In addition, the market was moving towards EUV, for 
technological reasons as well as the interest of heavyweight Intel. The organizational setup of 
the collaboration enabled ASML to withdraw easily from the program once its term was 
finished, and so they did as the IPL program finished. 
ASML’s Influence on the Selection Process 
The chip manufacturers were the champions of NGL development to keep up with 
Moore’s law, but lithography equipment suppliers were the ones that finally had to deliver the 
solution. ASML took advantage of its geopolitical situation and its networking to take a 
strategic position in this process. First, the US government did not accept non-US based 
suppliers to be part of the EUV LLC consortium, but US suppliers dramatically lost their 
market power in the early 1990s. ASML, as the only non-Japanese leading supplier of the 
industry, took advantage of this situation and successfully negotiated with the US government 
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to join EUV LLC. In addition, ASML later acquired US-based SVG Company to strengthen 
its growing ties with major American clients and establish its strategic status. Second, ASML 
was engaged in different technological options and became the natural choice for the 
development of proof of concepts for each option. Therefore, ASML’s decisions to keep or 
abandon a certain technology option were highly influential on the industry’s course of action.   
The level of ASML’s commitment to the different NGL options was already an important 
signal to the rest of the industry, but ASML’s decisions to abandon particle-base E-beam and 
IPL technologies had a decisive influence. Once ASML abandoned IPL, IMS was not able to 
compete alone to remain in the main market of lithography. Additionally, the SCALPEL 
technology was also not able to push to the market after ASML left. Both technologies had 
difficulties to find additional funding when ASML left and after a while were dropped from 
the industry’s roadmap, which was formulated based on industrial experts input and published 
by SEMATECH in 2003. 
Stage 3: Exercising the Option of Choice in the Twilight of the Era of Ferment 
After 2001, ASML exclusively focused on EUV development. Both initial consortia, 
EUV LLC and EUCLIDES, ran until 2003. The EUV LLC consortium had delivered a basic 
Proof of Concept (POC) machine, yet the timing of rolling out the EUV machine (or in other 
word, exercising this technological option) was crucial yet uncertain. At that time, the 
technology was still highly fragile, and although there were no fundamental barriers in theory 
threatening the progress of EUV, there were still massive practical challenges standing between 
the prototypes and a working production technology. Therefore, ASML decided to keep 
investing in EUV as a research program. Nevertheless, ASML also built two basic alpha 
prototypes and in 2006 shipped them to two global semiconductor-testing facilities, IMEC in 
Belgium and one facility in Albany (U.S.), to see how potential customers responded to the 
new technology, and to establish the status of EUV as the NGL within the industry. In the 
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meantime and as another reason for the postponement of the introduction of EUV, new 
technological solutions in optical-lithography pushed the bar higher for the entrance 
performance of EUV.   
The Hidden Options: Architectural Innovations in the Current Technological 
Regime 
At the beginning of the era of ferment, the industry actors believed that the NGL 
technology regime would directly dominate the market after the last generation of optical 
lithography (i.e., DUV 157). As described above, it became clear soon that this would not easily 
happen.  
Despite its engagement in multiple NGL technological option, ASML continued to 
heavily invest in the extension of existing optical technologies. ASML believed that it should 
be successful in their main business to be able to afford pushing their NGL venture. As the 
ASML CTO stated:  
“You have to make sure you don’t get lost in the future, because the future is not 
going to make you money, you have to focus on the short-term as well.” 
 As long as NGL technologies were not mature enough, the organization still had the 
obligation towards its customers to enable them to produce affordable chips in the current 
technological regime. 
The first step on this way was the introduction of the dual-stage TWINSCAN 
technology in 2000. The TWINSCAN was mainly a process optimization architecture that 
enabled optimal use of the optical system, the most expensive element of the machine, by using 
two wafer stages rather than one. ASML’s main competitors Nikon and Canon never 
introduced comparable systems to the market, and ASML became the market leader with 
TWINSCAN in 2004. 
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 The second boost for the extension of optical lithography was immersion technology, 
an unexpected finding that was introduced around 2004. The industry initially believed that 
157 nm would be the natural successor of the 193 nm in DUV family. However, the 
development of DUV157 faced significant issues with the mask and resist. In the meantime, 
the concept of immersion technology was being discussed actively by the industry around 
2001. The basic idea is that immersing the lens in liquid, instead of air, increases its resolution. 
In fact, this is a very well-known principle used in microscope technology for years and it had 
already been proposed for lithography applications in the late 1980s. However, it took the 
industry a while to realize that H2O would be the best liquid. After that surprisingly difficult 
stage, ASML took advantage of the compatibility of its architecture with this solution and 
introduced immersion machines in 2004. Indeed, it turned out that immersion was an enabling 
technology for at least a few generations of products in the optical-lithography regime, which 
also meant the end of the DUV157 program. 
However, ASML was initially not leading in the third and the last extension of optical-
based lithography: double patterning. Double patterning means that rather than projecting an 
image in one exposure on the wafer, multiple exposures are used to enable smaller pictures at 
higher resolutions. This solution was a breakthrough as it provides significantly smaller nodes 
with the same generation of machines. The first impression of ASML when double patterning 
technique as another extension to existing optical technological regime was introduced, was 
that this new technique would cost them their EUV business. As the CTO of ASML explains: 
“So we keep on innovating immersion ... but then the customers were running out 
of steam on immersion and their solution was double patterning…. When I first 
heard about it I was afraid because I thought this might cost us business. It took 
me a while and I still remember the CTO from Micron, and it must have been 
somewhere around 2005 he called me out of a meeting …, and he said I have to 
 
115 
tell you something and he showed me the double patterning process and said this 
might have an impact on you. And I was going out of his office and was saying s**, 
and I was thinking about it and I quickly came to the conclusion this will save us.” 
Indeed, the new extension offered additional time for the development of EUV, and 
surprisingly actually supported the business case of EUV, as follows. Double patterning 
technique comes with a cost. It imposes more lithography work on the same number of wafers, 
so as the design becomes more complex, the required number of exposures, and the demand 
for higher performance in overlay, the precision of the second round of printing, paradoxically 
increases. Therefore, projecting the image in one exposure with EUV is more efficient than to 
continue the complex process of adding layers in patterning techniques with DUV machines. 
Enduring all these years, ASML had continued to invest in EUV developments, and 
they finally shipped their first pre-production tool in 2011. The R&D investment in EUV had 
continuously increased, so in order to keep up the investments in 2012 ASML issued shares 
that allowed its largest customers, TSMC, Intel and Samsung to take a share in the company. 
Collectively, these customers invested billions of dollars to sustain the progress of the 
development. ASML shipped the first complete machine in 2013; and the first machine for 
volume production in 2017. In 2018, EUV has finally become mature enough to be sold as a 
feasible technology for volume production and has claimed its position as the de facto NGL.   
DISCUSSION 
In this study, we explored how ASML successfully navigated the challenging dynamics 
of an era of ferment during a major technological transition in lithography equipment industry. 
To be able to understand the rationale of ASML’s actions, we also got a deep peek at underlying 
socio-technological dynamics of natural selection processes in the era of ferment. In 
consequence, our findings not only shed light on the course of an incumbent’s actions in the 
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era of ferment for both theory and practice, but also offer a novel insight into the dynamics of 
this era. To this end, we separately discuss these findings in the light of the technology change 
literature and the real option perspective to decision making under uncertainty.  
From Onset to Twilight of the Era of Ferment: An Alternative Explanation  
Our detailed examination of socio-technological processes offers novel insight into the 
rise and dynamics of selection processes in the era of ferment. The discontinuous model of 
technological evolution perspective posits that an emerging superior technological regime 
discontinues the existing dominant one and commences a tough competition between the new 
and old technological regimes, as well as between the design alternatives within the new 
technological regimes (Anderson & Tushman, 1990). However, this model remains silent about 
how a new technology, which naturally evolves gradually, can suddenly emerge and out-
compete the prior technology. Levinthal (1998) argued that speciation, “the application of 
existing technology to a new domain of application”, addresses this dilemma (p. 217). 
Accordingly, technologies evolve gradually but can discontinue the prior technologies of other 
domains if they can meet their demand criteria (Adner, 2002; Levinthal, 1998). Our findings 
shed light on an alternative explanation. Sood and Tellis (2011) classified technology 
disruptions into upper attack and lower attack. Upper attack happens when the performance of 
new technology is higher than the existing one from the beginning, contrary to lower attack. 
Upper attack is mainly the case for high-tech industries such as semiconductor industry in 
which there is a continuous demand for high-end technology. Our study illustrates the 
dynamics of the era of ferment in the upper attack. In this case, the era of ferment starts when 
the expected long-term performance of emerging technologies within the same domain 
challenges the future of existing ones. A competition takes place between variations of old and 
new technological concepts and designs, and industry-wide social-technological mechanisms 
determine the winner. This explanation, aligned with continuous models of technological 
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change (Foster, 1986) and similar to Levinthal’s (1998) account, considers the gradual progress 
of technology, but offers new insight into underlying social-technological mechanisms in the 
era of ferment when an upper attack is raised within the domain.  
Our observations show that the selection mechanism in the era of ferment is 
‘eliminative’. That is, rather than the triumph of one technological option over the others in 
such a technological contest, alternative options are fading away one by one by losing the 
required support and legitimacy for further development from the experts and investors. EUV 
technology has never been chosen as the winner in NGL contest; indeed, the other technologies 
lost their chances by losing the institutional support of experts and the financial support of 
industry champions. For example, the CEO of IMS, the leading company in Ion-Beam 
technology, stated: 
“So, the industry came to the conclusion that it doesn’t make sense to continue 
[with Ion-Beam technology as,] this will lead us to excellent research, but it would 
not lead us to production. And so… finally you have to come to the production 
environment.” 
 The selection process in the era of ferment looks like the inductive elimination 
procedure in natural science in which alternative hypotheses are eliminated one by one after 
each experiment (Norton, 1995). Here, the scientific-based, but socially constructed 
hypothetical evaluations of experts regarding the prospects of each technology have been tested 
over time in an eliminative process. This observation is also in line with the evolutionary theory 
in which the survival of the fittest implies the extinction of failures.  
On another note, our findings also provide insights into the dynamics of technological 
change. Consistent with Adner and Kapoor (2016), we show how technological changes can 
take a long time if the existing technology continues to extend, and complementary elements 
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in the technology ecosystem limit the progress of the new technology. Interestingly, the 
functionality of technology in this transition can change over the course of this process. EUV 
was supposed to take over the optical-lithography by offering smaller nodes, i.e., as a product 
innovation; however, EUV entered into the market as a process innovation as it offered the 
same nodes, but with a reduction of production cost in semiconductor manufacturing as well 
as a promising extendibility capacity.  
Incumbent Actions in the Era of Ferment: A Real Option Perspective  
As the most important contribution of this study, our findings highlight the success 
factors of incumbent firms in decision making under uncertainty. First, we found a convincing 
match between the stages of the era of ferment and the life cycle of real option, that helped us 
to investigate the rationale of ASML’s action in more detailed. As it is illustrated in Figures 1 
and 2, era of ferment starts with the emergence of new technologies that challenge the 
continuity of existing technology dominance. Given the fact that technologies grow gradually, 
a successful course of incumbent actions starts even before this stage, when incumbents 
actively search for the identification of emerging technological options that may threaten the 
existing technology in future, as well as of hidden opportunities for the extension of existing 
technology to outcompete the emerging technologies or postpone their triumph. The next stage 
is marked with the raise of decisive competitions over performance and compatibility with the 
supporting ecosystem between emerging and existing technologies. The next dominant 
technology is the one that survives the eliminative selection procedure of this crucial stage. In 
this stage, successful incumbents properly manage their technological options in term of 
preservation of selected technology and abandonment of eliminative ones. However, what may 
make the decisive difference between successful incumbents and others in the management of 
this process is timing. As the Senior Vice President research of ASML stated: 
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"But you like to have of course the head start. And that’s your way, because in this 
industry timing is everything if you are two years earlier than your competition, 
you have a very big advantage. Now that’s the price to gain.”  
Our case study showed while some of technology leaders had made considerable 
commitments in the development of emerging technologies earlier than ASML in the first 
stage, they lost their edge in the second stage because they were not able to make a timely 
decision to abandon their failing option due to their prior commitments. For example, IBM had 
hugely invested in hard X-ray and E-beam technologies, but they continued with their 
investments even when the industry actors convinced that these technologies are not viable 
options. Therefore, timely creation or acquisition of technological options during the first two 
stages has a significant influence on the success of an incumbent in the next stages. Likewise, 
if ASML would have invested in each of its technological options earlier or later, their benefits 
from these options could have been dramatically different. There is a sweet spot in the timing 
of the acquisition and exercise of options. ASML’s investment in each option was not too early, 
so they did not bear heavy research investment, but it also was not too late to let the competitors 
replace them. On the technological side, while the late investment in the technological options 
may prevent incumbents catching up the steep rate of technology development and competition 
in the second stage, the early investment in the first stage also may make an unnecessary 
escalation of commitment that prevent incumbent making timely decisions in the second stage. 
Finally, this turbulent period ends with the domination of the winner technology. The timely 
abandonment of eliminated technologies and making a commitment to exercise the selected 
technology in this stage can complete the successful course of action during this period. While 
Nikon had invested in the development of EUV technology early on, they did not keep their 
commitment to this expensive and ambitious technology, possibly due to the existence of other 
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options in their diversified business portfolio. Twenty years later- now- Nikon lost the majority 
of its market share to ASML, thanks to EUV technology. 
Our findings also highlight the importance of simple rules in making complex decisions 
under uncertainty in all these stages (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011). ASML relied on basic 
science and the two industry laws, Moore’s and Rock’s, and developed simple rules that 
governed its decision-making over complex technologies under uncertainty. ASML applied 
these simple rules in the examination of the hypothetical ultimate frontiers of each technology 
with respect to the resolution and the throughput. For instance, ASML convinced to drop the 
most advanced technology at that time, hard X-ray, as they did not see enough room for the 
extendibility of this technology. In hindsight, industry experts believe that if one of the EUV’s 
rival technologies had been selected, that technology could not have been extended enough to 
replace the continuously progressing optical lithography. One implication for the valuation of 
technological options in the era of ferment is that incumbents should consider the fundamental 
scientific attributes of technology to assess their long-term feasibility and extendibility, rather 
than their current performance. 
In addition, our findings offer novel insight into the boundary conditions of the real 
option perspective regarding the type of uncertainty in real option portfolios (Adner & 
Levinthal, 2004). Received research proposes that exogenous uncertainty is out of firm’s 
control and justifies a passive form of learning in which decision makers can wait to receive 
more information without the need to take a costly action (Chi et al., 2019, p. 541; Kulatilaka, 
1995). Therefore, a deferral option allows the decision makers to obtain new information 
without taking any specific actions that entail investments in time, effort, or money (Chi et al., 
2019). However, endogenous uncertainty can be resolved by the firm’s action over time and 
justifies an active form of learning, because the degree of uncertainty is a function of firm’s 
action to obtain more information (Chi et al., 2019; Cuypers & Martin, 2010). Therefore, a 
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sequencing option allows the decision makers to participate in active learning with a minimum 
required investment (Chi et al., 2019; Kogut, 1991) that to some extent violates the boundary 
condition of real option perspective (Adner & Levinthal, 2004). In sum, the level and type of 
uncertainty are crucial factors that determine the value of different types of real options. With 
this respect, we can elaborate on our observations regarding ASML’s decisions and actions 
toward technological options at both individual and portfolio levels. At the technology level, 
as the required resources for the viable options were not interchangeable, ASML evaluated the 
level of their uncertainties independently to set the level of its engagement in each technology. 
When the prospect of all technologies seemed relatively uncertain to ASML at the onset of the 
era of ferment, ASML engaged in all viable technological options. Later, when the promise of 
EUV increased, ASML increased its commitment toward EUV technology and entered into a 
new partnership with their long-term partners such as Zeiss, IMEC, and Philips, in addition to 
their membership in the EUV LLC consortium (Table 1). Moreover, they started considering 
the exit option in their agreements for less prospective particle-based options, E-beam and Ion-
beam technologies. This observation is aligned with a real option perspective and its 
applications in strategic management. Under exogenous uncertainty, ASML made the 
minimum possible commitment to all visible options; however, when more information 
revealed from the industry, they sequentially increased their investment in the most promising 
option to collect more information and establish their position; in addition, they considered 
abandoning the other options.   
While these technological options are individually independent, they are competing at 
the portfolio level. Received research suggests that when a firm forms a portfolio of competing 
options, the portfolio is sub-additive, as option investments overlap with one another (Vassolo 
et al., 2004). However, our findings suggest that the type of uncertainty and sub- or super-
additivity of a portfolio can be a function of relative size of portfolio to all available options. 
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First, while uncertainty about each individual option in the era of ferment can be considered 
exogenous, engaging in other options provides firm with timely information about the other 
competing options and reduces the uncertainty of the whole portfolio. Therefore, when the total 
number of options is limited, having multiple options, regardless to their competitiveness, 
might be super-additive, as it reduces the risk of improper actions and increases the total value 
of the portfolio. However, when the total number of options increases the cost of accessing to 
timely information outweighs its benefits, meeting the strict boundary condition of real option 
perspective regarding exogeneity of uncertainty. In other words, the sub-additivity or super-
additivity of a real option portfolio can be a function of the relative size of the portfolio with 
respect to the size of all the existing options. For example, ASML’s bet on E-beam technology 
was under exogenous uncertainty, as nobody could predict the next generation of technology 
on that time and as the ASML’s investment could neither reduce this uncertainty nor increase 
the success chance of particle-based technologies. However, ASML’s investment in the other 
viable options, such as EUV and Ion-beam, provided ASML with timely information about 
almost all technological options and turned exogenous uncertainty to endogenous one at least 
to a certain level.    
Moreover, when the portfolio size with respect to all options increases, the firm might 
be able to influence the overall uncertainty of its option portfolio. Hence, although it seems 
that competing option subsidizes the marginal value of each other at option level, the total value 
of an option portfolio might disproportionately increase. For example, ASML’s engagement in 
particle-based technologies not only initially helped ASML to hedge the risk of making the 
wrong technological choice, but also helped it to preempt other competitors to make use of 
these technological options and challenge ASML. In addition, being engaged in several options 
boost the ASML’s status as a technology leader in the industry and provided them with the 
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legitimacy that they needed to have a say in the selection process and to receive enough support 
in the development of the technology of choice. 
CONCLUSION 
This study shows how incumbent firms can prepare themselves to be actively engaged 
in the era of ferment and facilitate the domination of a new technology. Being prepared 
increases their chance to make the right decision at the right time, and ultimately maintain 
dominance in both the existing and the future technological regime. Choosing different R&D 
approaches with different levels of commitment for different technologies offers enough 
flexibility for incumbents to hedge decisions and minimize risks. Finally, the ASML story 
shows that deploying resources to focus on both existing and upcoming technologies can help 
maintain and even strengthen an incumbent’s position in the old technology, while 
simultaneously developing the new technological regime.  
ASML was not the only dominant Lithography OEM company in the industry, nor was 
it the only one active in multiple options and alliances. Both Canon and Nikon were investing 
in different alternative technological options, Canon was involved in X-ray, imprint and EUV, 
while Nikon invested heavily in both Prevail (a SCALPEL-like technology) and EUV. Indeed, 
there were several large Japanese consortia solely focus on the development of EUV 
technology and complementary infrastructure and capabilities around 2003. However, in the 
end, neither of these companies continued to invest in the long, expensive, and strenuous path 
that was needed to make EUV a reality. Now in 2020, EUV is finally getting a foothold in the 
market. VLSI, a prominent consultancy firm in the semiconductor industry, in October 2018 
called EUV a “30-year overnight success story”. It was a long and bumpy road taking much 
more effort, time, and investments than anybody could have anticipated, but it left ASML in 
the unique position of being the only player in the market that can provide clients with the 





R&D alliance is a multifaceted phenomenon, in which various socio-technological 
mechanisms operate in the interaction of partner firms. This dissertation is composed of three 
studies to shed light on different dimensions of firms’ resources and performance in different 
forms of R&D collaborations. The findings of this dissertation have theoretical and practical 
implications with respect to the boundaries of R&D alliances. The findings of the first study 
suggest that dyadic R&D alliances are the proper vehicles to learn from the different problem-
solving attitudes or cognitive map of alliance partners rather than acquiring their knowledge in 
new domains. The findings of the second study demonstrate that the performance consequences 
of diversity at alliance and firm levels are not necessarily aligned in multi-partner alliances, so 
some partners can benefit more than others, even when the alliance partnership on the whole 
is deemed unsuccessful. Finally, the findings of the last study shed light on the legitimacy 
acquisition and timing privilege to navigate the dynamics of technology change as the critical 
dimensions of alliance performance. These three studies tie together to the extent that they 
clarify the complex dynamics that exist between individual firms and their alliance partners in 
order to realize individual and joint value. In general, this dissertation contributes to the 
strategy and technology management literature by elucidating the less-explored dimensions of 
the firm’s resources and performance in R&D collaborations. In the following, I summarize 
the main findings of each individual study in this dissertation.     
The second chapter - Cognitive distance dimensions and inter-firm learning: 
Knowledge domain and knowledge architecture distance- revisits the central argument of 
interorganizational (IOR) literature for inter-firm learning mechanisms in R&D alliances. This 
study, in contradictory to extant research findings, shows that firms mainly learn from new 
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combinations of already known knowledge domains, rather than knowledge in new domains. 
This study offers a deep insight into the inter-firm learning mechanisms in R&D alliances and 
underlines the boundary of R&D alliances with respect to knowledge transfer and inter-firm 
learning. The reconceptualization of cognitive distance based on two distinct dimensions, 
knowledge domain and knowledge architecture, extends this concept. This extended and 
theoretically rich concept can cover all the different proposed concepts to address the difference 
between firm’s knowledge, such as knowledge overlap (Mowery et al., 1996), knowledge 
distance (Gilsing et al., 2008), and knowledge diversity (Sampson, 2007) under one umbrella.  
The third chapter - Multi-partner R&D alliance diversity and innovation performance: 
The dilemma of value creation and value appropriation - studies the innovative consequences 
of three dimensions of R&D consortia diversity with respect to the locus of resources: within-
firm, between-firm, and across the global network. Findings show that diversity within each of 
these dimensions in multilateral entities such as a multi-partner R&D alliance has an inverted 
U-shape relation with the total created value, but that resource-rich firms capture most of this 
value.  
This study advances alliance research by shedding light on the complexity of 
multipartner collaboration as well as the disparity between value creation and appropriation. 
This study contributes to the longstanding stream of strategy research on the performance 
consequence of diversification strategy (Rumelt, 1982; Montgomery, 1985; Markides & 
Williamson, 1996; Jiang et al., 2010; Richter et al., 2017; Ahuja & Novelli, 2017). In the 
context of multi-partner alliances, as collective and voluntary organizational associations, the 
diversification is a consequence of the initial decision of firms at the time of alliance formation, 
as well as the decision of firms to stay, leave, and invite or accept the new partners during the 
alliance. The findings show that diversity in different types of resources leads to distinct rent 
variation at both MPA and firm levels. My findings also contribute to the understanding of 
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value creation and appropriation mechanisms of MPAs by taking into account the underlying 
mechanisms of both the value creation at MPA level and the value appropriation at the firm 
level in the same study. On one hand, the value creation is a function of firms’ contributed 
resources to MPA as well as the dynamics of cooperation and coordination of firms in their 
mutual effort (Gulati et al., 2012; Gulati, 1998). On the other hand,  the value appropriation 
depends to the value of a firm’s contribution, the relevancy of its resources, its status and 
power, and its brokerage position (Adegbesan & Higgins, 2011; Dyer et al., 2008; Lavie, 2006; 
Lavie et al., 2007). These findings show the divergence of these two mechanisms at MPA and 
firm levels in such a way that value creation in MPAs alongside with diversification in each 
dimension is not compatible with the value appropriation in partner firms. In simple words, 
what is beneficial for alliance is not necessarily beneficial for all partner firms.       
On another note, my empirical approach in the identification of the technological scope 
of alliances in both studies is novel. I analyzed the technical content of each alliance agreement 
and took that part of a firm’s knowledge into account that has fallen in the knowledge category 
of alliance technological scope. This approach minimizes the noise of attributing knowledge 
domains to the alliances that have never been used or created in alliances, particularly in large 
companies that have a very wide knowledge breadth and use different knowledge sourcing 
instrument (Sampson, 2007). This approach can be widely applied to research on firms’ 
activities within specific technological scope, particularly if it is incorporated with machine 
learning techniques to improve its accuracy and replicability.  
The fourth chapter -Incumbent success in the era of ferment: Navigation of 
intergenerational transition of lithography technology within ASML- addresses how incumbent 
firms can leverage R&D collaborations to influence the process of technological change. This 
study shows how incumbent firms can actively engage in and facilitate the process of 
technology transition, in a way to maintain their dominance in both the existing and the future 
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technology. The findings show that timely commitment and abandonment in different 
technological options via R&D collaborations enable incumbents to not only manage the 
underlying uncertainty of decision making in this transition, but also navigate this process.  
My findings offer significant insight into the dynamics of the era of ferment and the 
course of an incumbent’s action in this era. My detailed examination of the technological 
selection process in the era of ferment uncovers its underlying socio-technological mechanisms 
and contributes to the evolutionary perspective on technological change (Dosi, 1982; Dosi & 
Nelson, 2013). My observations show that the selection mechanism is ‘eliminative’. That is, 
rather than the triumph of one technological option over the others in such a technological 
contest, alternative options are fading away one by one by losing the required support and 
legitimacy for further development from the experts and investors. This observation is also in 
line with the evolutionary theory in which the survival of the fittest implies the extinction of 
failures.  
My findings also contribute to real-option theory. I matched the life cycle of real options 
with the stages of the era of ferment to investigate the rationale of a successful incumbent’s 
action at each stage, a rare opportunity to elaborate on the real option reasoning in such detail. 
My observation on the application of simple rules in the lack of reliable valuation signal to get 
through the whole lifecycle of real options is informative. My findings also offer an insight 
into the underlying dynamics of real option portfolio management. Received research suggests 
that when a firm forms a portfolio of competing options, the portfolio is sub-additive, as option 
investments overlap with one another (Vassolo et al., 2004). This study shows that when the 
total number of options is limited, having competitive options might be super-additive, as it 
significantly reduces the risk and increases the total value of the portfolio. In other words, the 
sub-additivity or super-additivity of a real option portfolio can be a function of the relative size 
of portfolio with respect to the size of all the existing options. When the portfolio size in 
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comparison to all possible options increases, the firm might be able to influence the total risk 
of its option portfolio. Hence, although it seems that at the option level competing option 
subsidizes the marginal value of each other, the total value of portfolio options might 
unproportionally increase. These findings have direct implication in alliance portfolio 
literature. 
Finally, the timing of acquisition or investment in technological options is very crucial 
in the management of real option portfolios in the era of ferment. There is a sweet spot in the 
timing of the acquisition and exercise of options. Investments in each option should not be too 
early, to impose not heavy research investment, but it should not also be too late to let the 
competitors take the option and leverage it to challenge the other options. In addition, the 
timing of abandonment give the chance to influence the social side of technology selection 
process, when the industry actors perceive it as a strong signal to accelerate the elimination 
procedure. This is a good example that shows how the abandonment of an option, or 
termination of an alliance, can increase the total value of a portfolio of options, or alliances.  
LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Naturally, this research has several limitations. In the first two studies, chapter 2 and 3, 
I used archival data and employed quantitative analysis. In the third study, chapter 4, I studied 
a single case and ran a qualitative analysis. First, the alliances examined in the first two studies 
are those pertaining to R&D alliances, and although my argumentation is general and can apply 
to all types of alliances, there is a cautious in the generalizability of these findings to the other 
types of alliances (e.g., marketing, manufacturing, and supply chain). Second, I used patents to 
develop my main measures; however, the accuracy of patents to represent firm’s knowledge 
and inter-firm learning is questionable (Roach & Cohen, 2013). Finally, the fourth chapter is a 
single case study in a specific context of lithography technology in late 90’s. In this context, 
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there was a general belief that industry should collectively find a solution for the next 
generation of technology. This condition may not hold in technology transition in more 
fragmented industries, so generalization of findings should be considered with caution. These 
findings would need to be replicated to examine the boundary of transitions that allows the 
successful proactive engagement of incumbent firms.  
Future research may extend these studies in both theoretical and empirical aspects. 
From the theoretical point of view, I distinguished between two inter-firm learning 
opportunities in the second chapter. This approach invites future research to revisit knowledge 
sourcing strategies of firms. This study suggests that R&D alliances mainly provide 
opportunities to learn knowledge architecture rather than knowledge domain. Future studies 
may examine the other forms of knowledge sourcing such as M&A with this respect: which 
knowledge sourcing mode provides which learning opportunity.  
With respect to the third chapter, further studies are needed to understand better the 
complexity of configuration and dynamics of value creation and appropriation in MPAs. MPAs 
appear in different forms and I only focus on one form (i.e., R&D collaboration) in this 
research. Investigating the configuration and dynamics of the other forms of MPAs may 
improve the general understanding about this phenomenon. Future research might also take 
into account the other types of performance to improve the theoretical and empirical 
understanding of dynamic of value creation and appropriation in MPA. This research addresses 
the performance of MPAs in a specific context with elaboration on the alliance scope. 
However, it is necessary to develop a systematic examination of alliance performance measures 
at the alliance level, rather than at the common focal firm level. Finally, my approach to 
systematically examine the diversity in the context of multi-partner alliances can apply to other 
relevant phenomena such as alliance portfolios and corporate firms.  
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The fourth chapter calls for further research on the proactive actions of incumbent firms 
in the era of ferment. While the current research has extensively studied the success and failure 
of incumbent firms to adopt new technology, the underlying mechanisms and conditions of 
proactive actions of incumbent firms are relatively under explored. In addition, my contribution 
to real option perspective suggest that we need more empirical analysis to examine the 
boundary conditions of sub- vs super- additivity of real option portfolios as well as the 
boundaries between endogeneity and exogeneity in real options. These questions are directly 
applicable to the context of alliance portfolio studies.    
The goal of this dissertation was to provide insight into the multidimensionality of 
resources and the underlying socio-technological mechanisms of R&D collaborations. 
Answering the underlying research questions leads to novel insights and contributions to the 
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